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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to explore three key determinants of crime in the Becker-Ehrlich 
model: labour market conditions, the criminal justice system and family 
background. We firstly apply dynamic panel data analysis to test the effect of the 
labour market conditions and criminal justice system on crime for the UK and US. 
We test the effect of deterrence and unemployment on burglary, thefl and robbery. 
We adopt the methods used by Reilly and Witt (1996) and replicate them on new 
data for England and Wales. We improve on the previous analyses by introducing 
dynamics and estimating the model in the GMM framework. The results reveal that 
higher clear-up rate predicts lower levels of burglary, theft and robbery. Past crime 
rates positively predict current crime rates and unemployment rate effects are 
positive and significant in the system GMM specification. The second empirical 
chapter tests the impact of the labour market opportunities of those most likely to 
commit crime (unskilled males) on area arrest rates in the US utilising the GMM 
estimation. We have put together crime data from the Uniform Crime Reports and 
data on the labour market conditions from the Current Population Survey from 
1964 to 2008. We find a positive and significant relationship between unemployment 
and property crime arrest rates. However, for weekly earnings, the only clear and 
significant effect is on the burglary arrest rates. In the third empirical chapter we set 
up a logistic model to test for the association of parents’ criminal background with 
children’s contact with the police. We use self-reported data from the Offending 
Crime and Justice Survey (2003-2006). We find that children whose 
parents/guardians have committed at least one crime have a 2.5 times higher odds 
of committing an offence than children o f non-criminal parents. The effect o f a 
custodial sentence of the parents increases the odds of the children offending by 3.5 
times.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Background and Aims
The economics of crime offers insight into the effect of incentives on 
criminal behaviour, the interaction of decisions in a market setting and the use of a 
cost-beneflt framework to assess alternative strategies to reduce crime. According 
to the economic theory of crime proposed by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) 
criminal behaviour is the outcome of a rational calculation by individuals who 
maximize their expected utility and react to incentives. This thesis will study three 
key influences on this calculation: the criminal justice system, economic conditions 
and family background.
This is an important area of research for several reasons; first, as concerns 
grow over the current economic situation and the associated public spending cuts, 
policy makers are faced with the question of the correlation between increased 
crime and hardship in the economy. Does economic instability and the associated 
burden, such as unemployment, reduced wages, and reduced social services lead to 
a general increase in criminal activity? There is recent evidence that property crime 
has started to increase during the recession in the UK after decreasing for eight 
consecutive years. According to Home Office (2009), police recorded crime figures 
showed a rise of four per cent in both domestic burglaries and other burglaries in 
October to December 2008 compared with the same quarter in 2007.
The association between economic hard-times and crimë^îs particularly 
strong among young people. Youth unemployment stands at more than 20% 
(Guardian, 2012) and there is increasing concern about the number of young people 
who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs). Government figures 
show that 20% of men and 8% of women who had been NEET between the ages of 
16 and 18 became involved in crime between the ages of 17 and 30 - three times 
the rate among all young people (BBC Report,2005).
Secondly, and related to this, UK austerity measures to combat government 
debt include a commitment to cut police budgets by 20% by 2012 (BBC News, 
2012); the impact will this have on the level, and cost of crime depends on the 
deterrence effect of police activity on crime; which is estimated here.
Thirdly, this is a vital area of research because of the large direct and 
indirect costs of crime. In England and Wales the estimated total cost of crime 
topped £59 billion in 1999 to 6.5% of GDP (Brand and Price 2000) compared to 
$1102 billion in the US for the same year (11.9% of the GDP) (Anderson and 
Mercouillier 1999). Policies that can be proved to prevent crime can therefore 
generate substantial economic benefits by reducing the costs to victims, the 
community and the criminal justice system\
Finally, crime is an area of extreme behaviour that puts economic analysis 
to a rigorous test. As crime is inherently risky, attitudes towards risk are critical in 
the decision to participate in criminal behaviour.
* According to the US Department of Justice (2008) more than 23 million criminal offenses were 
committed in 2007, resulting is $15 billion in economic losses to victims and $179 billion to 
government expenditure on police protection, judicial and legal activities and corrections.
The high cost of crime means that Governments are eager to find efficient 
approaches to crime reduction; and the cost-benefit approach outlined in economic 
research has sought to uncover the most effective ways of doing this. In this thesis 
we cover three important aspects that economists have found to be important; 
deterrence, economic conditions and family background. The role of deterrence is 
obvious: in weighing up the costs and benefits of legal v illegal activity individuals 
take into account the likelihood of being caught and the punishment suffered. 
Similarly the economic conditions affect this calculation, as the rate of 
unemployment affects the probability of accessing legal income and the prevailing 
wage rate indicates the benefit from doing so. Another body of work [Farrington et 
al. (1998), Farrington et al. (2001), Butterfield (2002), Duncan et al. (2005), 
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2007), Van de Rakt et al. (2009)] proposes that an 
individual's environment influences his propensity for crime, perhaps by 
influencing his preferences, and focuses its attention on the role of the family 
(education, parental supervision, monitoring and family attachment) in explaining 
criminal preferences.
Recent empirical approaches have their roots in the classical criminology of 
the 18* century and the utilitarian social philosophy of Beccaria (1763), author of 
On Crimes and Punishments, and Bentham (1791), inventor of the Panopticon^, 
and other classical school philosophers^.
 ^ The Panopticon is a type of institutional building designed by English philosopher and social 
theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century. The concept of the design is to allow a 
watchman to observe (-opticon) all (pan-) inmates of an institution without them being able to tell 
whether or not they are being watched.
 ^ Classical school philosophers argued that: (1) People have free will to choose how to act. (2) 
Deterrence is based upon the notion of the human being as a 'hedonist' who seeks pleasure and
Fleisher’s (1963) work was of the earliest contributions to the economics of 
crime literature. However, a key turning point was Becker’s (1968) seminal work 
on crime and punishment. Becker’s work focused on the use of optimal sanctions 
to deter crime. Ehrlich (1972, 1973) contributed to the literature by modelling the 
supply of offences and its linkage to the law enforcement system. Since then many 
scholars have sought to investigate these relationships empirically. The advances in 
the empirical analysis and the availability of quality data helped this research to 
move away from focusing on the determinants of crime at the national-level 
towards using micro data and exogenous variation in the factors of interest to 
confidently uncover causal links.
The early aggregate models looking at the relationship between crime,
deterrence and unemployment have been criticised because of identification
problems but were nonetheless influential. An example is the work by Ehrlich
(1975) on the deterrence effect of capital punishment which was adopted and added
to the proceedings of the Supreme Court in the 1970s. The 1980s witnessed an
improvement in data quality enabling Wolpin (1980) and Craig and Heikkila
(1989) to use panel data to test the economic model of crime but ignored the
consequences of unobserved heterogeneity. Other studies from the same time
period used individual-level data based on samples of prison releases. Witte (1980)
finds evidence of the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system, but little
evidence of labour market effects, while Grogger (1991) finds evidence of both.
avoids pain, and a 'rational calculator' weighing up the costs and benefits o f the consequences of 
each action. Thus, it ignores the possibility of irrationality and unconscious drives as motivational 
factors. (3) Punishment (of sufficient severity) can deter people from crime, as the costs (penalties) 
outweigh benefits, and that severity o f punishment should be proportionate to the crime. (4) The 
more swift and certain the punishment, the more effective it is in deterring criminal behaviour.
In the 1990s research and data quality further improved and studies like 
Levitt (1997) attempted to solve the endogeneity of the deterrence (police numbers 
increasing in response to more crime) using the election cycles as a source of 
exogenous variation and found a strong negative impaet of police on crime. 
Moreover, Kessler and Levitt (1999) tried to differentiate between deterrence and 
incapacitation. They doeumented both a deterrent and an incapaeitation effect on 
crime based on sentenee enhancements. More recently researehers have expanded 
on Levitt’s instrumental variables approach and utilized a variety of hovel 
instruments to consider a broad number of factors linked to c r ime .One  example is 
the study by Draea et al. (2011) of the impact of police on erime. They look at 
crime before and after the London 2005 terror attacks. They implement an
 ^ Education and Crime: Jacob and Lefgren (2003), Lochner and Moretti (2004), Machin et al. 
(2010) identify a causal effect o f education on participation in criminal activity and state that 
improving education can reduce crime.
Alcohol use and Crime: Biderman et al. (2009) use a difference-in-differences design to estimate 
the causal impact of the adoption of dry laws in the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) on 
violent behaviour. Their main finding is that dry laws cause a 10% reduction in homicides. They 
find similar impacts on physical violence and deaths by car accidents. Carpenter and Dobkin (2010) 
test the effect o f four main types of alcohol regulations on crime: price/tax restrictions, age-based 
availability restrictions, spatial availability restrictions, and temporal availability restrictions. They 
conclude that there is strong evidence that tax- and age-based restrictions on alcohol availability 
reduce crime.
Immigration and Crime: Bell et al. (2010) consider possible crime effects from two large waves o f  
immigration recently occurred in the UK. They show that the first wave led to a small rise in 
property crime, whilst the second wave had no such impact. There was no observable effect on 
violent crime for either of the waves. Nor were immigrant arrest rates different to natives.
Abortion and Crime: Donohue and Levitt (2001) test the effect of the legalisation of abortion on 
crime in the US. They identify it to be the major contributor to the decrease in US crime rates in the 
90s. Kahane et al. (2008) test this hypothesis using panel data on recorded crime from 1983 to 2001 
for England and Wales. They replicate the negative association between abortion rates and reported 
crime that Donohue and Levitt found for the US. However, when they allow for the potential 
endogeneity of effective abortion rates with respect to crime, they find no clear connection between 
the two.
instrumental variable approach and identify a negative causal impact of police 
presence on crime.
Informed by the discussion above, this thesis uses economic concepts and 
econometric techniques applied to quality data to better understand the 
determinants of crime. We aim to answer the research questions listed in Table 1.1. 
These questions will be answered in the three empirical chapters and collectively 
discussed in the concluding section of the thesis.
Table 1.1
_______  Research Questions ______________________
Q .l W hat effect do labour market conditions have on crime?
Q.l.a What is the effect of the level of male unemployment on crime?
Q  ^ y What is the effect of wages and unemployment rate o f non-college
 educated males on arrest rates?______ ___________________
Q.2 Does the criminal justice system help in deterring crime? - "
How effective are certainty and severity o f punishment in reducing 
crime?Q.2.a
_ _ , Which dimension of the threat of punishment has a greater deterrent 
 effect, likelihood or severity?____________________________________
Q.3 Does family background help explain the propensity to engage in criminal activities?
Q 2 a children with offending parents more likely offend compared to
‘ children with non-offending parents?
_ g y How much more likely are children to offend if their parents have been
 sent to prison compared to children with non-offending parents?_______
1.2 Thesis Structure
This thesis aims to assess the effect of labour market conditions, deterrence 
measures and family background on crime. It proceeds by reviewing the literature 
in chapter 2 with the review broken into two key parts. The first part will cover the 
derivation o f the economic model of crime and decision making on the individual 
and aggregate levels. The second part of the review will discuss the empirical work
which has reviewed the impact of law enforcement, labour market conditions and 
family background on crime
Chapter 3 tests the Becker (1968) economic model of crime on England and 
Wales. It adopts the methods used by Reilly and Witt (1996) and replicates them 
on new data for England and Wales for the period 1992 to 2007 at the police-force 
area level. It improves on these analyses by adopting an instrumental variable 
estimation and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to handle the potential endogeneity 
between crime and deterrence, and to control for measurement error and 
persistence in criminal activity. Three major crime categories are considered: 
burglary, theft and robbery. The findings of these analyses generally support 
Becker’s economic model of crime, with significant effects o f the certainty of 
punishment and unemployment.
The second empirical chapter (4) tests the effect of the labour market 
conditions on crime in the US. It examines the relationship between wages and 
employment conditions and arrest rates in the United States. Substantial effort has 
been devoted to compile annual crime data from the Uniform Crime Reports 
between 1964 and 2008. This is matched to data on the labour market conditions 
extracted from the Current Population Survey at the Metropolitan Statistical Area 
level for the same time period. I focus on the changes in the labour market 
opportunities for those most likely to commit crime. The analyses in this chapter 
differ from the existing literature in two ways. First, this is one of very few large- 
scale studies to look at whether local crime rates are responsive to the labour
market conditions of those most likely to commit crime, unskilled men, rather than 
looking at whether crime rate respond to the general economic conditions o f the 
area. Second, instead of concentrating only on the unemployment rate, it also 
measures the labour market prospects of potential criminals with the wages o f low- 
skilled workers and adds controls for the income per capita and the policing at the 
MSA-level. I find a positive and significant correlation between unemployment and 
the overall property crime arrest rates.
Chapter five looks at the effect of family background on crime by testing 
the intergenerational criminal correlations. The hope is that a better understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms, and their relative importance, may help us to think 
more clearly about the'effect of policies on criminal behaviour. We aim to assess 
whether the parent — child correlation in crime is simply due to the existence of 
some common external factors, such as poverty, or whether there is a mechanism 
that directly links parent criminality to child criminality. In order to answer our 
research questions we analyse data of the Offending Crime and Justice Survey 
2003->2006 which is a longitudinal self-report survey that asks young people in 
England and Wales about their attitudes towards and experiences o f offending. One 
advantage is that the data is representative and is not focused on a sample of either 
criminal parents or criminal children as most previous studies are in the literature, 
and we can compare children of criminal parents and those of non-criminal parents. 
We find that children whose parents/guardians have committed at least one crime 
have 2.5 times higher odds of having an offence than children o f non-criminal
parents. The effect o f a custodial sentence of the parents increases the odds of the 
children offending by 3.5 times.
Chapter six concludes the thesis by re-iterating the key findings o f the 
substantive analyses and directly answering the specific research questions outlined 
in the previous section. In doing so, we attempt to draw a scientific conclusion on 
the determinants of crime, evaluate the contributions made and draw out the themes 
of the research.
Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this review is to place this research in context by recording and 
analysing the progress of research in the economics of crime. We start the literature 
survey by presenting the classical economic framework for crime introduced by 
Becker (1968) and developed by Ehrlich (1973). Starting in Section 2 we discuss 
each of the main determinants separately starting with the deterrence effect of law 
enforcement^. In Section 3 we consider the papers testing the effect of the labour 
market conditions on crime, specifically the unemployment-crime relationship and 
the impact of wages and local incomes on crime. Finally, section four focuses on 
the effect of family background (mainly parents’ criminal behaviour) on the 
individual’s criminal behaviour. The papers most related to our empirical studies 
will be introduced here and discussed in more details in the individual chapters.
2.2 Theory of the Economics of Crime
In the 1950s and 1960s conventional wisdom was that criminal behaviour 
was caused by mental illness and social oppression, (Goldstein and Katz, 1960). 
However, Becker (1968) argued that some individuals become criminals not 
because their basic motivation differs from that of other jpersons but because their 
benefits and costs differ.
 ^Cook (1980) identifies the deterrence theory to have been primarily developed by economists, who 
have viewed potential criminals as rational decision makers faced with an array of illicit 
opportunities characterised by costs and payoffs.
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The economists’ approach to the choice to carry out criminal activity 
(Becker, 1968) implies that there is a function relating the number of offences by 
any person to his probability o f conviction, his punishment if convicted and other 
variables such as income available from legal or illegal activities, the frequency of 
arrests, and his willingness to commit an illegal act. This can be represented as
Oj =  O j ( p j , f j , U j )  (2 .1 )
where Oj is the number of offences that an individual j  would commit during a 
particular period, pj is his probability of conviction per offence, fj  is his 
punishment per offence, and Uj is a portmanteau variable representing all other 
influences.
The total number of offences is the sum of all the Oj and would depend on 
the set of pj, fj  and Uj. Although these variables are likely to differ between 
persons (because of differences in intelligence, age, education, offending history, 
wealth, family upbringing etc) for simplicity Becker (1968) considers only their 
average values, p, /  and u.
Thus, Becker’s 1968 economic model for the aggregate supply o f offences
IS
0  =  0 (p ,/,t4 )  (2.2)
where O is the supply of offences, p  is the probability o f apprehension given an 
offence,/is the severity o f punishment and u represents a set of variables such as 
income (legal and illegal), family background, education, preference for risk etc.
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This function is expected to have the same properties as the individual function: the 
aggregated number of offences would be negatively correlated with both p  and f  If 
most offenders are risk-averse, the supply of offences is expected to be more 
responsive to the change in severity o f  punishment than to change in probability o f  
apprehension. However, it would be more responsive to the change in probability 
o f apprehension than to the same change in severity o f punishment if, and only if, 
most offenders are risk-lovers.^ Moreover, this model makes the usual economic 
assumption that if the expected return to an activity falls, individuals will do less of 
it. Thus, if the returns to illegitimate activities fall due to an increase in the 
probability or severity of punishment, fewer offences will be supplied. Also, the 
opportunity cost of illegitimate activities increases with increased returns to 
legitimate activities.
The analysis by Becker (1968) was concerned with the choice o f an optimal 
level o f resources to be devoted by society to combat crime. This includes the 
optimal combination of law enforcement instruments to be imposed, the probability 
of apprehending and convicting offenders, the magnitude of the punishment for 
crimes with different severities as well as the form of sanction to be imposed 
(prison or fine). Subsequent work has focused on complete formulation o f the 
supply o f offences and alternative social welfare criteria for producing optimal 
enforcement strategies. Ehrlich (1973, 1975, and 1977) attempt to expand the scope 
of the relevant incentives by which offenders can be motivated or deterred and
 ^ Becker (1968) demonstrated that if  the elasticity of the expected utility with respect to the 
probability of punishment exceeded the elasticity of the expected utility with respect to conviction 
(both in absolute values), the offenders were risk lovers.
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explores the factors identified by Becker (1968) but not tested, such as one’s 
incomes in legal and illegal activities, family background, education, preference for 
risk etc. He develops a mathematical framework which analyses the participation in 
illegal activities with choice under uncertainty.
Ehrlich (1973) develops the Becker (1968) initial economic model of crime 
and characterises individuals as rational decision makers who respond to 
opportunities, some of which illegitimate. Each individual engages in legitimate 
and illegitimate activities according to the expected returns from each activity. The 
extent to which an individual engages in illegitimate activities, therefore, depends 
on (1) variables characterising the alternatives to illegitimate activities; (2) 
variables affecting returns to illegitimate activities including the probability of 
being caught and punished and the severity of punishment; (3) tastes and (4) 
preferences for risk.
An essential assumption in Ehrlich (1973) is that individuals are free to 
combine a number of legitimate and illegitimate activities or switch occasionally 
from one to another during any period throughout their lifetime. Their objective is 
to maximize their expected utility by optimally allocating their time and other 
resources between legal and illegal activities. For example, the unemployment rate, 
as an important indicator of the legal labour market, can be included to measure the 
risk in legal activities while as before, the expected punishment measures the risk 
in illegal activities.
Ehrlich (1973) specifies a behavioural function relating a person’s actual 
participation in illegal activity in a given period to its basic determinants. The
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dependent variable is specified in terms of the number of offences one commits as 
a function of
Rij = ^ ijiP ijJ i j  (2-3)
where ip denotes the number of offences committed by individual j, i and / denote 
illegal and legal activities respectively; p  and /  denote the probability of 
apprehension and punishment respectively,; w denotes wealth or returns; u 
represents unemployment and n  denotes a set of other variables that might affect 
the number of offences committed by individual j .  If all individuals are identical, 
the behavioural function (2.3) could also be regarded as an aggregate supply
function in a given time period. Since people differ in their earning opportunities
and hence their opportunity cost of imprisonment (or other form of punishment), 
Ehrlich (1973) takes the means of these variables to incorporate in the aggregated 
supply of offences function
Of =  (2.4)
where (g represents the aggregated supply of offences; P, F, W, W, U represent the 
average values of p, f ,  w, w, u; and n  includes, in addition to those environmental 
variables, all the moments of the distributions of p , f  etc. other than their means.
Based on his earlier work, Ehrlich (1996) describes a market model of 
crime which is also based on the assumption that offenders, like other members of 
society, respond to incentives. The incentives described in this model are very 
similar to those introduced in Ehrlich (1973) with one important difference that the
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equilibrium is achieved through the interactions between three parties instead of 
two; in addition to offenders and the law enforcement authorities, the behaviour of 
potential victims is also a factor. Potential victims are expected to demand 
protection from offences, such as insurance against crime, burglar alarm systems, 
safety deposit boxes etc. However, such protections come at a cost. The supply of 
offences, together with the demand for protections against offences, forms the basic 
components of the “market model”. The equilibrium is reached when the level of 
offences is such that neither offenders, potential victims, nor the government feel 
the need to adjust their behaviours.
Many aspects of the Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973, 1996) original model 
have been pursued in the literature. The empirical evidence generally supports the 
predictions of the original model (deterrence effect of the criminal justice system, 
the effect of labour market conditions and family background) but flags potential 
problems in the analysis. In order to achieve robust results, research must attempt 
to control for the endogeneity of some o f the explanatory variables (deterrence and 
labour market variables, specifically unemployment)^. Moreover, specific care 
should be taken to control for the potential incapacitation effect created by some 
deterrence measures. These issues will be discussed in the next section of the 
literature on the effect of the criminal justice system on crime.
’ The criminal justice system variables are likely to be endogenous because of the simultaneity with 
crime rates. While the endogeniety of unemployment might be caused by unobserved heterogeneity 
when using panel data.
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2.3 Crime and Deterrence
A hypothesis of the theory discussed is that crime will be effectively 
deterred by the criminal justice system. The idea is that law enforcement 
(apprehension and punishment) serves partly to deter future offences by increasing 
the expected cost of breaking the law for both actual and potential offenders. Given 
the increased expected cost of committing offences, both actual and potential 
offenders would have lower incentives to participate in illegal activities.
However, a major issue highlighted in the literature is the endogeneity of 
the deterrence- variables. The deterrence variables both determine and are 
determined by crime rates (See Ehrlich, 1973, 1975, Brier and Fienberg, 1980, 
Pogue, 1986). Differentiating between correlation and causality is critical. Levitt 
(1997) provides an example to clarify the simultaneity between crime and 
deterrence. He provides a comparison that Newark has a violent crime rate four 
times higher than that of Omaha, and it also has twice as many police per capita. A 
likely explanation for this relationship is that high crime rates lead cities to hire 
more police and not that police cause crime. Thus, identifying the causal link 
between inereases in poliee and crime is necessary.
In this section we take a detailed look at the empirical work that tests the 
deterrence effect of law enforcement. We explore the crime-reducing effect of the 
certainty and severity of punishment (detection and sentencing). These variables
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are in principle controllable by policy, and they affect crime either by raising the 
expected cost of crime or by incapacitating criminals.
As discussed earlier, a key concept of deterrence is the severity of 
punishment; however for this to matter there must be some probability that the 
punishment will be incurred if the crime is committed. For that to happen, the 
offender must be apprehended by the police. Thus, another key concept of the 
deterrence theory is the certainty of punishment. Other things equal, a higher 
certainty of punishment should imply a lower incidence of crime. Accordingly, the 
second variable o f interest is the clear-up^ rate, which is a proxy for the certainty of 
punishment. The ideal proxy would be the crime specific clear-up rate, and part of 
the literature considers this measure. This specific measure -of the certainty of 
punishment will be discussed in the third empirical chapter. In the next section we 
will discuss the deterrent effect of punishment starting with the effects of the 
severity of punishment and then by the certainty of punishment.
2.3.1 Punishment Severity and Crime
Becker (1968) identifies criminal behaviour as the outcome o f a rational 
calculation by individuals. Consequently, the more severe the punishment, the 
more deterred the individuals are from engaging in illegal activities. Thus a 
negative relationship is expected. Ehrlich (1972) tests this theory on US state-level 
data from census years 1940, 1950 and 1960 mainly via a cross-state regression
* The ratio of the number of crimes cleared by the police to the total number of crimes reported, for 
each area and crime category.
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analysis of variations in the rate of seven "index I crimes"^ punishable by 
imprisonment. The empirical model takes the number of offences per capita as 
dependent variable and the ratio of the number of commitments into prison to the 
number of offences, the average sentence length, the median family income, the 
percentage of families below one-half of the median family income, and the 
percentage of non-white population as independent variables. His results display 
consistency with the theoretical predictions. He finds that the probability and 
severity of punishment (length of imprisonment) to have deterrent effects on 
offenders.
However, the early empirical support for this theory has always been 
weaker than the established beliefs in deterrent effectiveness for a variety of 
reasons. Most obviously, relatively little empirical research was attempted until the 
latter part of the twentieth century and the research methods available at that time 
to test variations in criminal penalties were fairly weak due to estimation and data 
limitations (see summary Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Moreover, the severity of 
punishment may affect crime through the caveat of incapacitation whereby 
criminals are locked up to prevent them from committing more crime.
Originally, studies on the deterrent effect of punishment focused on the 
imprisonment rate; typically measured as the number of inmates per capita in 
prison on December the of a given year. A major contribution to the 
deterrence literature is the work by Levitt (1996) who tests the effect of prison
 ^Index Crime Definition: Index Crime includes murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. These eight crimes serve as a common indicator of the 
nation's crime experience because of their seriousness and frequency of occurrence. Offenses are 
unlawfiil acts reported to a law enforcement agency. Arrests are those individuals seized, held, 
summoned, or cited by law enforcement agencies for involvement in an unlawful act.
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population (severity of punishment) on different crimes. His research is motivated 
by the steep increase o f the incarceration rate between 1970 and 1990. Although 
the level o f incarceration in the US is three times its European counterpart, it did 
not correspond with a significantly lower crime rate for the same period. 
Consequently his research has focuses on identifying the effect of prison 
population on crime. Levitt (1996) attempts to isolate the causal effect of the 
changes in prison population on crime. He employs an instrumental variable 
approach using state prison-overcrowding litigation to address the possible 
simultaneity, as litigation is followed by a fall or, at least, a reduction in the growth 
of the prison population. He uses a US state-level panel for the period 1971 to 
1^93. His results confirm the earlier findings o f Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) 
of the negative effect of prison population, representing severity of punishment (- 
0.16), on crime.
In an improvement on the earlier specification, Kessler and Levitt (1999) 
introduce a clever way to test the effect of sentence severity as a deterrence 
measure and differentiate it from the incapacitation effect. They demonstrate that 
the introduction o f sentence enhancements provides direct means o f measuring 
deterrence. Because the criminal would have been sentenced to prison even without 
the law change, there is no additional incapacitation effect from the sentence 
enhancement in the short-run (normal sentence Figure 2.1). Therefore, any 
immediate decrease in crime must be due to deterrence.
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They test the model using California’s Proposition 8^°, which imposed 
sentence enhancements for a selected group of crimes. Proposition 8 appears to 
reduce eligible crimes by 4 percent in the year following its passage and 8 percent 
3 years after passage. These immediate effects are consistent with deterrence.
Figure 2.1 provides an example how Proposition 8 affects the sentence 
length of the next offence of same type for individuals with three different 
offending backgrounds. Sentence enhancement 1 is the enhancement to a normal 
sentence if the offender has committed one previous offence. Sentence 
enhancement 2 is the enhancement to a normal plus enhancement 1 sentence if the 
offender has committed two previous offences.
2 OFF
1 OFF
OOFF
Figure 2.1
California’s Proposition 8, Next Offence Sentence Length.
1.5 2
Enhanced 1■ Normal Enhanced 2
California’s Proposition 8 is a referendum enacted in 1982 that increased the scope and severity 
of repeat-offender sentence enhancements.
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A similar real life example of the effect of deterrence is the 2006 Italy 
Collective Clemency Bill, Drago et al. (2009). In 2006, Italy passed a Collective 
Clemency Bill that set free all prison inmates who had less than three years left on 
their sentences. However, the law stipulated that if the former inmates were 
convicted of any crime within the next five years, the remainder of their suspended 
sentence would be added to whatever sentence they received for their future crime. 
The law gave researchers the chance to study the direct effect of the threat of 
longer sentences on the recidivism rates for the former inmates. They checked on 
the inmates seven months after their release from prison and found that:
• Inmates with longer suspended sentences — and therefore longer expected 
sentences for new crimes — were less likely to be re-arrested than those with 
shorter suspended sentences.
• Even a small increase in the expected sentence - as low as one month - was 
enough to reduce recidivism slightly, by 1.3 percent.
• The deterrent effect was consistent across all age groups and genders of former 
prison inmates.
The Drago et a l (2009) results confirm the general theory of deterrence. In 
summary increasing the expected sentence by 50 percent should reduce recidivism 
rates by about 35 percent in seven months.
Despite the evidence reported, a significant disagreement remains 
surrounding the quality of empirical evidence estimating the nature and magnitude 
of deterrent effects. Economists often come to different conclusions from 
criminologists on the value of harsher sentences in reducing crime. While
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criminologists tend to regard various legal threats as the result of a complex and 
unpredictable process, economists approach the issue from a rational choice 
perspective that considers the risk and benefits of engaging in crime; where 
sanctions represent the expected cost of engaging in criminal behaviour. On the one 
hand, one body of scholars (e.g., Ehrlich, 1973; Levitt, 2002; Lewis, 1986; 
Shepherd, 2002) argues that sentence severity does, in fact, affect levels of crime. 
In contrast, another body of academics (Nagin, 1978, 1998; Zimring et al. 2001) 
has been less optimistic about the ability of harsher sanctions to reduce crime rates. 
The concept of elasticity is linked directly to the issue of marginality. Bushway and 
Reuter (2011) argue that elasticity as a concept is well developed in economics but 
is not often used in criminology, which tends to focus on effect sizer Unlike effect 
size, elasticity has inherent in its definition a relative assessment of returns. To be 
precise, elasticity refers to the percent change in Y “caused by” the percent change 
in X. Percentages can only be calculated if we know the current level o f an activity. 
The same effect size can have a large elasticity if the initial investment in X was 
low and a low elasticity if the initial level o f X is high. As the concept o f elasticity 
is less used in the criminology literature, this might be the cause of the difference 
in the findings on the effect of the sentence severity on crime.
We will revisit deterrence theory in the first empirical chapter where we test 
the effect of the severity of punishment (crime specific sentence length) on the 
incidence of burglary, theft and robbery in England and Wales. In the next section 
we discuss the deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment on crime.
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2.3.2 Certainty of Punishment and Crime
Numerous studies test the effect of the certainty of punishment on the 
supply of offences. Levitt (1998) tests the deterrent effect of the certainty of 
punishment (arrests/reported crimes) on crime by distinguishing between its 
deterrence and incapacitation effects. He bases his approach on two specific 
assumptions: firstly, criminals commit multiple offences and do not specialize in 
one particular type of crime; secondly, certain types of crime are substitutes for 
each other while other types of erime are not. As long as these two assumptions are 
satisfied, the deterrence and incapacitation effects of the certainty of punishment 
can be separately identified. This is because an increase in the arrest rate for any 
crime would lead to a reduction in'atl crimes due to the incapacitation effect. If 
different crimes are substitutes for one another, the deterrent effect implies that 
increasing the arrest rate for on “burglary”, would lead to a decrease in burglary, 
but an increase in other crimes such as robbery as criminals would substitute away 
from burglary.
Therefore, the expected sign o f the deterrence effect depends on the 
relationship between different types of crimes: deterrence is negative for the same 
own-crime rate and positive for the substituting crime rates. For the non­
substituting crimes, the deterrence effect is not expected to be significant. If the 
incapacitation effect exists an increase in the arrest rate for one crime would not 
only reduce own-crime rate, but also reduce the substituting-crime rates since more 
criminals have been locked up behind bars.
23
Levitt’s analysis is applied on an annual panel of 59 large US cities between 
1970 and 1992. He reports a significant negative effect of arrest rates on crime 
across the different property and violent crimes (except for murder) tested. He 
considers the three possible explanations of the negative correlation between arrest 
rates and crime rates (deterrence, incapacitation, measurement error). He 
concludes that deterrence appears to be more important than incapacitation in 
reducing crime. There is little evidence that measurement error (to be discussed in 
the first empirical chapter) is responsible for the relationship between arrest rates 
and crime rates.
As discussed by Levitt (1997), differentiating between correlation and 
causality is critical when analysing the impact of the certainty of punishment on 
crime. A recent set of studies were motivated by the recent threat of terrorism to 
study the impact of police resource allocation on crime in cities around the world 
(London, Draca et al. 2011; District of Colombia, Klick and Tabarrok 2005; 
Buenos Aires, Di Telia and Schargrodsky 2004; Stockholm, Poutvaara and Priks 
2006). These studies utilize the fact that the decision to alter police presence is not 
spurred by the change in crime and makes their added presence exogenous to the 
increase in crime. Draca et al. (2011) study the impact of police on crime by 
looking at crime before and after the London 2005 terror attacks. They implement 
an instrumental variable approach to identify the causal impact of police on crime. 
Their analyses produce an elasticity of crime with respect to police of 
approximately -0.3, so that a 10 percent increase in police activity reduces crime by 
around 3 percent.
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However, in the work pursued here we seek to consider the general impact 
of police without the special circumstances described above. Theoretically, the 
crime rate depends on police deterrence efforts, police deterrence efforts depend 
upon the level of police resources, and the level o f police resources depends on the 
crime rate. As a result, the "typical" econometric model employs a simultaneous 
equation estimation technique with at least two equations in which police 
deterrence efforts are proxied by the probability of arrest.
Some of the current panel studies in the literature fail to treat the 
endogeneity of the law enforcement variables (Carmichael and Ward, 2000, 2001; 
Edmark, 2003). Neglecting this issue will break down the consistency o f the 
estimation. An example of the studies that control -for the endogeneity of the 
deterrence measures is the work by Saridakis and Spengler (2009) who examine 
the relationship between crime, deterrence and unemployment in Greece. They use 
regional data over the period 1991-1998 and apply the GMM to handle potential 
endogeneity between crime and deterrence. Their results show that property crimes 
are significantly deterred by higher clear-up rates. Also for property crime rates, 
their results indicate that unemployment increases crime.
Since the modem explanation of the economic model of criminal behaviour, 
empirical economists have tested its predictions using variation in expected 
criminal punishments. The empirical evidence generally supports the deterrence 
model but shows that incapacitation influences crime rates, too. Evidence of the 
crime-reducing effect of the scale of policing and incarceration is consistent across 
different methodological approaches. Estimates of the deterrent effect of other
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penalties, such as capital punishment, are less robust and suggest that claims of 
large effects from these policies may be spurious. More work is needed to assess 
the relative importance of deterrence and incapacitation.
In the second and third empirical chapters we will explicitly treat our law 
enforcement variables as endogenous by implementing instrumental variables. 
Such a strategy is achieved by carrying out the GMM estimations which will be 
introduced in latter parts.
2.4 Crime and the Labour Market
Fleisher (1963) is of the first to treat crime from an economic viewpoint and 
stress the importance of understanding the relationship between delinquency and 
labour market conditions from the point of view of public policy. He focuses 
attention on other aspects of the frmctioning o f the labour market such as the 
influence on crime of the levels and distributions of wages and the consequences of 
population distribution. In his empirical analysis Fleisher (1963) uses time series 
data for the period 1932-1961.
In his study, the dependent variable being estimated is the arrest rate for 
property crimes and is expressed as the number of arrests divided by the age- 
specific population (similar to the choice of dependent variable in the analysis o f 
chapter 4 here). The independent variables include the male unemployment rate for 
ages 14-19 and 20-24, the total number of personnel in the United States, the ratio 
of property crime arrest rate for all ages to the rate of property offences known to 
the police and a dummy variable splitting the whole time period into two parts with 
the year 1951 as a break. With OLS estimation, the results do support the
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prediction that the effect of unemployment on juvenile crime is positive and 
significant.
Fleisher (1966) studies the role o f income in the decision to commit 
criminal acts by individuals. He states that if legitimate earnings are low, the 
opportunity cost of time actually spent in delinquent activity, or in jail, is also low. 
The differentiation between the effect of the level of legal income expected by an 
individual on committing a crime and the income level of potential victims is 
important. According to Fleisher (1966) the higher the level of income of potential 
victims, the higher the incentive to commit crimes especially crimes against 
property. Thus the average income has two conceptual influences on delinquency 
which operate in opposite directions, although they are not necessarily'-equal in 
strength. Econometric results of Fleisher (1966) show that higher average family 
incomes across 101 U.S. cities in 1960 were actually associated with lower court 
appearances by young males, and with lower numbers of arrests of young males for 
the crimes of robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
Becker formalises Fleisher’s ideas on how the returns o f crime are related 
to income and develops the idea of the impact of crime control on rational 
decisions about crime (detailed Section 2.2). Ehrlich (1973) extended the analysis 
made by Becker (1968), to consider how income levels and distribution may affect 
criminal propensity and the crime rate. The benefits of crime, especially property 
crime, depend primarily on the opportunities provided by potential victims o f crime 
(Ehrlich 1973). Ehrlich (1973) conducts an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of state crime rates in the U.S. in 1960 and found that higher median
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family incomes are associated with higher rates of property crimes, such as 
burglary (presumably because there are more assets to steal) .
Both Fleisher (1966) and Ehrlich (1973) also consider the effect of 
unemployment on crime rates, viewing the unemployment rate in a community as a 
complementary indicator of the income opportunities available in the legal labour 
market. In their empirical studies, however, both authors find that unemployment 
rates are less important determinants of crime rates than income levels and 
distribution.
According to Freeman (1994), analyses of the effect of the labour market on 
crime take several forms: time series studies that relate the crime rate to labour 
market variables over time; cross-section-area studies that compare crime and 
economic characteristics across areas.
Time series data has been a commonly used to investigate the determinants 
of crime. However, Levitt (2001) argues that “national-level time series data are an 
extremely crude tool for answering criminological questions” for several reasons. 
Firstly, time series data usually provide limited sample size compared to panel 
data. Hence, it is difficult to include a wide range of explanatory variables into the 
equation. Thus, the estimated parameters only reflect the correlations between 
explained and explanatory variables, instead of causal links. This is because, in 
order to interpret the coefficients as causal, it is necessary to include all the 
potential crime-influencing factors into the equation. The limited degrees of 
freedom given by time series data hinder this possibility. Secondly, although time 
series data is an ideal tool for analysing macro variables such as economic growth
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and inflation etc., crime rates and their influential variables usually exhibit 
significant local variations. Thus, applying time series data to crime modelling 
loses much of the variation o f interest.
Thirdly, some studies are particularly interested in separately estimating the 
two channels through which unemployment affects crime: opportunity and 
motivation, as predicted by Cantor and Land (1985). As earlier discussed by 
Fleisher (1966) and Ehrlich (1973), the rational choice explanation is that 
unemployment has a positive effect on crime by increasing the criminal motivation 
of unemployed individuals by decreasing the opportunity cost of participating in 
crime and being punished. Cantor and Land (1991) argue that there is a 
contemporaneous negative relationship between unemployment and crime that is 
based on the reduction in the number of people available in the areas where crime 
happen as individuals substitute their work habits by home-based ones. This in 
return will negatively affect burglaries as people will be available at home for more 
time than before. Cantor and Land’s theoretical m odeltriggered  a new body of 
empirical research that was divided in support of the two mechanisms However, 
using national-level time series data has limited power for such a job.
” Cantor and Land’s re-specification: This work interprets unemployment as having positive effects 
on crime through increasing criminal motivations at the same time as it has negative effects by 
reducing criminal opportunities (victim-target availability).
According to Cantor and Land (1991), the average weekly earnings are also expected to have 
ambiguous effect on crime due to the same reason. Whilst higher earnings could reduce people’s 
incentives to commit crimes, it could also increase the opportunities for property crimes. Therefore, 
the net effect of real earnings on crime rates could be positive, negative, or insignificant. This will 
be discussed extensively in the second empirical chapter when we test the effect o f the labour 
market conditions (earnings and unemployment) on crime in the US.
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Cross-section area studies are free from collinearity or serial correlation, but 
they can still fail to uncover causality. If characteristics that have a direct effect on 
both left- and right-hand side variables are omitted, explanatory variables will be 
correlated with errors and regression coefficients will be biased measures of the 
structural effects. Thus, researchers have often been confronted with massive cross- 
sectional data sets from which precise correlations can be determined but that, 
nevertheless, could provide no information about parameters o f policy interest. 
Still, studies using this data type find a positive link between crime and 
unemployment, but according to Freeman (1994) there are enough statistical 
shortcomings in these estimates to leave a door open to doubt.
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) suggest that;" in addition to law 
enforcement and labour market conditions, crime rates are affected by socio­
economic conditions, as well as demographic composition. Due to data restrictions, 
the early literature has only included some of the relevant factors and omitted other 
potentially important ones. As a result the estimated correlation between crime 
rates and the variables of concern, mainly unemployment rate, could be inaccurate 
in cross-section and time series studies, (due to omitted variable bias). The positive 
correlation between unemployment and crime, as proposed in some studies, may be 
due to the positive correlation between crime rates and a third variable which is 
neglected from the specification but correlated with unemployment rate.
Panel data has been used to control for time-invariant heterogeneity and to 
study dynamics. This strand of the literature suggests that the relationship between 
crime and unemployment is clear and unambiguous.
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The work by Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) is one example of using 
rich panel data to investigate the relationship between unemployment and crime. 
More specifically, the data is disaggregated on state-level in the United States 
covering the years 1971-1997. In addition to the unemployment rate, the model 
also incorporates a set of controls for alcohol consumption, average income, 
ethnicity, deprivation, as well as prison population. Furthermore, the model also 
includes state-specific and year-specific effects to eliminate the influence of factors 
that vary by either state or year. The results of OLS regression have shown that the 
effect of unemployment rate is positive and significant for property crime. In order 
to deal with the potential endogeneity o f the unemployment rate, two-stage-least- 
squares (2SLS) approach is applied employing two instruments: Department of 
Defence annual prime contract awards to each state and state-specific measure of 
oil price shocks.
The 2SLS estimations generate similar results: unemployment exerts a 
consistent, positive and highly significant effect on total property crime. For each 
individual type, the estimated results are generally supporting a positive correlation 
between unemployment and each type o f property crime, although the coefficient 
on unemployment is not significant in every specification. For violent crimes, on 
the other hand, a correlation with unemployment is not established.
The question that traditionally motivated analyses of crime and the job 
market had been the effect of unemployment on crime. According to Freeman 
(1994) studies through the mid-1980s found that higher unemployment was 
associated with greater occurrence of crime. For example Willis (1983) finds crime
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rise in areas where unemployment is high for two of the three crime categories 
explored in his study for England and Wales. Similarly for the US, Chiricos (1987) 
finds a positive relationship between crime and unemployment.
The trademark of the more recent literature was to carefully control for the 
endogeneity of unemployment owing to unobserved heterogeneity. As in Raphael 
and Winter-Ember (2001), recent contributions to the unemployment-crime debate 
make use of rich panels to control for this potential endogeneity. Gould et al. 
(2002) look at the state-level changes in crime and labour market conditions in the 
United States from 1979 to 1997. They use instrumental variables to establish 
causality. They find that both wages and unemployment are significantly related to 
crime in the expected direction. Witt et al. (1998) also report evidence for the-UK, 
based on police-force area data for England and Wales. Their empirical results 
suggested that continued falls in the relative wages of unskilled men and increases 
in male unemployment in England and Wales act as incentives to engage in 
criminal activity. These studies will be extensively discussed in the empirical 
chapters as they are closely linked to my own work.
2.5 Crime and Family Background
Most of the literature focuses on deterrence and labour market conditions 
when testing the determinants of crime. However, Ehrlich (1972) states that the 
criminal behaviour is mainly attributed to the offenders’ unique motivations which, 
in turn, have been linked to social circumstances and family background. In fact, it 
is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural 
and family background, level of education, availability of fire arms, drugs and
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other economic and social factors. In labour economics, social mobility is well 
documented. While studies like'Blanden et al. (2005) focus on the intergenerational 
income, educational and social mobility and others like Johnston et al. (2011) look 
at the transmission of poor mental health across generations, few studies looked at 
whether the mechanisms of the intergenerational persistence could transport 
offending traits between generations and the relationship between parents’ criminal 
behaviour and that of their children is less established. Apart from the few studies 
on Sweden that use official records to test the intergenerational criminal 
correlations, the larger part of the research has used small-scale studies to examine 
the cross-sectional relationship between the criminal acts of fathers and those of 
their children.
International research on the transmission of criminal behaviour between 
generations has a historic basis. Dugdale (1884) was the first known researcher to 
look at crime in families. He found six members of the same family in a US county 
jail. He decided to trace back several generations of the family and found a history 
of poverty, disease and crime. Other, also classic studies found similar results. 
Glueck & Glueck (1950) selects a group of 493 boys committed to correctional 
schools in Massachusetts, together with seven cases which had records o f 
continuing offences. A control group of 500 non-delinquent boys from the general 
public school population in Boston was paired with the delinquents on the basis of 
four characteristics: age, ethnicity, residence area delinquency rate and IQ. The 
data is gathered and independently analysed by a staff of social investigators, a
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psychiatrist, physical anthropologists, statisticians and R orschachanalysts. They 
find the delinquents as a group to be “distinguishable from the non-delinquents 
physically, temperamentally, psychologically, in attitude and most importantly 
socio-culturally, in having been reared to a far greater extent than the control group 
in families of little understanding, affection, stability or moral fibre by parents 
usually unfit to be effective guides and protectors”(see Reiss, 1951; p;115). 
However, the fundamentals of analysis in this study have not been met.
There are some studies that explicitly focus on the transmission of criminal 
behaviour between generations. Table 2.1 presents overview of these studies, the 
structure of the samples used and the adopted methodologies since 1980. In this 
section of the literature review we will present the findings of these studies while 
the studies with methods and research questions similar to ours will be further 
discussed in the third empirical chapter (Chapter 5).
More recent studies using larger and nationally representative samples 
focus explicitly on continuities of criminal behaviour from parents to children. We 
split the literature geographically, US and non-US studies, as the majority of the 
studies use data from the US.
2.5.1 US Studies
Most of the empirical literature is based on U.S. data and despite the use o f 
different datasets and measurements, results seem consistent. In the Chicago Youth 
Development Study, Gorman-Smith et al. (1998) follow 288 research subjects and
Rorschach is a method of personality analysis, a psychological instrument first publicized by 
Hermann Rorschach in 1921.
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their parents, (self-report data of 5th and 7th grade students aged 10 and 12). Using 
correlation and OLS regression analysis they find that persistent delinquents are 
more likely to originate from families with deviant conduct. Farrington et al. 
(2001) show similar patterns using data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study but 
employing risk-factor analysis (self-report data of 1395 respondents sample o f le, 
4e and 7e years male students to collect data on children and parents).
Sampson and Laub (1993) use the data gathered by Glueck & Glueck 
(1950) and improve on the analysis methodology, and reveal a substantial 
association between the criminal behaviour of fathers and that of their offspring. In 
the Oregon Youth Study, Kim et al. (2009) use correlation between generations 
and find gender-specific pathways of transmission of extemalizing-behaviour. They 
find that fathers have a larger influence on daughters than on sons. A recent study 
by Giordano (2010) uses binary logistic regression estimation to test the effect 
paternal and maternal criminal behaviour on the criminal behaviour among 
children. They find the parents’ criminal behaviour to be a significant predictor of 
criminal behaviour for adult children.
An important investigation of the intergenerational transmission o f criminal 
behaviour is the Rochester Youth Development Study (New York) by Thornberry 
et al. (2003) and Thornberry (2009). This study begins in 1988 to follow 1,000 
adolescents, along with their parents and, over time, their children. The study 
consistently shows that intergenerational transmission of anti-social behaviour is 
modest, but evident. They find that parents’ anti-social behaviour leads to 
aggression in young children and results in delinquent and criminal behaviour as
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children grow older. These findings are interpreted as supporting genetics as the 
explanation for any correlation.
Also on the US, Duncan et al. (2005) use the 1979 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) to find that daughters of convicted mothers are five times 
more likely to be convicted themselves and they find positive correlations between 
specific characteristics of parents and children. They report intergenerational 
correlations between mothers and their children for 17 behaviours and attitudes 
(both good and bad) measured during adolescence. They find striking support of 
the hypothesis that “likes beget likes” and, with regards to criminality, that 
daughters whose mothers were ever convicted are more than five times as likely to 
be convicted of a crime themselves;-
In a controversial paper Donohue and Levitt (2001) take an alternative 
approach to understanding the impact of parents on children’s criminal activity. 
They demonstrate that a major contributor to the decrease in US crime rates in the 
90s was the legalisation of abortion as it can be shown that those states which 
legalised abortion first also saw the earliest drop in recorded crime. There are 
several aspects of this; (i) women who have abortions are likely to come from 
poorer backgrounds and therefore have more criminal children; (ii) if an abortion is 
desired, but not achieved, this will have a profound effect on the mother-child bond 
and lead to delinquency; (iii) women may use abortion to optimize the timing of 
having children and thus provide them with better living environment. Easier 
access to abortion leads to fewer children at risk of delinquency and a reduction in
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crime rates twenty years later. Donohue and Levitt estimate that the social benefit 
of abortion legislation from reduced crime is $30billion annually.
Overall, US studies consistently find a strong association between criminal 
behaviour of parents and that of their children. The next sub-section covers the 
non-US literature on the intergenerational transmission of criminal behaviour.
2.5.2 Non-US Studies
Outside the US, the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development (CSDD) 
was the major data supplier for the vast majority of the studies on the development 
of offending and anti-social behaviour. The CSDD is a prospective longitudinal 
survey of the development of offending and anti-social behaviour in 411 South 
London boys, mostly bom in 1953. These males have been followed up by 
personal interviews from age 8 to age 46. The Study began in 1961 and has been 
funded primarily by the Home Office and secondly by the Department of Health.
Results of the Study have been described in four books (West, 1969, 1982; 
West and Farrington, 1973, 1977), and in nearly 120 articles (see Farrington and 
West, 1990 and Farrington, 1995). Farrington and West (1990) find that 75 percent 
of a sample o f dual conviction couples produced offspring who were also 
convicted. Rowe and Farrington (1997) use the same data to assess environmental 
and genetic factors contributing to criminal behaviour exhibited between parent's 
and their children and find that convictions in a parent increased the risk of 
convictions in a child. Farrington et al. (1998) use the CSDD data to show that the 
criminal careers of children resemble those of their fathers, but that careers of older 
generations seem to be longer than careers of younger generations. However, the
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delinquent acts of younger generations follow one another more quickly than those 
of older generations. This could be due to children imitating their fathers’ criminal 
behaviour and terminating their acts once their parents’ do; therefore a causal 
aspect to the intergenerational relationship is suspected..
Some of the most recent studies on intergenerational crime take advantage 
of a Swedish dataset, the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study (SBC), which contains 
administrative crime records for both a cohort of more than 15,000 individuals born 
in 1953 (and residing in Stockholm in 1963) and their fathers. Hjalmarsson and 
Lindquist (2007, 2009, 2011) use this data to study the effect parent-child criminal 
correlation as well as the parent-child drink driving correlations. These studies will 
be extensively discussed in the third empirical chapter as they are closely linked to 
our work. Janson (1982) uses the SBC to find that 9.8 percent of the boys with 
fathers that have no criminal record are delinquent while 19.9 percent of the boys 
with criminal fathers are delinquent. Data on the boys' criminal behaviour are 
related to their families' social position and composition and to background and 
behavioural characteristics from early childhood. The results indicate that the 
proportion of variance of criminal behaviour accounted for by the background and 
individual variables is small, in most analyses below 15 percent.
More recently, also using the SBC data, Murray et a l (2007) find that 
parental incarceration has no effect on children’s offending, above parental 
criminality. Studies from several countries suggest that parental criminality is a 
strong predictor of children’s own criminal behaviour.
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While these studies provide strong evidence that criminal behaviour may 
have intergenerational components, small sample sizes (apart from Janson, 1982 
and Murray et a l, 2007), early research methods, and regional as well as time- 
specific effects limit applicability of early research to contemporary public level 
trends. The result, as Johnson and Waldfogel (2002) note, is that existing data falls 
short and hinders identifying factors of causation and specifying what factors 
influence children of crime committing parents to indulge in the criminal 
behaviour. In the third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) we test the effects of the 
parents’ criminal behaviour on the children’s offending habits in England and 
Wales.
The work in This thesis fits the gaps in the literature identified in this 
chapter. It aims to build on the current findings and improve our understanding of 
the three determinants discussed in this chapter. The next chapter test the effect of 
the labour market condition and law enforcement on crime in the England and 
Wales.
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Chapter Three: Crime, Deterrence and 
Unemployment
3.1 Introduction
The existing economic crime literature is mostly developed and applied to 
(property) crime data for the US apart from some notable exemptions on the UK 
(e.g. Hale, 1998; Reilly and Witt, 1996; Wo Ip in, 1978). There is a shortage of 
empirical work in UK that takes into consideration the sharp increase in criminal 
activities towards the end of the 90s, as confirmed by several empirical studies 
(See Fajnzylber et a l, 2002 and Freeman, 1999). -  -
In order to add further evidence for the UK, this chapter adopts the 
methodology used by Reilly and Witt (1996) and replicates it on new data on 
England and Wales for the period 1992 to 2007 at the police-force area level. 
Moreover, these analyses improve on Reilly and Witt (1996) by adopting an 
instrumental variable estimation and using a GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1998) to handle the potential endogeneity between crime and 
deterrence, potential measurement error and persistence in criminal activity. Three 
major crime categories are considered: burglary, theft and robbery.
The outline o f the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 presents a review o f 
the UK literature that tests the Becker-Ehrlich framework while Section 3.3 
describes the data used in this chapter. Section 3.4 presents the empirical analysis. 
Section 3.5 is devoted to explaining the limitations and shortcomings of the
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empirical strategy used here and suggests ways to improve on it; the last section 
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Review of the Literature
The literature review chapter of this thesis provided an overview 
discussing the early contributions to the economics of crime and the literature 
about crime deterrence and the labour market. In this section we present the main 
contributions to the England and Wales literature focusing on the role of 
deterrence and unemployment in determining crime rates, concentrating on recent 
panel analysis.
Most of the earlier empirical work on crime, deterrence and 
unemployment for England and Wales was, due to data Jimitations, conducted 
using aggregate data. Carr-Hill and Stem (1973) used Census data for 1961 and 
1966 that links crime to deterrence for England and Wales, concluding that 
criminal behaviour is responsive to deterrent effects. However, they find no effect 
of unemployment on crime. Willis (1983) using 1979 police-force area cross- 
sectional data for England and Wales finds that crime rose in areas where 
unemployment was high for two of the three crime categories explored in his 
study. His results suggest deterrent factors decrease the likelihood of committing a 
criminal offence.
National-level time series data are not the most appropriate for answering 
criminological questions for several reasons which are discussed in the literature 
review chapter (limited sample sizes, area variations, omitted variables, the 
endogeneity of unemployment and deterrence measures). Moreover, cross-section 
area studies still fail to fully account for unobserved heterogeneity.
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The later empirical work improves on the earlier literature by adopting 
panel data analysis. Reilly and Witt (1996) use aggregate data from 42 police- 
force areas in England and Wales from 1980 to 1991 to test predictions of 
Becker's economic model of crime. They explore the effects of measures of 
deterrence on the incidence of three types of acquisitive criminal activity: 
burglary, theft and robbery. Their preliminary analysis using two-way fixed 
effects model revealed a possible long-run relationship between various crime 
rates and the deterrent variables and a short-run role for unemployment rate in 
determining the crime rates. Reilly and Witt (1996) use an unrestricted error- 
correction mechanism (ECM) to control the simultaneity between crime and 
deterrence (sentencing length and clear-up rate). They derive the long-run 
elasticities for the deterrent variables and achieve signs consistent with Becker’s 
theory.
Witt et al. (1999) use police-force area data on England and Wales for the 
years 1986-1996 to examine the relationship between economic factors and 
property crime. They test the effect of unemployment rate on burglary, vehicle 
crime, handling stolen goods as well as other theft. They control for wage 
inequality, cars per capita, once-lagged police per capita, as well as year-specific 
and area-specific dummies. More importantly, they control for crime persistence 
by using once-lagged crime rate as an explanatory variable. Witt at. (1999) 
adopt the GMM technique to cope with the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variable. They find the change in unemployment rate to have positive and 
significant coefficient in the analysis of each type of crime, which is consistent 
with the finding in Witt et a l (1998). Also, the wage inequality has constantly
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shown positive and significant effect on crime rate in all cases. They also find the 
size of the police-force to negatively affect property crime.
Carmichael and Ward (2000) test the effect of unemployment and different 
deterrence measures on crime rates in England and Wales. They use a regional 
level panel over the period 1985-1995 to implement their analysis on burglary, 
theft, robbery, violence against the person and total crime. Their results suggest 
that, while there is positive correlation between unemployment and crime in 
general, different crime rates are affected differently by youth and adult 
unemployment. Specifically, burglary is the only crime positively affected by both 
the youth and adult unemployment rates. Criminal damage and robbery only have 
positive correlations with youth unemployment rate, while theft is only positively 
related to adult unemployment rate. In contrast, violence against the person shows 
no significant correlation with either youth or adult unemployment rate. With 
regard to the deterrent variables, Carmichael and Ward (2000) find mixed results. 
Except for the case of violent crimes against the person, the influence o f the clear- 
up rate is consistently negative. As expected, they find the average sentence 
length to be consistently insignificant and conclude that the severity o f the 
punishment has a much smaller effect on crime than clear-up rate. This might be 
due to the uncertainty about punishment.
A shortcoming of the current UK literature is that the law enforcement 
variables are not treated as endogenous (e.g. Reilly and Witt, 1996; Witt et al. 
1998; Carmichael and Ward, 2000). Neglecting the endogeneity of law 
enforcement breaks down the consistency of the estimations. But Reilly and Witt 
(1996) one of the few studies on England and Wales that acknowledges the
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simultaneity between crime and sentence length and points the endogeneity of the 
clear-up rate variable. We adopt the methods used in Reilly and Witt (1996) and 
apply them on new data for England and Wales from 1992 to 2007. However, the 
methods used in Reilly and Witt (1996) to tackle the stated issues raises some 
questions about the potential bias in the dynamic model (ECM) when fixed effects 
are used; this will be further discussed in the methodology section. We aim to 
improve on Reilly and Witt analysis by explicitly treating the law enforcement 
variables as endogenous and implementing instrumental variables. This is 
achieved by carrying out the GMM estimations which will be introduced in a 
latter part. Our focus is on empirically analysing the unemployment-crime 
relationship and the crime-reducing potential o f deterrent variables and we present 
causal statistical evidence based on new data for England and Wales at the police- 
force area level.
3.3 Data
The data used in this chapter is a panel of 42 police-force areas from 1992 
to 2007. The analysis will focus on three offence groups: burglary, theft and 
robbery. According to Section 9 of the Theft Act 1968 the definition of burglary is 
as follows: A person is guilty of burglary if they: enter any building or part of a 
building as a trespasser with the intention to steal, inflict grievous bodily harm, 
rape or cause unlawftil damage, or having entered any building or part o f a 
building as a trespasser they steal, inflict or attempt to inflict grievous bodily 
harm.
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Theft is defined as: A person is guilty o f theft if they: dishonestly 
appropriate property belonging to another with the intention of permanently 
depriving the other of it. Reference: Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968.
While a person is guilty of robbery if he/she: steals and - immediately 
before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so - uses force on any person, 
or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to 
force. Reference: Section 8 (1) of the Theft Act 1968.
The three categories are expressed as recorded crime rates per 100,000 of 
the population and are denoted by B for the burglary rate, F  for the theft rate and 
R for the robbery rate.
„.-_As with any study based on recorded offences, it should be noted that- 
recorded offences are influenced by reporting habits and police recording practice. 
A rise in reporting may reflect a genuine growth in criminal activity, but may also 
reflect changing social attitudes to the reporting of crime. In addition, increased 
incentives to report crime on the part of victims, given the obligations placed on 
them by insurance companies, may also induce a greater degree of reporting. 
Patterns in the reporting of crime, and police procedures in recording it, may have 
changed over the period to which our data refer, and, indeed, may also vary across 
police-force areas. The two-way fixed effects specification we adopt in the first 
set of estimations may be viewed as one way of attempting to deal with this 
problematic measurement issue, although in a relatively imperfect way. The 
recorded crime was sourced from the home office publications at the police-force 
area level for the period 1992 to 2007.
47
In this study we provide estimates for the elasticity of sentence severity 
which can be defined as the percentage change in the crime rate for a specific 
crime divided by the percentage change in the average sentence served by 
prisoners convicted of that crime, other things being equal. For this purpose we 
use the crime specific average sentence length handed down by the judiciary. 
Average sentence lengths, for both males and females, at all courts for the three 
crime types were obtained from the Ministry Of Justice and the Prison Authorities 
for each police-force area, and for each year over the period 1992 to 2007. Hough 
et al. (2003) studied the reason behind prison population in England and Wales 
rising steeply and progressively at a time when crime rates falling. He concludes 
that while many factors are ^ t .work, the key drivers^f the rise are sentencers’ 
increased readiness to pass custodial sentences.
We also include the clear-up rate (or the measure of the likelihood of 
being apprehended) as an explanatory variable. This is defined as the proportion 
of offences recorded as solved by the police to the total number of offences 
recorded. It is difficult trying to compare detections data over time and there are 
many important things to note as follows:
1. The counting rules for recorded crime changed in 1998/99. The changes 
brought new offences into the series, some with higher than average detection 
rates. For example, in 1998/99, the new offences of common assault and assault 
on a  constable had detection rates of 58 per cent and 97 per cent respectively. It is 
estimated that the overall effect of the counting rule changes was to increase the 
overall detection rate from 27 to 29 per cent. (But this should not affect our 
analysis as we use crime specific clear-up rates for burglary, theft and robbery).
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2. In 1999/00, more precise and rigorous criteria for recording detections were 
introduced with the underlying emphasis on the successful result of a police 
investigation.
3. The National Crime Recording Standard was introduced in 2002/03 which 
again affected the detection figures and means that figures for earlier years are not 
directly comparable with those for 2002/03 onwards.
4. British Transport Police detections have been included since 2002/03.
5. Since 2002/03 the Home Office have split ‘Theft and handling stolen goods’ 
into ‘Offences against vehicles’ and ‘Other theft offences’. However, for the 
purposes of this exercise they are combined under theft.
  We use the-male-unemployment rate^ "^  in our analysis; its use is motivated
by the consideration that the greater percentage of crimes within the burglary, 
theft and robbery categories are committed by men. It could be argued, however, 
that the unemployment rate is an inappropriate measure given that a substantial 
minority of criminal activity is undertaken by those under the age of sixteen. In 
1991, for example, again using information contained in Criminal Statistics, 27 
per cent of those convicted for burglary offences were between 10 and 17 years of 
age, with the comparable figures for theft and robbery 19 per cent and 22 per cent 
respectively. Carmichael and Ward (2000) point out that there is a systematic 
positive relationship between most crime and male unemployment regardless of 
age as discussed in the main literature review. In the later stages of this chapter we 
will explore the relationship between recorded criminal activity and age structure
Male unemployment rates are the number of male claimants resident in an area as a percentage 
of the male workforce plus the male claimant count.
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through the inclusion of a variable for the proportion of the population aged 
between 15 and 24.
Mid-year population estimates, produced by the Office for National 
Statistics, are provided here for each police-force area and local authority. These 
estimates represent the most recently available population estimates when the data 
were originally published. Figures for mid-2002 to mid-2007 were updated in 
2010. In most cases, police-force areas in England and Wales correspond fairly 
closely to local authority districts. However, there are ten cases where local 
authorities have to be aggregated up to make police-force areas. These are Avon 
and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, West 
Mercia, Northumbria, Sussex, Thames Valley, North Wales, South-Wales, and 
Dyfed-Powys.
Figure 3.1 presents the male and total unemployment for England and 
Wales. It shows that the greater share of the total unemployment corresponds to 
male unemployment and that it follows the total trend closely throughout the time 
period.
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Figure 3.1
Unemployment rate: Male and Total, from 1992 to 2007 (Source: ONS 2009)
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Figure 3.2 plots the growth rates for recorded crime in the three categories, 
and the annual growth rates in male unemployment over the period 1992 to 2007 
for England and Wales. The annual growth rates seem to follow similar patterns 
over most of the period. This suggests a possible relationship and motivates us to 
study the matter further.
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3.4 Reilly and Witt (1996) Revisited
3.4.1 Motivation
In this section, we adopt the methodology used by Reilly and Witt (1996) 
and replicate their work on new data at the police-force area for England and Wales 
for the period 1992 to 2007. We are motivated by the small literature on England 
and Wales that takes looks at the increase in crime towards in the late 1990s. We 
round up this section by comparing our finding for the period 1992 to 2007 with 
those of Reilly and Witt (1996) for the period 1980 to 1991.
In section 3.6 we aim to improve on Reilly and Witt (1996) by adopting an 
instrumental variable estimation and using a GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1998). This should resolve the potential endogeneity between 
crime and deterrence, and the potential measurement error in criminal activity.
3.4.2 Analysis on New Data
The analysis is based on a panel o f 42 police-force a r e a s i n  England and 
Wales over the period 1992 to 2007 that initially provide 672 observation points. 
As stated in the previous section, the crime categories examined are burglary (B), 
theft (F) and robbery (R). In their natural logarithmic forms these are denoted by b, 
f  and r respectively. The empirical proxies for the deterrent variables, S (sentence 
length) and C (clear-up rate), are denoted in their natural logarithmic forms by  ^
and c respectively. In addition, the natural logarithm of the unemployment rate (U)
There are 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales. In this study the City of London 
police-force area is amalgamated with the Metropolitan police district since the total notifiable 
offences recorded by the City police force is relatively small.
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is denoted by u; A denotes the first difference operator: and t the time period. The
following table defines the main variables more precisely.
Table 3.1 
Variable Definitions and Sources
Var Definition Source
B burglary per 1000 of the estimated resident population at mid-year.
Home Office Research & 
Statistics Dept.
F theft per 1000 of the estimated resident population at mid-year
Home Office Research & 
Statistics Dept
R robbery per 1000 of the estimated resident population at mid-year
Home Office Research & 
Statistics Dept
C proportion of recorded offences solved by the police, divided by the total number of offences
Home Office Research & 
Statistics Dept
S
U
average sentence length
Male unemployment rate (narrow and 
workforce-based definitions)
Ministry of Justice 
(1992-^2007) 
Department of 
Employment & Office of 
National Statistics
Replicating the OLS estimates (Table 1 in Reilly and Witt, 1996) we obtain 
the following:
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Table 3.2
Supply of Offences: Log levels form (1992-2007)
Independent variables ht ft r t
S t -0.128** -0.037* 0.043
(0.045) (0.021) (0.051)
Ct -0.140** -0.243** -0.286**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.036)
U t -0.062 -0.043 -0.003
(0.041) (0.027) (0.062)
Area fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Wald (djM l) 97.21** 107.50** 118.98**
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Wald (df=15) 30.55** 25.85** 13.04**
(adjusted) 0.934 0.935 0.951
Observations 672 672 672
** and * denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels receptively 
with standard errors in parentheses. Hypothesis relating to area and time effects 
were tested using Wald joint significance test. . _
We expect a negative correlation between crime rates and clear-up rates and 
sentencing length and a positive correlation between crime rates and male 
unemployment.
The equations reported in Table 3.2 include two sets of binary variables, 
one designed to capture police-force area-specific fixed effects for the 42 areas, and 
the other year effects. This two-way fixed effects specification allows each area 
and each year its own intercept term but keeps the slope effects for the deterrent 
variables constant both across police-force area and through time. The inclusion of 
the time effects in particular are designed to capture the effects of possible changes 
in victim reporting behaviour and/or recording practices and procedures over time. 
The area-specific fixed effects could also be viewed as controlling for, among other
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things, spatial variation in reporting and recording of crime which, are treated as 
time-invariant.
As in Reilly and Witt (1996), the estimates reported in Table 3.2 could be 
viewed as static long-run estimates. The deterrent effects take the expected sign 
throughout the three equations. The unemployment rate appears to exert little 
influence in any of the three equations. On the basis of likelihood ratio tests, both 
the area-specific fixed effects and the time effects are seen to be statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Excluding the area-specific fixed effects from the 
specifications reported in Table 3.2 leads to the unemployment coefficients 
becoming positive and attaining statistical significance for all three crime 
categories. This suggests that the area-specific fixed effects are capturing, among 
other things, unemployment effects.
Applying a first difference operator to the static equations of Table 3.2 
removes relevant long-run information and eliminates the fixed effects. This is 
confirmed by calculation of likelihood ratio tests for the exclusion of the area fixed 
effects from the specifications ultimately reported in Table 3.3^^ Indeed, all the 
estimated coefficients, including the unemployment coefficients reported, remain 
invariant to the exclusion of area fixed effects.
If the null hypotheses are given by the specifications reported in Table 3.3, the computed 
likelihood ratio values for testing the exclusion of the area fixed effects (with 41 degrees of 
freedom) are 15.44, 4.65 and 3.96 for burglary, theft, and robbery respectively none with statistical 
significance conventional level.
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Table 3.3
Independent variables Abt Aft Art
l^St -0.010 -0.033** -0.045
(0.028) (0.015) (0.037)
-0.053** -0.144** -0.199**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.029)
Aut 0.153** 0.047** 0.031
(0.029) (0.023) (0.059)
Constant -0.047** -0.037** 0.038**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009)
Area fixed effects No No No
Time effects No No No
(adjusted) 0.069 0.124 0.068
Observations 630 630 630
** denote statistical significance at the 
parentheses
5% level with standard errors in
Given the logarithmic nature of the variables in the static equation, the 
difference transformation yields growth rate variables. Table 3.3 reports OLS 
estimates of these first difference models. The inclusion o f a constant term captures 
trend effects in the growth rates of the various categories o f crime. In all three 
equations the pairs of deterrent variables register correct a priori signs, with four of 
the six estimated coefficients achieving statistical significance at conventional 
levels using two-tailed tests. As was the case in the static equation, the clear-up rate 
elasticities in all three cases are numerically larger than their sentence length 
counterparts. A noteworthy feature of Table 3.3 is the significant effect o f the 
growth in unemployment on burglary and theft categories.
At the comparable stage of their analysis Reilly and Witt (1996) point to the 
possible mis-specifications in the previous models and the simultaneity problem
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that may exist between crime and the deterrent variables. An increase in crime 
might lead to the judiciary passing harsher and longer sentences. As a result 
sentencing length could be viewed as endogenous to this model as well as the 
endogeneity problem arising from the inclusion of the clear-up rate variable. If  the 
police resources are constant, a rise in crime rate could be associated with a 
decrease in the clear-up rates because less time is allocated to clear-up each 
offence.
The traditional solution to the above simultaneity problem has been the 
estimation of simultaneous equations designed to account for the endogeneity of 
the deterrent variables. Wo Ip in (1980) views the identification restrictions used in 
such models as unintended and adopts a single-equation approach, using the 
justification that the effects of crime rates on sentencing are negligible. If a positive 
correlation does exist between sentence length and offences, the task of uncovering 
a negative deterrent effect is more difficult and any single-equation estimate may 
be subject to a downward bias in absolute terms. In the case of the clear-up rate 
variable, given the discussion above, an upward bias is a more likely outcome.
At this stage of the analysis Reilly and Witt (1996) point to a possible long- 
run relationship between the various crime rates and the deterrent variables with a 
short-run role for the unemployment rate, other things equal. To address the 
potential endogeneity of the deterrent variables the analysis exploits the time 
dimension of the data set. Reilly and Witt (1996) suggest that a convenient way of 
modelling long-run and short-run effects, without imposing any restrictions on the
Both of these points will be further discussed in the limitations and biases section
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relationship between short-run and long-run responses, is through use of an 
unrestricted ECM model (Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991). The advantage of the 
error-correction model is its ability to capture both long and short-term dynamics in 
a single-equation framework.
The unrestricted ECM model expresses the difference of the dependent 
variable (the crime rate) as functions of lagged levels and differences in the 
explanatory variables. Table 3.4 reports estimates based on such a model. The 
inclusion of fixed effects biases the coefficient on the lagged variable and 
Instrumental Variable (IV) procedures are thus required. As in Reilly and Witt 
(1996), this is not done here due to the difficulty in finding appropriate instruments. 
Unemployment enters the ECM contemporaneously in first difference form and is 
implicitly assumed to be weakly exogenous (Muscatelli and Hum, 1992). The 
potential endogeneity of the deterrent variables is treated through their inclusion in 
the ECM in lagged difference form.
Including the deterrence variable in the lagged difference eliminates their 
potential endogeniety. This will mean that growth in crime rates cannot affect 
lagged growth in sentence length or clear-up rate. Furthermore, Crow et al. (1989) 
and Gill and Fry (1988) argue that that unemployment may influence the 
sentencing policy of the judiciary. The contemporaneous treatment o f the 
unemployment rate combined with the lagged treatment of the sentencing variables 
ensure that this does not create a problem in our case.
Table 3.4 reports the ECM estimates of the effect of deterrence measures 
and unemployment on crime. The long-run estimates are relatively sensible for a
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majority o f the cases. The majority o f the elasticities are signed in a manner 
consistent with the predictions of Becker’s economic model of crime. The short- 
run or impact effects of the deterrence measures take the expected sign in five of 
the six different cases. The short-run effects of the detection rate are negative and 
statistically significant for the different types of crime.
Table 3.4
Independent variables Abt Aft Art
bt-i -0.234** -------- ———
(0.029) -------- —
fi-i --- -0.293** —
-------- (0.031) —
' n-i -------- --- -0.347**
-------- -------- (0.034)
St-I -0.092** 0.018 -0.037
(0.042) (0.021) (0.061)
Ct-1 0.009 -0.044** -0.041
(0.016) (0.020) (0.060)
Ast-1 0.009 -0.017 -0.014
(0.032) (0.016) (0.041)
Act-i -0.025** -0.051** -0.067**
(0.014) (0.021) (0.031)
Aut 0.194** 0.131** 0.381**
(0.055) (0.041) (0.102)
Area fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Walt test (df=41) 1.83** 2.32** 2.53**
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Wald test (df=13) 22.91** 24.82** 24.89**
(adjusted) 0.362 0.432 0.437
Observations 630 630 630
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level with standard errors in 
parentheses. Hypotheses relating to area and time effects were tested using Wald 
test.
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As for the unemployment effects, for all three crime categories (burglary, 
theft and robbery), obtain a well-determined positive unemployment effect. This 
explains the role which unemployment plays in the determination of the three 
acquisitive criminal activities explored in this study. A one-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate yields a 0.19 (0.13, and 0.381) percentage point 
increase in burglary (theft and robbery).
The results in Table 3.4 are used to derive the long- run elasticities 
presented in Table 3.5 for the two deterrent variable used in our analysis. The 
deterrent effects appear strongest for the burglary category, and comparable to 
findings from Lewis (1986) on sentencing. The strong sentencing effects obtained 
for burglary relative to robbery are somewhat surprising given that the latter crime 
has a higher probability o f securing a custodial sentence than the former.
Table 3.5
Long-run sentence length and clear-up rate elasticities (1992-2007)
Sentence length Clear-up rate
Burglary -0.393 0.040
Theft 0.061 -0.153
Robbery -0.106 -0.118
^Elasticities are derived from Table 3.4
The clear-up rate elasticity is numerically greater than the severity elasticity 
for two of the three categories. The current results are comparable to the findings of 
some previous British studies which have emphasized the dominance o f detection 
effects over severity effects in deterrence (e.g. Carr-Hill and Stern, 1973).
The three equations could be said to perform reasonably well in terms of the 
estimated effects. While burglary possesses the largest numerical values, the theft 
and robbery categories report long-run clear-up rate elasticities that are
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dimensionally comparable to that for the burglary category. But their respective 
estimated sentence length elasticities appear relatively small when compared with 
the average estimates obtained previously in Lewis (1986)*^ who summarizes the 
finding of the literature on the severity of punishment.
The findings reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide support for Becker’s 
economic theory of criminal behaviour as the majority of the long-run elasticities 
of the deterrent variables are signed in a manner consistent with Becker’s theory. It 
is, nevertheless, worth making a number of general points about the interpretation 
of these elasticities. Lewis (1986) questions the interpretation of the sentence- 
length effect as a pure deterrent effect since it may confound genuine deterrence 
with an incapacitation effect (one that leads to a reduction in crime because o f the 
restriction on criminals to commit crimes while in prison (see Wo Ip in, 1978 for 
some evidence). This caveat is worth noting, but Ehrlich (1981) argues that a pure 
deterrence effect generally accounts for more than 90 per cent of estimated 
sentence elasticities (mainly due to two reasons (1) individuals might still offend 
during their imprisonment and (2) imprisonment could increase the chances of 
recidivism). A real life example of the effect of deterrence is the 2006 Italy 
Collective Clemency Bill, Drago et a l (2009) discussed in the main literature.
We now turn to an analysis of the area-specific fixed effects predicted fi*om 
the ECM estimation. In examining the effects of unemployment and the deterrent 
variables on criminal activity, we treated the police-force area-specific effects as 
fixed. It might be instructive to explore the fixed factors (aside from issues relating
Sentence length elasticities found by Lewis(1986): Burglary -0.336, Theft -0.283 Robbery -0.471
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to the reporting and recording of crime already raised) that were being controlled 
for implicitly in the specifications reported in Table 3.4. It uncovers why some 
areas have higher crime rates than others. The Census of 2001 allows the derivation 
of certain variables that have changed little over the respective periods spanning 
our analysis. The Census data provide an ideal opportunity to unpack the factors 
that influence the fixed effects and dig deeper into other factors that may determine 
recorded criminal activity. Thus, in order to roughly examine these area-specific 
fixed effects, we regress the estimated fixed effects for each crime category on a set 
of socio-economic variables obtained from the 2001 C e n s u s T h e  role of social 
privation is proxied through the inclusion of a variable for the proportion of 
households with 1-3 rooms. This variable could be interpreted as proxying the 
housing conditions and our priors suggest a positive effect in this case. Clearly, this 
is only one indicator and it is acknowledged that there is no universally accepted 
definition o f deprivation (Carstairs and Morris, 1991).
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results based on the fixed effects regressions. 
The relationship between recorded criminal activity and age structure is explored 
through the inclusion of a variable for the proportion of the population aged 
between 15 and 24. Given that young people are more likely to engage in criminal 
activity, a positive correlation is expected.
In the cases where police-force areas do not correspond to local authority areas, the Census data 
were aggregated up by calculating a weighted average using the total number of households or the 
relevant resident population group on Census night in 2001 in each county as the appropriate 
weights. A problem posed by use of the Census data is that some local authorities spill over into the 
Metropolitan Police District (Essex, Hertfordshire, and Surrey). For the purposes of this study it is 
assumed that such boundary anomalies do not alter the nature of the relationship under 
consideration.
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As in Reilly and Witt (1996), the population to area density variable is 
included to assess the possible effects of urbanization on crime. It could either be 
explained as the greater the population density the greater the opportunity set 
available to criminals, or the greater the population to area density the more 
urbanized the area and thus the lesser the social control. Both explanations suggest 
a positive effect.
Table 3.6
Regressions of fixed effects on income and socio -economic
Independent variables Burglary F.E. Robbery F.E.
household income -0.216 -0.261* -0.519**
Per capita (log) (0.150) (0.137) (0.257)
Population to area density 0.046** 0.037** 0.152**
(log) (0.004) .^(0.016) (0.032)
% population aged (15-24) 0.069** 0.062** 0.154**
(0.005) (0.021) (0.038)
%population higher 0.005 0.004 0.003
education (0.014) (0.005) (0.011)
% Head of Household bom -0.007 -0.006 0.004
in Common Wealth (0.001) (0.004) (0.010)
% of households with 1-3 0.001 0.004 0.013
rooms (0.001) (0. 005) (0.009)
Constant 1.203** 1.660 -1.882**
(0.333) (1.220) (0.907)
(adjusted) 0.369 0.316 0.241
Observations 42 42 42
Heteroscedasticity (hottest) 2.39 3.05 0.83
Ramsey’s RESET 0.30 0.32 1.52
Normality (sktest) 14.5** 20.88** 19.68**
*Fixed effects estimates obtained from specifications reported in Table 3.4. All independent
variables relate to data for 2001.___________ ____________________________________________
The variable for the proportion of the population in a police-force area with
higher education qualifications is designed to measure the possible opportunity cost
associated with criminal activity. Individuals with high levels of education are less
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likely to engage in crime given that they may incur, if caught, a large financial cost 
both in terms of their unusable and/or their depreciated human capital. Thus, one 
would expect that the greater the level of education in given areas, the lower the 
crime rate.
Finally, we also include a per capita household income variable in all the 
specifications reported. Ideally this particular variable should have entered the 
panel specifications reported in Table 3.4. Due to the unavailability o f household 
income by police-force area over the full time period of our study, its inclusion was 
not possible. Its availability for the 2001 Census year of our study facilitates its 
inclusion in the specifications reported in Table 3.6. Its interpretation is not straight 
forward. It could-define the opportunity set available to the criminal in a given 
area. Where the greater this is, the greater the potential for crime, and thus a 
positive relationship between offences and household income is expected. 
Moreover it can exert an important influence on criminal activity; not through its 
implication for available crime but through the fact that lower levels o f household 
income reduce the opportunity cost of committing crime (nothing to lose). Under 
this interpretation, a negative effect is expected.
As expected, a crime increase from young person is also seen in the 
percentage of young people in society in row (3) for all crime categories. The 
population density variable is significant for burglary, theft and robber. The 
education variable exerts a small and statistically insignificant effect in the three 
equations. The percentage of households with one to three rooms variable 
controlling for social privation is estimated as positive throughout the three crime
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categories. The per capita household income variable is negative and significant 
for theft and robbery but insignificant for burglary. It could be argued that 
household income may simply perform a proxying role for the unemployment rate. 
In the specifications reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.4, the effects of the long-run 
unemployment rate were absorbed within the estimated fixed effects.
In order to complement the analysis reported in Table 3.6, Table 3.7 
presents estimates for the same specifications augmented by an unemployment rate 
variable. This is calculated as the police-force area-specific average (1992—2007) 
unemployment rate. The averaging procedure helps eliminate business cycle effects 
and is intended to provide an approximation for a long-run unemployment rate. 
Results reported in Table 3.7 show the estimated per capita household income 
coefficients to maintain statistical significance at conventional levels for both theft 
and robbery. The estimated unemployment coefficients are insignificant throughout 
the three equations. Thus, we are unable to provide evidence that household 
income is proxying an unemployment effect. Lastly, the population density and 
share of young people of the population hold statistical significance in the 
specification presented in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7
Regressions of fixed effects on income, socio-economic variables and the
unemployment rate
Independent variables Burglary F.E. Robbery F.E.
household income -0.256 -0.286* -0.610**
Per capita (log) (0.164) (0.149) (0.278)
Population to area density 0.051 ** 0.041 0.165**
(bg) (0.020) (0.018) (0.034)
% population aged (15-24) 0.072** 0.064** 0.161**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.041)
%population higher -0.004 0.001 -0.006
education (0.009) (0.008) (0.015)
% Head of Household bom -0.008 -0.006 &002
in Common Wealth (0.005) (&005) (0.009)
% of households with 1-3 0.004 0.005 0.019*
rooms (0.007) (0. 006) (0.012)
% unemp rate -0.063 -0.038 -0.145
(0.097) 01088) (0.170)
Constant 1.670 1.941 1.949
(1.542) (1.339) (1.606)
(adjusted) 0J58 0.301 0.770
Observations 42 42 42
Heteroscedasticity (hottest) 2 J7 283 1.01
Ramsey’s RESET &28 0A3 1.38
Normality (sktest) 14.45** 12.96** 6.84**
*Fixed effects estimates obtained Jfrom specifications reported in Table 3.4. All independent 
variables relate to data for 2001. See notes under Table 3.2 for starring conventions adopted.
3.4.3 Changes Over Time
Our analyses for the 1992 to 2007 period on England and Wales support 
Becker’s economic theory and the effect of deterrence measures. As presented in 
Table 3.8, comparing the findings with those for 1980-1991 in Reilly and Witt
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(1996) show very similar (sign and magnitude) sentencing length long-run 
elasticities for the three crime categories. We achieve clear-up long-run elasticity 
estimates with expected signs for two of the three categories with the burglary 
clear-up rate elasticity producing a positive but insignificant estimate. Reilly and 
Witt (1996) provide full evidence for the burglary category and although we 
achieve healthy negative estimates for the long-run deterrence effects on robbery, 
the coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Table 3.8
_______ Comparison o f main findings with those from Reilly and Witt (1996)_______
Burglary Theft Robbery
1980-91 1992-07 1980-91 1992-07 1980-91 1992-07
Sentence
elasticities -0.387** -0.393** 0.146* 0.061 -0.092 -0.106
CleaNOp
elasticities -0.249** 0.040 -0.253** -0.153** 0.040 -0.118"
Growth
unemp. 0.172** 0.194** 0.120** 0.131** &098 0.381**
** and * denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively._________
Similar to results by Reilly and Witt (1996) for the period 1980 to 1991,
higher responsiveness of long-run effects than the short-run effects are achieved for 
deterrence measures. On the other hand, the growth in unemployment appears to 
have a strong impact effect on the three crime categories. Like Reilly and Witt 
(1996) we find a robust effect of the age structure and the deprivation variables and 
identify the important and consistent role they play in the determination o f all three 
types of criminal activity (Tables 3.6 and 3.7).
Through the analysis of the later trends in crime, which peaked in the late 
90s, it appears that agents are behaving in the manner explained by Becker’s 
theory. In four out of the six cases, the deterrence elasticities for the new sample 
take the expected sign. Deterrence measures along with policies increasing
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people’s awareness are helping to reduce crime. Moreover, influencing the 
attitudes and perception of social norms of potential criminals also share credit for 
the later decrease in crime.
3.5 Limitations and Shortcomings of the Analysis
As discussed in literature chapter, the average sentence length used as a 
deterrent variable can be viewed as endogenous to our model due to the 
incapacitation effect it creates. This will impose an upward bias on our estimates 
and over-estimate the effect of sentence length as a deterrence measure. Another 
issue to consider is the strong negative correlation between arrest rates and reported 
crime rates. This particular issue will be discussed extensively in the next chapter 
when we test the effect of the changing labour market conditions on arrest in the 
US. While this relationship has often been interpreted as a support for the 
deterrence hypothesis, it is equally consistent with incapacitation effects, and/or a 
spurious correlation that would be induced by measurement error in reported crime 
rates.
Another potential limitation of our previous specification in equations (1), 
(2) and (3) is the endogeneity problem arising from the inclusion of the clear-up 
rate as an explanatory variable. If police resources are constant, a rise in crime rate 
could be associated with a decrease in the clear-up rates because less time is 
allocated to clear-up each offence. This will lead to misinterpretation of the effect 
of clear-up rate on crime. Another problem in the previous analysis is created by 
the use of the sentencing length as an explanatory variable and not controlling for 
its simultaneity with crime. An increase in crime might lead to the judiciary
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passing harsher and longer sentences. As a result sentencing length could be 
viewed as endogenous to our model.
Reilly and Witt (1996) adopt the error-correction mechanism to control for 
the endogeneity of the deterrence variables by including them in our model in the 
lagged differenced form. However, the ECM falls short in a number of ways. The 
inclusion of the fixed effects biases the coefficients on the lagged dependent 
variable in the ECM. It is known that parameter estimates in dynamic systems with 
fixed effects are downward biased, see Nickel (1981). This essentially involves 
estimating the equation (3) in first-differences. However, the presence of the lagged 
crime rate as an explanatory variable invalidates any conclusions from such 
traditional fixed effect luodels (see Baltagi 2008; Hsiao 1986, 2003).
Furthermore, estimation o f this form of crime equation poses more 
challenges and in order to produce non-biased and consistent estimates of the effect 
of deterrence and unemployment on the occurrence of crime, any proposed 
specification should address the issues of persistence of crime and measurement 
errors.
Persistence:
An important issue neglected in the Reilly and Witt (1996) analysis is that a 
significant proportion of crime is committed by a relatively small group of 
persistent or prolific offenders. Glaeser et al. (1996) show how crime rates tend to 
persist over time across areas where previous crime incidence is high, which can be 
interpreted as showing important dynamic processes (that may be due to peer
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group, neighbourhood effects, prolific offenders, or other dynamics) in the 
evolution of crime.
Introducing dynamics, through the lagged dependent variable, captures area 
persistence in criminal activity. It might be argued that the ECM specification in 
the Reilly and Witt (1996) analysis controls for persistence as it includes some 
form of the lagged dependent variable. However, the inclusion of the fixed effects 
in the ECM potentially biases the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
(Hsiao, 1986). Inclusion of lagged endogenous variable as an explanatory variable 
requires us to adopt an instrumental variable estimation by using a GMM estimator. 
Measurement Error:
The issues of measurement error associated with aggregate variables are 
severe for most types of crime data. Under-reporting is most pronounced for low- 
value property crime (e.g., common theft). We attempt to reduce the biases caused 
by measurement errors by, first, choosing the types of crime that are least likely to 
be affected by under-reporting and, second, employing an econometric 
methodology that deals with systematic measurement error. Robberies are crimes 
against property that include a violent component, which means that the victim has 
two reasons to report the crime. Though burglary, theft and robbery are good 
proxies for overall crime, our conclusions apply to criminal activities broadly 
understood. The use of panel data allows us to control for the effect of unobserved 
variables that vary little over time and can be considered as area-specific effects. In 
the context of crime regressions, the most important unobserved area-specific 
effect is the systematic error involved in the measurement of crime rates. By
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controlling for these specific effects, we are reducing the estimation bias due to the 
under-reporting of crime.
Approach:
To tackle the earlier issues along with the simultaneity problem as the 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, Nickell (1981) has 
shown that even if the “fixed effects” (F.E.) or Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) is used, lagged dependent variable will still be correlated with the error 
term and this will bias our estimates.
The usual approach for dealing with this problem is to start by first 
differencing the data to remove the time-invariant component. Then, because 
differenced lagged dependent variable 'correlated with the first difference error 
term it is necessary to instrument for it. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) have suggested 
using D t / / - 2  or yu.2  as an instrument as these terms are not correlated with the error 
term. But Arellano (1989) showed that an estimator that uses the levels for 
instruments has no singularities and displays much smaller variances than does the 
analogous estimator that uses differences as estimators.
To solve the problem of endogeneity of the deterrent variables (as causality 
may run in both directions) one would usually use fixed effects instrumental 
variables estimation (two-stage least squares or 2SLS). In the absence of adequate 
instruments the fixed effects IV estimators are likely to be biased in the way of the 
OLS estimators. Therefore, we use the Arellano -  Bond (1991) difference GMM 
estimator first proposed by Holtz-Eakin et ah (1988). Instead of using only the 
exogenous instruments lagged levels of the endogenous regressors are also added.
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This makes the endogenous variables pre-determined and, therefore, not correlated 
with the error term in our model.
3.6 GMM Estimation
Two types of GMM estimations could be utilized in our estimations. One 
developed by Arellano-Bond (1991) starts by transforming all regressors, usually 
by differencing, and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen 1982), and 
so is called “difference GMM.” An alternative well developed dynamic panel 
estimator has become becoming increasingly popular among economists is the 
Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator. Both are general 
estimators designed for situations with (1) “small T , large N” panels, meaning-few 
time periods and many areas; (2) a linear functional relationship; (3) a single left- 
hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; (4) 
independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past 
and possibly current realizations of the error; (5) fixed individual effects; and (6) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within areas, but not across them.
The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments Are llano-Bond by 
making an additional assumption, that first differences of instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more 
instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a system of two 
equations—the original equation as well as the transformed one—and is known as 
the System GMM.
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We start our analysis by applying the Arellano and Bond (1991) to handle 
unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity between crime and deterrence 
(measured by clear-up rates and sentence length).
We set up the dynamic model as follows:
Cr is the crime rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) by crime category for police-force 
area i in year t. The deterrence, which is treated as endogenous, is represented by 
the clear-up rate and average sentence length. The variable Unemp is the 
unemployment rate and is considered to be exogenous. All "variables are measured 
in natural logarithms. The GMM will help us deal with the lagged crime variable 
and the endogenous variables (i.e. these variables are instrumented with suitable 
lags of their own levels).
To cope with problem of the fixed effects the difference GMM uses first- 
differences to transform our model. By transforming the regressors by first 
differencing the fixed area-specific effects are removed, because they do not vary 
with time. For the problem of autocorrelation due to the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable the lagged dependent variable is also instrumented with its past 
levels.
A robust variance-covariance matrix is used to obtain auto correlated and 
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors for the coefficients. Given that we have 
more instruments (previous values of the explanatory variable) than the parameters
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to be estimated (over-identified model), we carry out the Sargan/Hansan test of 
over-identifying restrictions. A potential problem with this difference GMM 
estimators is that moment conditions can increase prolifically. In particular, the 
number o f instruments is quadratic in the time dimension of the panel. This can 
cause problems in finite samples. And according to Roodman (2009) a finite 
sample may lack adequate information to estimate such a matrix well. It can 
potentially weaken the Sargan/Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions to the 
point where it generates “very” good p-values of 1 (See Anderson and Sorenson 
1996). This can be addressed by using a system GMM which combines moment 
conditions for the model in first differences with moment conditions for the model 
in levels (discussed in Sectioîr3.7).
3.7 Results
Tables 3.9, 3.10 & 3.11 present the different GMM estimates for the supply 
of burglary theft and robbery respectively. Column 1 of Table 3.9 presents OLS 
estimates on the levels with the lagged dependent variable and the levels of the 
deterrence and unemployment variables used. The second column presents the 
within-groups with the time trends. The third column of Table 3.9 provides the 
difference GMM with the lagged dependent variables the clear-up rate, average 
sentence length as well as the unemployment rates are specified as endogenous.
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Table 3.9
015' F.E.
Independent variable bt bt bt bt
bt-i 0.963** 0.761** 0.743** 0.825**
(0:010) (0.024) (0.061) . (0.030)
Ct -0.038** 0.069** -0.110** -0.101**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.025) (0.044)
St -0.028 -0.255** -0.113*0.104**
(0.024) (0.029) (0.053) (0.074)
Ut -0.006 -0.032 -0.058 0.059**
(0.011) (0.026) (0.041) (0.031)
Waldjoint sig o f exp vars 932.8** 515.7** 12774.1** 17080.5**
(77, 6 # (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan test (38 dof) — — . 27.61 24.47
(0.999) (1.000)
Diff-Sar(156-114 doj) — — --- -1.9Y_
(24.47-36.41 dsar) (1.000)
AR(1) serial correlation --- — -4.94** -5.20**
(0.000) (0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- — -1.01 -0.98
(0.311) (0.326)
R-squared 0.972 0.944 --- ---
Area fixed effects No Yes --- ---
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 630 630 588 630
Notes: Standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and presented
in parentheses. The p-value of the Wald test of a joint significance of all explanatory variables is
reported. Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, p-value is
reported. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests o f first-order and second-order serial correlation.
asymptotically N(0,1), p-value is reported. GMM results are one-step estimates, (b, c s ). These
variables are instrumented by lagged own values. ^^Significant at the 5% level ; * Significant at
the 10% level. Diff-sargan test (null H = exogenous).
As discussed in the previous section, sometimes the lagged levels of the 
regressors are poor instruments for the first-differenced regressors. In this case, one 
should use the augmented version -  “system GMM”. The system GMM estimator 
uses the levels equation to obtain a system of two equations: one differenced and
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one in levels. By adding the second equation additional instruments can be 
obtained. Thus the variables in levels in the second equation are instrumented with 
their own first differences. This usually increases efficiency. The last column 
presents the system GMM estimates. We expect it to have better finite sample 
properties in terms of bias and root mean squared error than that of the DIF GMM 
estimator.
We present results based on our preferred specification which includes a 
lagged crime rate, and contemporaneous values of clear-up rate, sentence length, 
and unemployment rate as explanatory variables. It also includes a time trend and 
PFA fixed effects. We instrument for two potentially endogenous variables -  clear- 
up rate and sentence length by lagged values-of these variables. We have used the 
same lags for clear-up rate and sentence length as instruments, starting from lag 2. 
Similarly, for the lagged crime rate, we have used two lags starting from lag 2. 
This reveals a significant persistence in area crime rates, which may reflect peer 
effects at the local level or more general persistence in spatial crime rates. And on 
average, it appears that increasing the clear-up rate is an effective tool in combating 
different types of property crimes, whereas an increase in average sentence length 
does not automatically reduce crimes.
Focusing on the burglary results in Table 3.9, we find that across the 
different specifications burglary is highly persistent with a positive and statistically 
significant own-lagged coefficient. The own-lagged coefficient varies from a high 
of 0.94 in the OLS to 0.74 in the Difference GMM. Our findings are within the 
range of findings of earlier research on the England and Wales (Witt et a l, 1998,
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Han et a l, 2010 and Han, 2010). Property erime is expected to be highly 
correlated with business cycles and likely to be affected by recidivism. This 
explains the significance of burglary lagged coefficients.
An important feature of Table 3.9 is the strong and consistent negative 
effect of clear-up rates and average sentence length on burglary. For example, the 
GMM estimates of the clear-up coefficient register a value of -0.1. This implies 
that more police presence and effective policing are associated with lower burglary 
rates. Similarly, the GMM estimates of the average sentence length coefficient are 
consistent, negative throughout the four different specifications and significant for 
burglary implying that severer sentences constitute an effective deterrent against 
burglary crime rates.
Table 3.9 provides weak evidence that unemployment has an independent 
impact on burglary crime. Though, the system GMM^^ estimate in column (4) 
reveals positive and statistically significant effect of unemployment on burglary.
Moving on to theft analyses. Table 3.10 presents the various estimation 
results. The estimates of clear-up rate have eonstantly exhibited negative and 
significant correlation with theft across estimations. This result reflects the 
expectation that clear-up rate, as proxy for the probability of apprehension, should
A usefiil feature of xtabond2 is that different assumptions can be made about the validity of 
different instruments. This can be done by using two separate gmm(.) options.
The iv(i.year, equation(level)) option uses the year dummies as instruments for the equations in 
levels only. This treatment is specific to year dummies, and ensures that the correct number of 
moment conditions of the form E[uit - ct] = 0 are used. For other strictly exogenous variables used 
as iv-style instruments, the equation(level) restriction would not normally be used.
The h(l) option uses 2SLS as the one-step estimator. This was also the case in the Blundell-Bond 
(2000) estimates.
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negatively affect crime rate (theft in this case) through both deterrence and 
incapacitation effects.
Table 3.10
F.E.
Independent variables f ft ft ft
bt-i 0.947** 0.698** 0.671** 0.775**
(0.009) (0.026) (0.055) (0.037)
Ct -0.064** -0.142** -0.145** -0.162**
(0.010) (0.016) (0.025) (0.048)
S t 0.008 0.001 -0.021 -0.043
(0.013) (0.015) (0.035) (0.038)
Ut 0.004 -0.023 -0.029 0.051**
(0.007) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 850.8** 560.7** 5807.8** 9890.8**
(75,630) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan test (41 dof) --- — 24.77 25.80
(1.000) (1.000)
--- --- --- -2.46
(25.80-28.26 dsar) (1.000)
AR(1) serial correlation -------- -4.68** -5.21**
(0.000) (0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation —-- — — — -1.15 -1.03
(0.250) (0.320)
R-squared 0.966 0.892 -------- --------
Area fixed effects No Yes -------- --------
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 630 630 588 630
*See notes of Table 3.9
The impact of sentencing length, on the other hand, displays unstable 
estimates over the different specifications. Its effect is positive in the OLS and the 
fixed effects, changes to negative in the GMM-DIFF and system GMM where we 
instrument for the deterrence variables by previous values as instruments. These 
changing estimates might be due to the judiciaries being lenient during times when
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prison population is high and vice versa. Hence, this limitation o f data may also 
bias the estimation results.
Based on our analyses, we do not obtain significant effects of 
unemployment on theft, just like the case of burglary. However, this alone is not 
enough to conclude that there is no correlation between unemployment and theft 
crime. Unemployment is known to have a motivation and opportunity effect on 
crime. Moreover, higher unemployment often indicates an economic dip which is 
reflected in lesser spending and thus fewer targets for potential thieves. As a result, 
the estimated insignificant coefficients suggest the noticeable existence that effects 
are roughly equally strong.
For all the different estimations, own-lagged coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant. More importantly the system GMM estimation shows a 
rather strong positive correlation between the contemporary and once-lagged crime 
rate of theft with a magnitude of 0.77. Furthermore, the estimation passes the over­
identification test indicating that the instruments used are valid.
Although it is classified as violent crime, robbery is motivated by monetary 
interest and thus is expected to be affected by the same factors as property crime. 
The estimates reported in Table 3.11 reflect the effect of deterrence and 
unemployment effects on robbery crime rates.
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Table 3.11
Supply of Robbery Offences: GMM Estimates (1992-2007)
015 F.E.
Independent variables rt rt rt n
rt-i 0.941** 0.656** 0.380** 0.787**
(0.011) (0.030) (0.083) (0.036)
Ct -0.159** -0.187** -0.325** -0.347**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.077) (0.083)
St -0.023 -0.005 -0.096 0.092
(0.037) (0.040) (0.061) (0.121)
Ut -0.005 -0.055 -0.060 0.106**
(0.019) (0.049) (0.115) (0.043)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 932.8** 515.7** 1298.3** 5494.9**
r75, 630) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan test (38 dof) --- — 29.07 23.68
(0.999) (1.000)
--- --- --- cO.93
(23.68-22.75 dsar) (1.000):^
AR(1) serial correlation --- -4.24** -4.02**
(0.000) (0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation ——— --- 1.62 1.82*
(0.105) (0.069)
R-squared 0.970 0.957 --- ---
Area fixed effects No Yes --- ---
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 630 630 588 630
*See notes of Table 3.9
Similar to burglary and theft, the estimates of the effect of the clear-up rate 
have constantly revealed a negative and significant correlation with robbery. 
Moreover, the estimates on the sentencing length displayed ambiguous effects on 
robbery crime rates over the different specifications.
When we instrument for unemployment in the system GMM, we find some 
evidence that the economically motivated violent crime of robbery is positively 
affected by unemployment rates. The magnitude of the robbery-unemployment
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effects in the last model is similar to the property crime effects, a reassuring finding 
considering that robbery, while a violent crime in nature, is motivated by the desire 
to steal someone else’s property. This finding, however, is not reproduced in the 
other specifications.
In sum, the deterrence variable, clear-up rate significantly affect different 
types of crime implying that it could be an effective tool to control such crimes. 
Although unemployment rate have significant positive signs in the system GMM 
for all crime categories, the magnitude of the effect is questionable.
Overall, the results suggest that there is indeed a finite sample bias problem 
caused by weak instruments in the differenced GMM results, which can be 
addressed by system GMM. The system GMM estimator also yields a considerable 
improvement in precision compared to difference GMM. Neither the basic Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions nor the difference-in-Sargan test, which focuses 
on the additional instruments used by the system GMM estimator, detect any 
problem with instrument validity. These additional instruments therefore seem to 
be valid and highly informative in this context.
Finally, we apply our preferred estimator, system GMM, on data used by 
Reilly and Witt (1996) from 1981 to 1992. The results reported in table 3.12 
confirm our previous findings on the effect of the certainty of the punishment as 
well as a significant persistence in area crime rates. As earlier discussed, this may 
reflect peer effects at the local level or more general persistence in spatial crime 
rates. The magnitude on the lagged dependent variable is even greater than that 
achieved on the later sample; this might be due to the upward trending crime rates
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during this period. Moreover, these analyses confirm that clear-up rate is an 
effective tool in combating the different crimes, whereas an increase in average 
sentence length does not automatically reduce crimes. However, the estimates on 
unemployment do not reflect a significant effect on burglary and theft offenses, but 
just on robbery rates.
It is difficult to compare our results to those of different specifications in 
Reilly and Witt (1996), nevertheless the preferred estimates presented here produce 
similar results to the fixed effects estimation in Reilly and Witt (1996) for the 
effect of sentencing length, clear-up rate and unemployment on the three crime 
types discussed here.
Table 3.12
Applying preferred GMM estimator on data used by 
Reilly and Witt (1996) (1980-1992)
Independent variables Burglary 7% ^ robbery
CVt-l 0.987** 0.988** 0.914**
(0.014) (0.009) (0.020)
Ct -0.103** -0.071** -0.202**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.101)
S t -0.098** -0.051* -0.043
(0.061) (0.061) (0.071)
U t 0.011 0.004 0.140**
(0.021) (0.011) (0.043)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 19133.6** 24843.9** 7918.41**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan test 28.58 29.93 31.73
(1.000) (0.998) (1.000)
Diff-Sar -3.04 2.13 -2.26
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Time effects (year dums) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 462 462 462
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Previous studies find convincing evidence of the validity o f deterrence 
measures. Farrington et al. (1994) examine crime and punishment trends in 
England and the U.S. and find substantial negative correlations between the 
likelihood of conviction (a "certainty" measure) and crime rates. Further research to 
confirm that these associations are attributable to deterrence found the statistical 
associations between severity of punishment and crime rates were much weaker 
and were not sufficient to achieve statistical significance.
The analysis in this chapter therefore concentrated on the effects of the; (1) 
certainty of punishment (e.g., the likelihood of being apprehended and convicted); 
and (2) severity of punishment (e.g., the length of the prison sentence). It is the 
issue of severity which is the primary concern. We conelude that, asAvith previous 
studies reviewed, our analysis do not provide a basis for inferring that increasing 
the severity of sentences generally is capable of enhancing deterrent effects. And to 
be able to test this specific mater more extensively a better measure o f severity is 
required. This measure should provide controls for the likelihood of a convicted 
offender being imprisoned.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we have used a panel of 42 police-force areas over 16 years 
to test Becker’s economic model of crime on the UK and provide an analysis of the 
effect of deterrence and unemployment on burglary, theft and robbery. The results 
support Becker’s economic model o f crime. The majority of the long-run 
elasticities of the deterrent variables are signed in a manner consistent with 
Becker’s theory. None of the short-run effects were found to be statistically
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significant at conventional levels. In general, the long-run effects were found to be 
more responsive than the short-run effects. The growth in male unemployment 
appears to impact strongly on both burglary and theft but with lesser significance 
on robbery over the time period considered.
But the inclusion of the fixed effects in the ECM potentially biases the 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable. Furthermore, in order to produce 
non-biased and consistent estimates the issues of the persistence o f crime, 
measurement errors and endogeneity of the deterrent variables should be addressed.
We adopt an instrumental variable estimation by using a GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to handle unobserved heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity between crime‘-and deterrence (measured by clear-up rates 
and sentence length). And by introducing dynamics, through the lagged dependent 
variable, we should capture area persistence in criminal activity.
Our analyses reveal that clear-up rates and own-lagged crime rates are the 
most significant predictors of all crime categories. Higher clear-up rate predicts 
lower burglary, theft and robbery crimes and higher past crimes positively predict 
current crime rates. However, the unemployment rate effects, although positive and 
significant in the system GMM for all crime categories, are less consistent through 
the different specifications.
Despite all the measure taken in this study, it still falls short on two 
instances. First, it is not ideal to have used the sentencing length as the only 
measure of severity of punishment. This measure of severity might not be 
adequately specified, since no controls are provided for the likelihood of a
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convicted offender to being imprisoned. Second, although our analysis provided 
some support for the Becker model, and also provided an important insight into 
other socio-economic factors influencing criminal activity, it is clear that further 
and deeper understanding of these relationships may be facilitated by investigations 
at the micro-level. The aggregate-level approach adopted here, while informative, 
can only serve to complement an individual-level approach.
In the next empirical chapter we build on the UK findings on the effect of 
the labour market conditions and deterrence measures with a US national study of 
the effect of the labour market conditions on crime. We adopt a similar empirical 
approach to the one used in this chapter and test the effect of the weekly earning 
and unemployment rate of non-college educated males, who are the most likely to 
offend, on US arrest rates.
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Chapter Four: Labour Market Conditions and 
Arrest Rates in the US.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the relationship between labour market 
conditions and arrest rates in the US. We focus on the changes in the labour market 
opportunities of those most likely to commit crime. Our research is motivated by 
the fact that labour market prospects of young, unskilled American men fell 
dramatically in the 1980s and then improved in the 1990s. On the other hand, crime 
rates show a reverse pattern increasing during 4he^  1980s and falling in the 1990s 
(Levitt, 1997). Since young, unskilled men commit most crime (Freeman, 1996), a 
connection between the two trends is suspected.
A number of studies have analysed the link between the unemployment rate 
and crime rates in the US (with a greater focus on property crime), some theorizing 
that in times of economic turmoil, people may turn to illicit rather than legal 
sources of income. However, a review by Congress Research Service (CRS) found 
a lack of consensus concerning whether the unemployment rate has any correlation 
with the property crime rate. A number of studies analysed by CRS that did find a 
correlation between the unemployment rate and the property crime rate generally 
examined time periods during which the unemployment and property crime rates 
moved together especially at the end of the 1990s.
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This study is the most representative in terms of population coverage and 
time period from 1964 to 2003 and the Metropolitan Statistical Area level. 
Moreover, the analyses in this chapter differ from the existing literature in two 
ways.
i) The Nature o f  the Dependent Variable
This is one of few large-scale studies to look at whether juvenile male crime 
rates are responsive to the labour market conditions of those most likely to commit 
crime, young unskilled men, rather than looking at whether crime rate respond to 
the general economic conditions o f the area. Using an age-specific dependent 
variable is a crucial feature according to Steffensmeier el al. (1989), given the 
strong age-dependency of froth employment and crime. The arrest statistics of the 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)^^ are virtually the only source of information on 
long-term trends in age and gender information of reported crime in the United 
States. The arrests data are available from the mid-1930s, but comparisons of UCR 
data over time are complicated by revisions in how UCR arrest statistics are 
collected. First, the way arrests are reported to the FBI has changed: fingerprint 
cards were used from the 1930s to 1951, arrest reports from 1952 to the present. 
Second, the classification of offences has changed: some categories have been
The Uniform Crime Reports are published by the United States Department of Justice Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. The UCR Program is a 
nationwide, cooperative statistical effort of over 18,000 city, university and college, county, state, 
federal, and other law enforcement agencies who voluntarily report data on crimes brought to their 
attention. Law enforcement agencies report monthly to the FBI offense and arrest data from the 
traditional Summary Reporting System (SRS) and the National Incident-Based Reporting System 
(NIBRS).
dropped, new ones added, and others combined or subdivided. Our analysis of 
trends in crime, therefore, is limited to index crime offence categories (a list of 
these offences with detailed definitions is available in Appendix A) for which 
arrest data have been collected continuously from 1964 to 2008. Finally, there have 
been slight changes in the definition of age groups. To make the analysis consistent 
over the whole period, we only use juvenile age-group. We use the labour market 
opportunities for people on the margin of legal and illegal activity and test its effect 
on the arrest rates of juvenile male group. This is justified by the fact that men 
engage in criminal activity at much higher rates than women and people between 
the ages of 16 and 24 are more likely to commit crime than the elderly, and those 
with relatively little education commit more crime than the higher educated.
ii) Measures o f  the Labour Market Conditions and Deterrence
Instead of concentrating only on the unemployment rate, we also measure 
the labour market prospects of potential criminals with the wages of low-skilled 
workers and test the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system represented by 
policing (police per capita). The MSA-level data utilized in this study are compiled 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's UCR arrest data and from the Census 
Bureau's annual March Current Population Survey (CPS) covering the years 1964- 
2008. Results are analysed separately for the four property and violent crimes 
included in the UCR Crime Index. The importance of understanding the 
crime/labour market relationship among young people is highlighted by recent 
debate concerning the strong relationship o f age to crime (see Fougere et a i, 2009). 
There is no question that rates of offending for index crimes are highest for the
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juvenile age-group for whom rates of unemployment and other labour market 
problems are also high. The fact that both labour market and crime indicators are 
strongly related to age could lead to spurious results in aggregate analyses based on 
totals for all ages.
We start the analysis by estimating the effect of wages and unemployment 
of the non-college educated on arrest rates using the standard OLS method. Then 
fixed effects are added to address the potential bias due to the correlation between 
the independent variables and time-invariant area characteristics. The third 
specification will include the lagged dependent variable to capture area crime 
persistence and will be estimated using the GMM technique. This will also control 
for the potential endogeneity of police per capita resulting from the reverse 
causality from arrest rate. As increased arrest rates due to higher crime could 
trigger higher investment by the government on police expenditure (hiring more 
police).
We find the labour market conditions to play an important role in determining 
the overall arrest rates, property arrest rates as well as each of the individual property 
crimes and surprisingly so for murder of the violent crimes.
4.2 Literature Review
Fleisher (1963, 1966) launched the attempts to examine how unemployment 
affects crime. Since then, the literature on crime and the labour market [Becker 
(1968), Ehrlich (1973), Freeman (1983), Chiricos (1987), Freeman (1995), Levitt 
(2004) and Blumstein & Wallman (2006)] spread across five decades presents a 
large gap between original theory and the later empirical work. While the
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hypothesis of growing labour markets reducing crime seems obvious and widely 
accepted, empirical results fail to show consistent evidence to support the theory. 
In this section we review the literature on the US that investigates the effects of 
labour market conditions on crime. These studies are important to us as they are 
closely related to our work. Then we extend our literature to cover closely related 
work from other countries.
Most of the research about labour markets and crime focuses on the United 
States, and the most commonly used source of aggregate data is the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s UCR. The initial research was focused at the national or state- 
level, but over time smaller areas of analysis like metropolitan areas and counties 
have been used. As discussed in the main literature chapter. Freeman (1995) and 
Levitt (2001) argue that the national-level time series data do not yield meaningful 
results.
Over time, the quality o f the research on crime and labour market improved 
in specification, coverage and methodology. Recent research (since late 90s) made 
substantial progress in resolving the previous problems by using panel data, two of 
which were briefly outlined in the literature review chapter (Raphael and Winter- 
Ember, 2001, and Gould et a l, 2002). For the purpose of this chapter we will 
present the latest US literature and contributions in time order. As the deterrence 
effect has been extensively discussed in the previous empirical chapter, here we 
focus on studies which consider the labour market and develop the GMM 
methodology to be used in the empirical analysis.
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In a first attempt to address the coverage and endogeneity issues, Doyle et 
al. (1999) use U.S. state-level panel data jfrom 1984 to 1993 to estimate how wages 
and unemployment influence crime. They use fixed effects models to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across states, and measure labour market opportunities 
with an expected wage that takes into account wages, unemployment 
compensation, and the unemployment rate. They find strong evidence that higher 
wages, especially those in low-skilled sectors, decrease both property and violent 
crime, and that wages explain a greater amount of variation in crime than do 
unemployment rates. In their state-level panel data set, they apply a GMM 
estimator to control for simultaneity bias and find strong evidence that wages 
decrease both property and violent crime and that income inequality has no effect 
on crime. They find that wages in the low-skilled sectors of wholesale and retail 
trade reduce crime, a result that is robust across many specifications. A one-percent 
increase in wages in the retail and wholesale sectors decreases crime by between 
0.3 and 0.9 percent. This effect of wages on crime is larger than the effect of 
unemployment on crime and the effect sizes are larger for property than violent 
crime.
Another significant contribution to the literature is the study by Raphael and 
Winter-Ember (2001), who use state-level panel data from 1970 to 1993, include 
state-specific time trends, state effects, and year effects. Their fixed effects results 
indicate that a substantial portion of the decline in property crime rates during the 
1990s is attributable to the decline in the unemployment rate, with much weaker 
effects on violent crime. They also use defence contracts and a state-specific
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measure of exposure to oil shocks as instruments for unemployment rates. Using 
2SLS they estimate that the elasticity of unemployment on property crime was 
about 2.8 to 5.0 percent. They find the results of unemployment on property crime 
rates to be stable across model specifications.
A comprehensive study by Gould et al. (2002) uses county, metropolitan 
area (MSA), and state-level panel data from 1979-1997 with time and area fixed 
effects. They use the weekly wage of non-college educated males and the retail 
wage, which is a proxy for the wages of non-college-educated men. They find that 
increases in the wages of low-skilled men reduce property crime more than violent 
crime and that wage measures are much more important than unemployment for 
explaining the changes in crime rates. They also explain the ten-year change in 
crime rates by the ten-year change in the average wage and unemployment rate of 
non-college men. This long-term regression approach also reduces the effect of 
measurement error problems in panel regression analyses. To develop instruments 
they interact three sources of variation that are exogenous to the change in crime 
within each state: (1) the initial industrial composition in the state, (2) the national 
industrial composition trends in employment in each industry, and (3) biased 
technological change within each industry, as measured by the changes in the 
demographic composition within each industry at the national-level. They conclude 
that both wages and unemployment of low-skilled males affects crime, and that the 
effect of wages on crime is greater than the effect of unemployment. Moreover, 
they show that endogeneity is not responsible for the significant relationship 
between the labour market conditions of unskilled workers and the various crime
93
rates. However Gould et al. (2002) evaluated the relationship between 
unemployment and the property crime rate between 1979 and 1997, and similarly 
found that the significance of the relationship was dependent on the time period. 
They found a strong, short-term correlation for the years 1993 through 1997, but 
determined that there was no evidence for a long-term relationship between 
unemployment and the property crime rate between 1970 and 1997.
Another notable contribution to the US literature is a study by Arvanites 
and Defina (2006) who use state-level panel data from 1986 to 2000 to study the 
conceptual framework of Cantor and Land (1985) that distinguishes between 
opportunity and motivation effects. They examine the influence of business cycle 
fluctuations on street crime. They conclude that the strong economy of the l#90s 
reduced all index property crimes and robbery. Although unemployment is 
correlated with overall economic conditions, it may not fully capture other key 
economic indicators such as work hours, employment stability, and wages.
In a more recent attempt to test the effect of unemployment on crime in the 
US, Lin (2008) analyses a panel of states from 1974 to 2000. Using OLS, Lin finds 
that a one-percentage-point increase in the average unemployment rate raises 
property crime by 1.8 percent. To instrument unemployment, Lin (2008) uses the 
changes in the real annual exchange rates multiplied by the percentage of state 
manufacturing sector employees o f GDP value. His 2SLS results indicate that the 
elasticity increases to about 4 to 6 percent, which is about two to three times larger 
than the OLS estimate, and explains about 30 percent of the property crime change 
during the 1990s. According to Zimring (2007), even looking within the 1990s,
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there is a stronger correlation between unemployment and the property crime rate 
in the late 1990s than in the early 1990s. Because the conclusions drawn about the 
relationship between unemployment and the property crime rate differ across 
shorter segments of time, it is difficult for researchers to predict the effect of 
unemployment rates on the property crime rate.
As we have reviewed the UK studies in the previous chapter, the majority 
of the findings reported in this review have concentrated on the US. Comparing 
these results shows similar findings when similar methodologies are used. These 
results generally document the presence of a positive and significant effect of 
unemployment on property crime. Similarly studies on Sweden (Edmark, 2005), 
Germany (Mehlum et al. 2006) and on France (Eougere et a l, 2009) make use of 
local panel data and find a positive and significant effects of unemployment on 
crime.
As well as considering unemployment, here we look at the effect of wages 
on crime. In a major contribution to the wage-crime literature, similar to Gould et 
al. (2002), Machin and Meghir (2004) examine how changes in wages at the 
bottom end of the distribution affect crime rates for England and Wales. They use 
the New Earnings Survey (NES) to obtain panel data on the police-force areas 
between 1975 and 1996. They use different wage measures to identify those who 
are on the margins of legal and illegal activity. They use the 25* percentile o f both 
the overall wage distribution, the wages in the retail sector where low skill workers 
typically work, and a selection corrected wage, which they interpret as the absolute 
value of the lower bound of the impact of wages on crime. They conclude that
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coefficient estimates of the unemployment rate are not statistically significant; once 
they control for wages, unemployment is of little importance. However, they also 
find that decreases in the wages o f low-wage workers increase vehicle, theft, and 
burglary.
4.3 Data
In this section we present the Uniform Crime Reports data used in the 
analysis on this chapter. In order to understand the arrest rate data we then compare 
it to more standard measures. Finally, we describe the data we use to measure 
labour market conditions and present the trends in the crime and unemployment
and criminal justice measures over our period of study. -
....................
The fact that both labour market conditions and crime indicators are 
strongly related to age and gender motivates the use of age and gender specific data 
on crime. The UCR arrest statistics are virtually the only source of information on 
long term trends in age and gender variations in crime in the US. The individual 
UCR arrests information is used to calculate the crime specific arrest rates for 
juvenile males at the MSA level for every year. This data is appended to form US 
crime data at the MSA level for the years 1964 to 2008. Parallel to this, the March 
CPS is the only source of individual data on the labour market conditions and 
education for the same time period at the MSA level. Finally the two data sets are 
merged to form the longest panel (45 years) on crime and the labour market at this 
disaggregated area level covering 95% of the US population.
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According to Cook et al. (2012), the latest development in data collection 
has been the matching of individual administrative criminal datasets with other data 
sources containing information on individuals as education and employment of 
very large samples of the population. This enables research into the complex 
dynamics between labour market opportunities and criminal participation at the 
individual level.
Figure 4.1 shows that the ratio of arrests to recorded crimes is a constant 
proportion over time for the period studied. This is a further reassurance of the 
validity of arrests rates s a good measure of crime.
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Figure 4.1
United States Trends in Arrests to Recorded Crime Indicies
♦  A rrests/R ecorded
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4.3.1 The UCR Arrests Data.
The aggregate arrest data used in this chapter comes from the FBI’s UCR. 
Merged with data from the CPS, it forms an unbalanced panel starting from 1964 to 
2008 at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
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The unit of analysis is the US MSA-level data for juveniles aged 14-17 for 
the years 1964-2008. The data (aggregated by MSA, year, gender and age-group) 
were drawn from data tapes of the FBI (1964-2008)^^. The data on arrests for 
aggravated assault, rape, murder, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft were 
aggregated from raw data made available by the FBI in the form of arrest counts by 
crime type and age subgroup for each MSA for the years 1964-2008. The measures 
for labour market variables and control variables were obtained from the Census 
Bureau's March Current Population Surveys for 1964-2008 and from publications 
of the U.S. Department of Justice (1964-2008). The various UCR, FBI, CPS, and 
other files were aggregated by MSA, gender and by age-group and merged. In 
the United States an MSA is a ^ographical region with a relatively high 
population density at its core and close economic ties throughout the area. The 
concept of an MSA did not change much with time but there was a variation in the 
population and coverage. This is essential to understand as the population 
distribution inside an MSA may differ by agency; we return to this below. We were 
limited by the number of MS As available in the CPS which identifies around 20 
MSAs before 1979, 42 MS As between 1979 and 1986 and about 220 MS As post 
1986 each year till 2008. N = 15000 [(20 MSAs x 16 years) + (42 MSAs x 7 years) 
+ (220 MSAs X  22 years)].
The Uniform Crime Reports are published by the United States Department 
of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) UCR Program. The UCR Program
^ With measurement errors (to be discussed below) long regressions are most suitable to control 
some of the variation. Griliches and Hausman (1986) and Levitt (1995) discussed advantages of the 
"long regression" in the presence of measurement error.
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is a voluntary city, university and college, county, state, and federal law 
enforcement program that provides a nationwide view of crime based on the 
submission of statistics by law enforcement agencies^^ throughout the country. In 
2007, law enforcement agencies active and reporting to the UCR Program 
represented more than 285 million United States inhabitants—94.6 percent of the 
total population and the other 5 percent are either institutionalised or in rural areas.
Since 1930, through the UCR Program, the FBI has collected and compiled 
data to use in law enforcement administration, operation, and management, and to 
indicate fluctuations in the level of crime in America.
The UCR Program collects data on known offences and persons arrested by 
law erïtbrcement agencies. The UCR Program does not record or collect statistics ■ 
on the findings of a court, coroner, jury, or the decision of a prosecutor.
Because not all law enforcement agencies provide data for complete 
reporting periods, the FBI includes estimated crime numbers in these presentations. 
The FBI estimates data for three areas: MSAs, cities outside MSAs, and 
nonmetropolitan counties. The FBI computes estimates for participating agencies 
not providing 12 months of complete data. For agencies supplying three to 11 
months of data, the national UCR Program estimates for the missing data by 
following a standard estimation procedure using the data provided by the agency. If  
an agency has supplied less than three months of data, the FBI computes estimates
^  In the US, a law enforcement agency (LEA) is a government agency responsible for the enforcement o f  the laws. These can 
be state, county, city, college or university, or other agency. Some o f  these services are called police while others have other 
names (e.g. State agencies are referred to as “State Police”. County agencies are referred to as “County sheriffs Office” ;
City agencies are referred to as “Police Department”. College or university agencies are usually referred to as “Security or 
Safety Department” while national investigative police services in the USA  are often called bureaus).
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by using the known crime figures o f similar areas within a state and assigning the 
same proportion o f crime volumes to non-reporting agencies. The estimation 
process considers the following: population size covered by the agency; type of 
jurisdiction, e.g., police department versus sheriffs office; and geographic 
location.
To detect outliers in reporting of arrests the UCR follows a stratifying 
scheme of partitioning agencies into similar agencies. In detecting outliers, the 
algorithms compare a given agency’s report to those of similar agencies. The 
choice o f similar agencies is made by a stratum to which the agency belongs. This 
is extensively discussed in Appendix B (UCR quality control).
The UCR Program collects arrests data on Part I offences (index crimes) 
and 21 other crimes. Part I offences are murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle 
theft, and arson (Appendix A contains the full definitions of these crimes). These 
are serious crimes by nature and/or volume. The 21 other crimes are Part II 
offences.
For each crime, the agencies record only the most serious offence during 
the crime and thereby classify any arrests under this category. For instance, if a 
murder is committed during a bank robbery, only the murder is recorded.
Robbery, burglary, and larceny are often mistaken for each other. Robbery, 
which includes attempted robbery, is the stealing, taking, or attempting to take 
anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force, 
threat of force, or violence, and/or by putting the victim in fear. There are seven
1 0 0
types of robbery: street and highway, commercial house, residence, convenience 
store, gas or service station, bank, and miscellaneous. Burglary is the unlawful 
entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft. There are three types o f burglary: 
forcible entry, unlawful entry where no force is used, and attempted forcible entry.
Larceny is the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of 
property or articles of value from the possession or constructive possession of 
another. Larceny is not committed by force, violence, or fraud. Attempted larcenies 
are included. Embezzlement, “con" games, forgery, and worthless cheques are 
excluded. There are nine types of larceny: items taken from motor vehicles, 
shoplifting, taking motor vehicle accessories, taking from buildings, bicycle theft, 
pocket picking, purse snatching, theft from coin-operated vending machines and all 
others "^^ .
The arrests data is specific to juvenile males and split by offence type and a 
classification of the crime if property or violent crime. The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the arrest rates per 100,000 of the population (population data to 
be discussed in the next section). The logarithmic transformation increases the 
homogeneity of the variances. It also minimizes reliability problems stemming 
from use of population estimates rather than census counts in calculating the 
rates.^ ^
24 When zero arrests were reported for a given crime type, the arrest rate was counted as missing 
from the sample for that year
25 We think of the rate as ri = (xi/ni), where ri = the "true" rate, xi = arrest volume, and ni = "true" 
population. However, ni is estimated, rather than known. The estimated rates must be calculated as 
ri* = (xi*/ni*). Comparison of 1980 CPS estimates with 1980 census data suggests that the CPS 
estimates tend to vary proportionally from the census data. (Method used by Allan and 
Steffensmeier, 1989).
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We use the natural log of the arrest rates per 100,000 of the population for 
the crime index of violent and property offences. All index property and violent 
offences (aggravated assault, rape, murder, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto 
theft) are included, since a measure of total property index offences would be 
heavily weighted by larceny arrests and same for violent by robbery. Analysing all 
offences provides a useful cross-check on whether effects are consistent across 
offence categories; alternatively, interesting differences may be revealed. Official 
statistics such as the UCR have been severely criticised; but, despite its 
shortcomings, criminologists and social scientists generally agree that the UCR 
furnishes fairly valid estimates of comparative frequencies of serious crimes and 
arrest data for index crimes may therefore be representative of violent arid property 
offences. (Refer to section 4.3.2). A comparison of the recorded crimes and arrests 
will be discussed further in the trends section.
4.3.2 Assessing the UCR Arrest Rates as a Good Measure of Crime
The U.S. Department of Justice administers two statistical programs to 
measure the magnitude, nature, and impact of crime in the United States: the UCR 
Program and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCYS) (formerly known 
as the National Crime Survey). Because of differences in methodology and crime 
coverage, the results from the two programs are not strictly comparable nor are 
they consistent. By complementing each other's findings, the two programs 
enhance the understanding of the national crime problem. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
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u s  criminal justice system in numbers for the year 2004. Here we discuss both in 
an attempt to understand the reliability of the UCR data for our task.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's UCR Program, which began in 1929, 
collects information on the following eight crimes reported to law enforcement 
authorities: homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny- 
theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
On the other hand, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)NCVS, which 
began in 1973, provides a detailed picture of crime incidents, victims, and trends. 
The survey collects detailed information on the frequency and nature of the crimes 
of rape, sexual assault, personal robbery, aggravated and simple assault, household 
burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft an&42 other crimes. Twice a year, the U.S. 
Census Bureau personnel interview household members in a nationally 
representative sample of approximately 43,000 households (about 76,000 people). 
Approximately 150,000 interviews of persons age 12 or older are conducted 
annually. The NCVS collects information on crimes suffered by individuals and 
households, whether or not those crimes were reported to law enforcement. It 
estimates the proportion of each crime type reported to law enforcement, and it 
summarizes the reasons that victims give for reporting or not reporting. Taking 
violent crime as an example. Figure 4.2 compares arrests, reports and unknown 
violent crime between NCVS and UCR.
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Figure 4.2
Summary o f the US Criminal Justice System number for 2004^^.
Crimes
committed
Neither reported 
nor detectedReported to police Detected by police
Crimes recorded 
by police
11,608,072
Not recorded by 
police
Arrests
4.124.800
Recorded crime 
cleared up by 
police
806,320
Incarceration
984.976
Critics of the UCR note they do not accurately reflect crime rates in that 
they ean only list crimes reported to law enforcement ageneies. It is also criticised 
for being biased in the reporting of rape. The UCR defines forcible rape as, "the 
carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will." It does not list rapes 
against men, nor does it list same-sex rape.
Despite its shortcomings, social scientists and criminologists generally 
agree that the UCR furnishes fairly valid estimates of comparative frequencies of 
serious crimes, though not of their absolute frequencies (Steffensmeier et a i.
 ^ The detailed sequence o f  events o f  the US criminal justice system is as follows: Entry into the system -> 
Prosecution ^  Adjucation^ Sentencing and sanctions^ Correction. Available in Appendix C.
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1989). Appendix B vindicates the measures taken to assure the UCR data quality 
control. Gove et al. (1985) note that if one defines crime as criminal acts serious 
enough to be reacted to by both citizens and the police, then from the evidence 
reviewed above, the UCR are at least as valid as the data from victimization 
surveys. Moreover, with regard to rape and aggravated assault the rates obtained 
from the UCR have much more validity than the victimization rates.
Figure 4.3
Violent crime arrests, reports and unknown
UCR R ep orted  C rim es
NCVS R eported  C rim es
UCR A rrests
U n k n o w n  C rim es
* Sourced from the UCR Handbook 2004.
With respect to the use of official arrest data for the estimation of age- 
specific offending rates, Steffensmeier, et al. (1989) confirm that comparing the 
UCR index arrest rates with age-specific offending rates estimated from surveys 
and self-reports has found close agreement. The use of arrest data is also supported 
by the large body of research on police-citizen encounters, which has found that the
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seriousness of the crime is the strongest predictor of arrests (Go ve et al. 1985); 
arrest data for index crimes may therefore be representative o f violent and property 
offences.
4.3.3 Description of the Population Data
A measure of population is needed to calculate arrests rates as arrests per 
100,000 people o f the population. From 1979 to 2008 the ICPSR supplies the 
arrests data files which contain details of the arrests plus population of the 
reporting agencies in the MSAs. Pre-1979, the arrest data were available in 
“summarized files” which lacked the information on the population covered by the 
MSAs. To add the population at the MSA-level for the period between 1964 and 
1978, the inter-censal popuMlon estimates available from the U.S. Census Bureau 
were used for the time period 1970 to 1978. Pre-1970 there were no population 
estimates at any area level, as confirmed by sources within the US Census Bureau. 
Adopting similar methods to derive the population estimates proved challenging as 
the method used was dependent on births, deaths and net migration, none of which 
was readily available. Though, a closer inspection of the 1971 to 1979 population 
estimates shown them to fall on or very close to the joining line o f the 1970 and 
1980 population counts available. Thus, this approach is adopted to get the MSA 
population 1964 to 1969.
To more accurately reflect an agency’s population, the national UCR 
Program has changed the methodology for estimating populations. In the past, the 
FBI calculated state growth rates using revised state/national population estimates 
from the previous year and provisional state/national population estimates provided
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by the U.S. Census Bureau. The FBI then estimated population figures for city and 
county jurisdictions by applying the state growth rate for the current year to the 
updated U.S. Census Bureau data. However, beginning with the 2007 the FBI 
computed individual rates of growth from one year to the next for every city/town 
and county using 2000 decennial population counts and 2001 through 2006 
population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. Each agency’s rates of growth 
were averaged; that average was then applied and added to its 2006 Census 
population estimate to derive the agency’s 2007 population estimate.
Some problems arise from the aggregation of arrest data at the MSA-level 
that should be considered. First, the UCR population coverage for a particular 
-'•MSA may vary from year to year, particularly when a major city fails to report its 
crime data for a certain year, as happens occasionally even for some of the largest 
cities in the country. Second, the population coverage of agencies participating in 
the UCR program may not resemble the population distribution of the MSA as a 
whole. Since arrest rates in cities tend to be much higher than in the rural areas, 
MSA rates may be drastically affected if the UCR coverage differs significantly 
from the actual rural-urban population. In MSAs where centre city populations are 
overrepresented in the UCR, MS A-wide rates will be exaggerated, and the reverse 
will be true for states where rural populations are overrepresented.^^ Third, the
27 For these reasons, the crime rates have been adjusted to reflect more accurately the actual 
population composition of each, using the following method. First, rates are calculated separately 
for central cities, for the metropolitan balance, and for nonmetropolitan areas, using arrest volumes 
and population estimates aggregated separately for each of those geographic segments of the state. 
Second, region-specific CPS population estimates are multiplied by the region-specific arrest rates 
to obtain estimates of the "actual" volume of arrests for that geographic segment. Third, these 
estimated arrest volumes for the three segments are summed to obtain a corrected volume of arrests 
for the state as a whole, given the CPS estimates of the actual rural-urban distribution o f the
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number of reporting ageneies participating in the UCR increased with time after 
more states participating and considering reporting as mandatory for the agencies. 
This reflected on the total number of MSAs in the data. Fourth, the population of 
the MSAs increased with time to the extent that in 2004 the Office of Management 
and Budget (0MB) was forced to divide these areas into more than one MSA and 
merge others to form new MSAs (shown in Figure 4.3). This makes it impossible 
to follow up with consistent MSA post 2004, and this is the reason our analysis is 
restricted to 1964 to 2004. Nonetheless this is the longest analysis ever constructed 
to investigate crime in the US.
Figure 4.4
Patterns in Population Covered froml 964-2008.
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populated MSAs into 
smaller ones________0.6
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MSAs to 240 from the 42 SMSAs 
available before.
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* The vertical axis represents the change in population relative to the year 1979.
population. Finally, corrected total rates are calculated for each state by substituting the corrected 
total arrest volume into the crime rate equation.
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4.3.4 Data on Labour Market Conditions
Data from the CPS^^ were used to estimate the wages and unemployment 
rates for less educated men for the annual, MSA-level analysis. In the March CPS, 
the variable METARE A identifies the metropolitan area in which a household was 
located. The number of metropolitan areas identified in the March CPS increased 
overtime: 15 in 1962-1967; 19 in 1968-1972; 35 in 1973-1976; 44 in 1977-1985; 
and over 200 beginning in 1986. We construct this data from 1964 to 2004 and 
added the MSAs as they were identified. This data was used to derive the 
unemployment rate, weekly earnings and income per capita at the MSA-level.
Unemployment was estimated using employment status in the week prior to 
the survey. Individuals who worked or held a job were classified as employed. 
Individuals who were out of the labour force were deleted from the sample, so only 
those who were unemployed without a job were classified as unemployed.
In most of the previous studies unemployment has been used as the sole 
indicator for labour market disruption. But more diverse indicators are needed for a 
full understanding of the labour market/crime relationship. Few studies in the 
literature accounted for the effect of wages on crime. Wages may be a better 
measure for the labour market prospects of potential criminals as unemployment is 
often short-lived and highly cyclical. Given the potentially long-lasting effects of 
incarceration and investing in human capital specific to the criminal sector, crime 
should be more responsive to long-term changes in labour market conditions than 
to short-term fluctuations.
28 Current Population Survey: Annual Demographic File, 1964-2008[MRDF]. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau o f  the Census 
[producer].
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;Instead of concentrating only on the unemployment rate the independent 
variable or labour market opportunities also measures the labour market prospects 
of potential criminals with the wages of low-skilled workers. Grogger (1998) found 
that falling real wages may have been an important determinant of raising youth 
crime during the 1970s and 1980s. To control for changes in the human capital 
stock of the workforce, we control for observable worker characteristics when 
estimating the wages.
Weekly earnings are calculated using the March CPS data for earnings 
years 1963 to 2003, for full-time, full-year workers ages 16-64, excluding those 
who are in the military or self-employed. Full-time, full-year workers are those 
who usually worked 35 or more hours per week and worked forty-or more weeks in 
the previous year. Weekly earnings are calculated as the logarithm of annual 
earnings divided by weeks worked. Calculations are deflated using the CPI 
adjustment factor to 1999 dollars. Earnings of below $110/week in 1999 dollars 
($ 136/week in 2008 dollars) are dropped.
4.4 Trends in Arrest Rates, Wages and Unemployment
In this section we summarize the trends in crime over the past 45 years 
(total recorded crime sourced from the Bureau of Justice Statistics) and compare it 
to trends in arrests rate (UCR) over this period. We expect different crimes to be 
affected by different factors. We anticipate that property arrests will be responsive 
to the economic opportunities and violent crime to the availability of guns or the 
legalisation of abortion, see the discussion of Donohue and Levitt (2001) in 
Chapter Two.
1 1 0
1.5 1
1964
Figure 4.5 shows the log offence rates for the overall arrest rates, overall 
reeorded crime rates, police per capita and prison population. Comparing the UCR 
arrests rates used in our analysis to the national trends of the recorded erime for the 
same time period demonstrates that our sample is representative o f the entire 
United States.
Figure 4.5
United States Sample Trends in Arrests Indieies 1964-2008
Overall Arr Overall Rec Police rat Prison Pop
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Figure 4.2 shows the log offence rates for the violent recorded erime index 
for the entire United States as well as sample trends for the log arrest rates for 
violent recorded crime index. During the whole period, violent crime rose by 150% 
until 1991 which was the global peak and declines by 50% until 2008. While 
violent crime arrests closely follows the path of the violent recorded crime which 
again peaks in the 1981 declines by 20% by 1987 then increase by 20% to 1991 
then it declines all the way to 2008 by about 25%. Thus, the pattern for violent 
crime is much more consistent with the common perception of increasing erime
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through the 1980s and declining since the early 1990s. This is confirmed in Figure 
4.8 where reeorded murder, which has virtually no measurement error, hit a global 
peak in 1980 at 10.2 murders per 100,000 people, and never got above 9.8, which 
was the second peak in 1991.
Figure 4.6
United States Violent Crime Indicies 1964-2008
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We focus on robbery and murder^^, the two violent crimes that are best 
measured. In Figure 4.7 we compare the rates of homicide and robbery from 1964 
to 2008. The first observation from comparing the murder and robbery trends is 
their remarkable similarity. Both reach their peaks and their troughs within a year
29
We devote less attention to the other two violent crimes, forcible rape and aggravated assault, both o f  which exhibit 
important measurement problems. Aggravated assault is troubled by the room for discretion in classifying an assault as either 
“aggravated” or “simple”; only if  it is aggravated is it recorded as a Part I crime in the Federal Bureau o f  Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Moreover, comparisons with the assault trends measured in the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (NCVS) suggest that the police have “upgraded” the recording and classification o f  assaults over time 
and classify many as aggravated that they would have treated as lesser offenses in the past (Rosenfeld, 2007). The 
measurement o f  forcible rape is subject to important variations in whether the incident is reported to the police and counted 
as a Part I crime.
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of each other. This may suggest that similar factors are affecting both trends. There 
was an important turning point in 1980. The rather steady rise in both arrests and 
crime rates until 1980 can be attributed to the post-war baby boom that began with 
the 1947 birth cohort.
Figure 4.7
United States Trends in Murder and Robbery A rrests^djlecorded erime 1964-2008
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As the baby boom cohorts moved into the high-crime ages of about 15 to 
20, they were important contributors to the erime rise of the 1960s and 1970s. This 
was a consequence of there being more people in those high-crime ages. The peak 
cohort in the baby boom era is the 1960 cohort, which had about 4.5 million 
members. By the year 1980 that group and large fractions of the baby boom 
population were moving out of the high-crime ages (all noted on Figure 4.7).
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A second turning point in robbery and murder trends took place in 1985. 
Blumstein (1995) highlight the importance of the recruitment of young people into 
crack markets as replacements for the older sellers who were being sent to prison at 
a very high rate in the early 1980s. The third major turning point in Figure 4.7 
occurred about 1993, which was the start of the major downturn documented in 
“The Crime Drop in America” by Blumstein and Wallman, (2006). That book 
discusses the shrinkage in crack markets that resulted from a major drop in demand 
for crack by new users and the consequent departure from the crack markets of the 
young recruits. This was helped by the deerease in unemployment rates for 
African-American teenagers which reached 20- to 30-year lows by the mid-1990s 
as shown by Nasar and Mitchell (1999).
Figure 4.8 shows the log offence rates for the property recorded crime index 
for the entire United States as well as sample trends for the log arrest rates for 
property recorded crime index.
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Figure 4.8
United States Sample Trends in Arrests Indicies 1964-2008
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Property crime follows a cyclical pattern, it peaks in the 1980 and declines 
by 17% until 1984, increases by 13% until 1991 then declines all the way to 2008 
by about 50%. Figure 4.8 shows property arrests to follow a similar path to that of 
property recorded crime which again peaks in the 1980 declines by 25% to 1987 
where a dip and a rebound occurs up to 1991 then it declines all the way to 2008 by 
about 50%.
Among property crimes, burglary and auto theft are of particular interest 
because of their seriousness, prevalence, and reliable measurement in the UCR. 
Victims are even more likely to report auto thefts^^, partly because they depend on 
the police to recover their car and partly because of insurance requirements.
Figure 4.9 presents the trends in burglary and auto theft crime and arrests 
rates. We see a different pattern for burglary from that in Figure 4.7 for murder and 
robbery. Burglary has been on an almost steady downward trend since 1980. It is 
not clear why burglary, which shares with robbery the motive of economic gain, 
should have such a different pattern. “It is possible that many offenders began to 
substitute robbery for burglary. It is also possible that sanctions against burglary 
have increased faster than sanctions against robbery, thereby diminishing the 
difference between them and making robbery relatively more attractive as a mean 
of economic gain” (see Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) p 19-21).
30 Well over half o f  burglaries documented in the NCVS are reported to the police, compared with only 32 percent o f  
larcenies (http://www.albany.edU/sourcebook/tost_3.html#3_x).
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Figure 4.9
United States Trends in Burglary and Auto Theft Arrests and Recorded crime 1964-2008
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The trend in auto theft, with a turning point in the early 1990s, is more 
similar to those for robbery and murder than to the burglary trend. A possible 
reason for the early 1990s turning point is the introduction of the LOJACK and the 
Club alarms and tracking systems. The makers of these products saw an 
opportunity to satisfy the demand for a product that the automobile companies 
were not giving. LOJACK has maintained a 90% recovery rate during the 
seventeen years it has been available to the consumer. Although these factors may 
have helped the auto theft figures going down, a clear need exists for research on 
the divergence between burglary and auto theft trends over the past 25 years.
Figure 4.10 shows the log offence rates for the overall crime as well as 
property crime indices for the entire United States as. Throughout our time period 
about 85% of all crime was property crime. Therefore, the overall crime rate 
pattern in Figure 4.10 is almost identical to the property crime rate. Consequently,
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results for the overall crime index are dominated by the results for the property 
crime index.
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Most of the property crimes were larceny and burglary, thus, results for the 
property crime index will be heavily influenced by larceny and burglary (shown in 
Appendix Figure C.4). Violent crime was dominated by aggravated assault and 
robbery, with a minor influence for rape and murder on the overall violent crime 
arrests rate (shown in Appendix Figure C.3). Flowever, the seriousness of these 
latter two crimes gives them a disproportionate influence over social welfare and 
public policy.
Figure 4.11 plots the average wages of non-college-educated, male workers 
(workers with only a high school degree or less) over time. The average wage of 
non-college-educated men declined from throughout to 1993, and then rebounded 
somewhat until 1997. This pattern is almost the mirror image of the overall arrests
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pattern. It motivates us to follow the matter further and identify whether a causal 
connection can be established.
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The theory is that a decline in the earnings increases the relative payoff of 
criminal activity. A lower wage also reduces the opportunity cost of serving time in 
prison. The degree to which wages will affect criminal behaviour may vary by the 
type of crime. Crime in the United States (1992) reports that the average monetary 
loss for larceny, robbery, burglary, and auto theft was very high compared with 
average monetary losses for rape and murder as they are less likely to yield 
material gains to the offender (non-financial motive).
Figure 4.11 shows a large long-term decline in the earning prospects of less 
educated men. In contrast. Figure 4.11 shows that the unemployment rate of non- 
college-educated men did not suffer a long-term deterioration throughout the
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period. Although less educated workers suffer the most unemployment, 
unemployment rates generally follow a cyclical pattern that, by definition, traces 
out the business cycle. In Figure 4.11, the unemployment rate is the same in 1997 
as it was in 1979, although there was variation in the intervening years. This is 
confirmed when compared to figures prepared and supplied by the Metric Mash of 
the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics.
Clearly, the unemployment rate affects the labour market prospects of less 
educated men, but it is hard to discern a long-term deterioration in their legal 
opportunities by looking at the overall trend in the unemployment rate. The overall 
decline in the labour market prospects of less educated men, however, is clearly 
shown by their wages.
The data clearly show that the propensity to commit crime moved inversely 
to the trends in the labour market conditions for unskilled men. These trends seem 
to be related, particularly because young, unskilled men are the most likely to 
commit crime. The goal of the remaining sections is to establish empirically 
whether the relationship is causal.
In the next section we present the model to be tested in our analysis. Then 
we discuss the econometric methodology used to test the effect of the labour 
market conditions on crime. Then we present our results by offence type and 
identify the possible short comings of our analysis.
4.5 Methodology
We construct our empirical model drawing from the theoretical frameworks 
developed in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) and discussed in Chapter 2. We
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specify our empirical model to be tested in the form of equation (4.1) below by 
assuming a linear relationship between the crime rate and its influencing variables.
logcriine.^ = Pq+ /3^  l o g Xogweaklyearn.^ + p^ logunemp.^
(4.1)
+ P^ log police + area_dum m y + time _ trend  +
In our specification, each type of crime rate is assumed to be affected by 
labour market opportunities, demographic composition, law enforcement, as well 
as its once-lagged value to control for area crime persistence.
The labour market conditions are represented by the real average weekly 
earnings and the unemployment rates of non-college educated males in our model. 
We use the police per capita as a proxy for the deterrence (probability of 
apprehension) and expect it to have a negative effect on arrest rates. We argue that 
the deterrence effect of police presence on potential offenders should be at least as 
strong as that of conviction rate. For offenders, being detected is often regarded as 
the first step of punishment. Even though the conviction depends on a number of 
exogenous variables such as the evidence presented by the police, who the judges 
are etc., the potential criminals still would try to avoid detection in first place as 
very few offenders will be certain that they will not be convicted by the court. 
Unfortunately the police data is only available from 1972 which limits the number 
of years that can be used to estimate the full model
We first estimate the empirical model using the standard OLS method 
without controlling for lagged crime rate and area-specific fixed effects as an 
exploratory analysis. The potential problems associated with this approach are that.
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firstly, the OLS estimation could be biased by the potential correlations between 
the independent variables and time-invariant police-force area characteristics. Such 
area-specific characteristics, if correlated with the independent variables and not 
eliminated from estimation, will be left in the error term and cause correlation 
between the error term and the independent variables. Thus, the OLS estimation 
will be biased by violating the assumption that explanatory variables should be 
independent from the error term.
In order to avoid the potential correlation between the independent 
variables and the error term, we re-estimate our empirical model with cross- 
sectional fixed effects method that explicitly eliminates the area-specific 
characteristics. We adopt this approach in onder to show how the coefficients are 
affected by eliminating the area-specific fixed effects. However, in this stage, we 
still exclude the once-lagged crime rate from the equation because its inclusion 
requires special treatment.
The second problem associated with both the OLS estimation and the fixed 
effects model is the potential endogeneity due to the reverse causality from the 
arrest rate to certain explanatory variables. In long-run, increased arrest rates could 
trigger higher investment by the government on police expenditure (hiring more 
police). This would again present a rise to the correlation between the error term 
and the law enforcement instruments, police per capita, and thereby bias both the 
OLS and cross-sectional fixed effects estimations. The within transformation does 
not solve the problem, because of inconsistency and downward bias (See Nickel, 
I98I). A possible solution is represented by the GMM technique.
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GMM Estimation
Following the discussion from of the previous chapter we reiterate the two 
different GMM estimations and identify the one that suits our panel analysis. 
Blundell et al. (2000)^^ explain that in a multivariate dynamic panel models, the 
system GMM estimator is shown to perform better than the differenced GMM 
when series are persistent and there is a reduction in the finite sample bias due to 
the exploitation of additional moment conditions. Davidson and MacKinnon, 
(2004) show that in presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, the two- 
step System GMM uses consistent estimate of the weighting matrix, taking the 
residuals from the one-step estimate and is more efficient than the one-step System 
GMM. Though asymptotically more efficient, the two-step GMM presents 
estimates of the standard errors that tend to be severely downward biased.
As with the analysis on England and Wales, we adopt the system GMM 
estimator for dynamic panel data models which combines moment conditions for 
the model in first differences with moment conditions for the model in levels as it 
has been shown to improve on the GMM estimator in the first differenced model in 
terms of bias and root mean squared error.
Bond et al. (2001) provide a useful insight in the GMM estimation of dynamic growth models, 
arguing that the pooled OLS and the LSDV estimators should be considered respectively as the 
upper and lower bound. As a result, whether the differenced GMM coefficient is close to or lower 
than the within group one, this is likely a sign that the estimates are biased downward (maybe 
because of a weak instrument problem). Thus, if  this is the case, the use o f System-GMM is highly 
recommended, and its estimates should lie between OLS and LSDV. This conclusion is supported 
by the empirical testing of the augmented Solow model (Hoeffier, 2002 and Nkurunziza and Bates, 
2003). Presbitero (2006) estimates a model similar to (2) showing that the System-GMM is a good 
estimator, at least better than the differenced-GMM, which is severely downward biased. In 
particular, there is evidence that using results obtained with the System GMM confirm that:
• the system-GMM lies between the upper and lower bound represented by OLS and LSDV,
• there is a gain in efficiency, and
• the instrument set is valid
1 2 2
We estimate equation (1) instrumenting for the endogenous variables with 
GMM-style instruments, i.e. lagged values of the variables in levels. We instruct 
Stata to use only the appropriate lags of the endogenous variables as instruments. 
The number of areas in the sample influences our decision on the number of lags. 
A large number of instruments can cause the over-identification test to be weak. 
The rule of thumb is to keep the number of instruments less than or equal to the 
number of MS As.
The second lag is required, because it is not correlated with the current error 
term, while the first lag is. Roodman (2006) advises that one can experiment with a 
second or deeper lags to find a good instrument, but using deeper lags reduces 
sample size. If the number of groups is large enough, one mayArse all available lags 
(second and deeper lags) as instruments.
We then instrument for the rest of the explanatory variables which are 
strictly exogenous using iv-style instruments and using the past values of the 
variables themselves as their own instruments. The advance to the econometric 
methodology and thus the statistical software enables us to use the programmed 
“xtabond2” GMM Stata estimation command developed by Roodman (2006). An 
advantage of xtabond2 bolt on is that it allows us to use lag operators in the 
instruments matrix while ordinary Stata commands do not.
4.6 Estimation Results
We start by reporting the results o f the effect labour market conditions on 
overall UCR Index I crimes arrest rates. Then we report the results of property 
crimes first as they are expected to be more responsive to the economic factors.
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then violent crimes. Each crime type is analysed by three estimation methods as 
mentioned in the methodology section; the OLS estimation without fixed effects 
and lagged crime rate, the fixed effects estimation without lagged crime rate, and 
the system GMM estimation on the full empirical model. Furthermore, the 
estimation based on the period 1972-2003 will be reported first as the main results 
as we are restricted by the policing data availability post-1972. Then the 
estimations based on the data set 1964-2003 will be used to check the robustness of 
the coefficients to using eight additional years, although obviously we are unable to 
include the police control in these models.
4.6.1 Results for Overall Crime
To get a feel for the data we start our analysis by estimating the effect of the 
labour market conditions o f the low-skilled males on the overall arrest rates of 
juvenile males in the data. Table 4.1 reports the results of the OLS, fixed effects, 
and the system GMM estimation results on the full empirical model.
All the coefficients take the expected sign and attain statistical significance 
in the OLS and the GMM estimations. Moreover, the lagged arrest rate has the 
predicted positive and significant coefficient suggesting persistence in the overall 
arrests rates. The diff-in-Sargan test for over-identification shows the instruments 
applied to be valid.
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Table 4.1
US Total Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables A t A t A t
A t - i -------- — — 0.298***
(0.075)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.146** 0.023 -0.10*
non-college educated males (0.058) (0.052) (0.059)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.084*** 0.015* 0.03**
o f non-college educated males (0.019) (0.08) (0.016)
Log state police per capita -0.054*** -0.01 -0.02**
(0.013) (0.01) (0.009)
Waldjoint sig o f exp vars 456.50***
(0.000)
Sargan test (164 dof) -------- -------- 143.47
(P:3j4)
-------- 30.18
(0.608)
Instruments (184) -------- — A t- 2 ^ - 3
P t-1  ^ -5
AR(1) serial correlation -------- ------------ -6.27**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation -------- — 0.70
(0.484)
R-squared 0.113 0.164 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes --- ,
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2750 2750 2531
Notes: Standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and 
presented in parentheses. The p-value of the Wald test of a joint significance of all 
explanatory variables is reported. Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the 
GMM estimators, p-value is reported. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first-order and 
second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1), p-value is reported. GMM results 
are one-step estimates, (b, c  s) These variables are instrumented by lagged own 
values.** Significant at the 5% level ; * Significant at the 10% level. Diff-sargan test (null H 
-  exogenous).
The weekly earnings of non-college educated male has a negative effect on 
the overall arrest rates highlighting the impact of improving the financial state of the 
group who are most likely to engage in illegal activities. The positive sign on the
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unemployment coefficient is consistent with previous findings in the literature 
and supports the hypothesis that individuals will substitute a legal source of 
income (job) by an illegal one (crime).
The police per capita coefficient reflects the deterrent effect of the police 
presence on overall crime. The results on the full sample (1964-2003 with no 
policing controls), presented in the Appendix Table D .l, confirm our finding with 
approximately identical estimates for the labour market variables and the lagged 
arrest rates. What is noteworthy from this first estimation is that the magnitude of 
the effect of the weekly earning of the low-skilled workers is bigger in absolute 
terms than the magnitude of the effect of unemployment on the overall arrest rates. 
It will be interesting to see if this result is also " present when the arrest rates are 
disaggregated by type of crime.
4.6.2 Results for Property Crime
Table 4.2 presents the estimates of the effect of labour market conditions of 
low-skilled males and police per capita on index I property arrest rates of juvenile 
males.
The analysis on the overall property arrest rates reflects the expected signs 
on the labour market conditions variables as well as the deterrence variable in the 
OLS as well as the GMM estimation. Thus, revealing the responsiveness of 
property crime to the economic factors. These results are similar to those of overall 
crime which is expected as property crime forms a large part of the overall erime.
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Table 4.2.
OLS Fixed Effects
Independent variables A t A t A t
At-i --- 0.382***
(0.061)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.169***
(0.063)
0.117**
(0.054)
-0.073
(0.07)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
0.089***
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.032**
(0.015)
0.033**
(0.014)
Log state police per capita -0.057***
(0.013)
-0.004
(0.011)
-0.032**
(0.010)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 626.56**
(0 .0 0 0 )
Sargan test (109) 184.86
(0.9419)
Diff-Sar --- -0.94
(1.000)
Instruments (130)
A t- 2 ^ - 3
P t - l ^ - 3
AR(1) serial correlation -3.96**
(0 .0 0 0 )
AR(2) serial correlation --- 1.87*
(0.061)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.137
No
Yes
2749
0.263
Yes
Yes
2749
Yes
2530
*See notes of Table 4.1
The unemployment effect is positive and attains statistical significance 
throughout the three specifications. Our GMM estimates return an elasticity of 
about 3.3 percent for unemployment on property crime, this is very similar to the 
findings from 2SLS included in Doyle et a l (1999) (2.8 to 5.0 percent). Moreover,
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Lin (2008) uses 2SLS and finds an unemployment elasticity of about 4 to 6 percent, 
which again is close to our estimates.
The weekly earnings take a negative and significant coefficient in the OLS 
and the fixed effects estimations. While the police per capita effect on the overall 
index I property arrests rates for juvenile males takes the expected sign throughout 
three estimations and attains statistical significance in the OLS and GMM 
estimations.
4.6.2.1 Burglary
Burglary"*  ^ involves the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or 
a theft. The estimation results o f burglary arrest rates of juvenile males based on 
the data from 1972 to 2003 are presented in Table 4.3. ■ -
As shown in the first column of Table 4.3, the variable of weekly earnings 
of non-college educated male shows negative effect on the burglary arrest rates. 
When the relevant estimation issues have been controlled for, the real earnings 
reflect a negative and highly significant correlation with burglary arrests in the 
GMM estimation. This result suggests that the variable of real earnings has picked 
up the effect of improving legal earnings of the group who is most likely to commit 
this type of offence; higher income of non-college educated males decreases the 
burglary arrests rate.
Moreover, we find significant positive correlations between burglary and 
unemployment. The positive sign for unemployment is consistent with previous 
findings in the literature and supports the motivational mechanism introduced by
Breaking and entering a motor vehicle is NOT categorised as a burglary; it is a Larceny from 
motor vehicle.
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Cantor and Land (1991) over the opportunity effect.
Table 4.3.
US Burglary Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)
OLS"
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables A t A t A t
A t - i
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.554***
(0.069)
0.086
(0.029)
0.322***
(0.036)
-0.203***
(0.083)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
0.087***
(0.021)
0.035**
(0.016)
0.026*
(0.018)
Log state police per capita -0.072***
(0.014)
-0.016
(0.012).
-0.029**
(0.011)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 991.10**
(0.000)
Sargan test( 94) 
Diff-Sar --- ---
103.24
(0.242)
29.06
(0.664)
Lnstruments(l 15) A t- 2 ^ - 3
P t - I ^ - 2
AR(1) serial correlation 
AR(2) serial correlation --- ---
-4.82**
(0.000)
0.05
(0.962)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.210
No
Yes
2746
0.355
Yes
Yes
2746
Yes
2527
* See notes of Table 4.1
police per capita coefficient is negative and significant in the basic 
OLS estimation. Once the area-specific fixed effects are eliminated, the coefficient 
of police per capita has become insignificant in the fixed effect model. When 
estimating with the system GMM, the police per capita coefficient is still
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negative and regains significance. While all three estimations have generated 
negative coefficient for the police per capita as predicted, the magnitude of the 
coefficient decreases from column one to column two. This is a result of eliminating 
the unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. In addition, as additional 
relevant variable are controlled for (i.e. lagged arrests rate), the correlation between 
police per capita and burglary becomes more significant, this is demonstrated by the 
increase in the coefficients between columns two and three.
In the GMM estimation, the lagged burglary arrest rate obtains a positive 
and significant coefficient as predicted. The magnitude of 0.4 suggests a strong 
self-correlation in burglary over time and thus a high persistent pattern. Secondly, 
the Difference Sargan test for over-identification shows the instruments applied to ’ 
the lagged burglary arrest rate and police per capita to be uncorrelated with the 
error term and thus are valid as instruments.
The estimation results based on the data set 1964-2003 are reported in 
Table D.3. These analyses are carried out to check whether the previously 
estimated coefficients are affected by the changes in the specification and the 
coverage of the data set. The results show no major changes to the size and 
significance levels in both of the labour market coefficients in all of the three 
estimations. These results indicate that an increase in the weekly earning of the non­
college educated males will reduce the burglary arrest rates of juvenile males. While 
an increase in the unemployment rate of the low-skilled males will increase the 
burglary arrest rates of juvenile males. The GMM results support the previous 
finding of the labour market effects and confirm the persistence pattern of the
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burglary arrest rates. Moreover, the over-identification test validates the instruments 
used in this estimation.
4.6.2.2 Results for Auto Theft
Auto theft involves the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. The 
analysis of theft arrests rates are conducted by the same procedure. The results 
based on the data set 1972-2003 are reported in Table 4.4.
We obtain a significant positive effect of unemployment on auto theft 
arrests rates in all the three different specifications, just like the case of burglary. 
However, none of the earnings coefficients achieve statistical significance in the 
three different specifications. —
The police per capita exhibit a negative correlation with theft arrests rates 
across the three estimations. This result reflects the expectation that police per 
capita, as proxy for the probability of apprehension, should negatively affect 
crime rate and thus theft arrests rates through both deterrence and incapacitation 
effects. However, this effect is only significant in the OLS estimation.
The GMM estimation shows a strong positive correlation between the 
contemporary and once-lagged arrest rate of theft with a magnitude o f 0.4. 
Furthermore, the difference-in-Sargan test of over-identification has captured an 
insignificant p-\%lue of 0.5, indicating that the null hypothesis o f valid over­
identifying restrictions cannot be rejected and hence the employed instruments are 
valid.
The analysis based on the full sample and presented in Appendix Table D.4 
confirm previously attained results of the effect of unemployment rate on auto theft
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arrest rates results. Moreover, the GMM estimations show a rather strong correlation 
between the current and lagged crime rate of auto theft revealing high persistence 
pattern.
Table 4.4
_______  US Auto Theft Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)_________
026 "
Fixed
E,ffects
Independent variables At At At
At-i --- -- 0.381***
(0.050)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.035 0.080 -0.032
non-college educated males (0.090) (0.072) (0.063)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.092*** 0.055*** 0.033**
o f non-college educated males (0.028) (0.020) (0.015)
Log state police~per capita -0.125*** -0.009 -0.019 -
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 678.81**
(0.000)
Sargan test (164) --- 188.31
(0.641)
Diff-Sar --- -- 32.18
(0.508)
At-2 -^10
Instruments(l 84) --- -- P f - l  _^-3
AR(1) serial correlation --- -- -7.15**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- 0.64
(0.525)
R-squared 0.126 0.298 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes --
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2732 2732 2511
*See notes of Table 4.1
4.6.2.3 Results for Larceny Theft
Larceny theft involves the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding 
away of property from the possession or constructive possession of another. The
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estimation results of larceny theft arrest rates of juvenile males based on the data 
set 1972-2003 are presented in Table 4.5.
The variable of weekly earnings of non-college educated males shows a 
negative effect on the larceny arrest rates in the OLS and GMM. When the 
relevant estimation issues have been controlled for, the real earnings retain the 
negative sign but lose significance in the GMM estimation. This ambiguous result 
may be due to the different effects that earning exert on crime. While it can 
motivate larceny as an act of acquisition and material gain, lesser earnings can 
reduce the spending on goods or items that hold value and thus decreasing the 
opportunity of larceny theft.
We find significant positive correlations between unemployment and larceny 
theft. Within the traditional rational crime theory an individual would 
reallocate time from legal earnings activities to illegal income activities if  the 
relative payoff from formal work declined. It is documented that losing a job 
as well as the likelihood of future employment, in the case of layoff due to 
economic downturn, reduces future earnings and increase the chance of 
engaging in crime for profit as larceny.
The police per capita coefficient is negative and significant in the basic 
OLS estimation. Once the area-specific fixed effects are eliminated, the coefficient 
of police per capita maintains statistical significance in the fixed effect model and 
through the GMM specification. As we control for the persistence of larceny arrest 
rates the correlation between police per capita and burglary becomes more 
significant.
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Table 4.5
US Larceny Theft Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)
OLS"
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables At At At
At-i
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.169**
(0.070)
0.090*
(0.05)
0.323***
(0.050)
-0.055
(0.063)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
0.054**
(0.022)
0.026*
(0.015)
0.003
(0.015)
Log state police per capita -0.089***
(0.015)
-0.020*
(0.011)
-0.036**
(0.011)
Waldjoint sig o f exp vars 963.00**
(0.000)
Sargan test (214) --- --- 136.67
(0.156)
Diff-Sar --- 33.88
(0.156)
Instruments (234) At-2:pio
P t - l ^ - 5
AR(1) serial correlation -3.53**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- 1.92
(0.55)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.127
No
Yes
2747
0.274
Yes
Yes
2747
Yes
2528
*See notes of Table 4.1
In the GMM estimation, the lagged larceny arrest rate obtains a positive 
and significant coefficient as predicted. The magnitude of 0.32 suggests a persistent 
pattern of larceny arrest rates. Secondly, the difference-in-Sargan test for over­
identification shows the instruments applied to the lagged larceny arrest rate and 
police per capita to be uncorrelated with the error term and thus are valid as
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instruments.
The estimation results for the larceny theft arrest rates based on the data 
set 1964-2003 are reported in Table D.5. These analyses have generated similar 
results as our previous finding of larceny theft arrest rates. Furthermore, the GMM 
specification confirms the persistence pattern of larceny arrests and returns a 
significant positive coefficient similar to our previous finding and the literature.
4.6.3 Results for Violent Crime
Table 4.6 presents the estimates of the effect of labour market conditions o f 
low-skilled males and police per capita on index I violent crime arrest rates of 
juvenile males. While the literature supports the positive effect of unemployment 
on property crime, it is less obvious when studying violent crimes.
The analysis on the overall violent arrest rates for both samples presented in 
Table 4.6 and Table D.6 reflect the expected signs on the labour market conditions 
variables in the three estimations. But the size of these effects is surprisingly 
similar to those for property crime.
The police per capita effect on the overall index I violent arrest rates for 
juvenile males is less obvious and varies from negative and significant in the OLS 
to positive and significant in the GMM estimation. And while the coefficient on the 
lagged violent arrest rate is positive and significant, the magnitude reflecting the 
level o f persistence falls short of our findings on the England and Wales as well as 
the findings in the literature. This could be due to us using the arrests rates as a 
measure of crime in our analysis.
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Table 4.6
US Total Violent Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables A t A t A t
A t-i --- --- 0.181**
(0.051)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.138** -0.048 -0.156**
non-college educated males (0.061) (0.058) (0.075)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.078*** 0.01 0.031*
o f non-college educated males (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
Log state police per capita -0.051*** -0.008 0.019*
(0.014) (0.121) (0.010)
Waldjoint sig o f exp vars 249.65**
(0.000)
Sargan test (136) --- --- 135.51
(0.496)
Diff-Sar --- 29.58
(0.638)
At-2^-10
Instruments (157) --- --- P t - 1 ^ - 3
AR(1) serial correlation -7.35**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- 0.57
(0.496)
R-squared 0.062 0.110 —
Area fixed effects No Yes —
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2750 2750 2531
*See notes of Table 4.1
4.6.3.1 Results for Robbery
According to the UCR index I crime robbery has been categorized as violent 
crime because the occurrence of such crimes is usually accompanied with the threat, 
at least, of physical harm to the victims. However, it cannot be neglected that the 
motivation of committing such crimes is usually of financial interest. Therefore,
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robbery is expected to respond in similar way to the independent variables as 
does property crime.
Table 4.7
US Robbery Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables A t A t A t
At-i --- — 0.149**
(0.068)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.061
(0.088)
-0.017
(0.072)
-0.100*
(0.059)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
-0.013
(0.027)
0.017
(0.020)
0.003
(0.017)
Log state police per capita -0.053**
(0.019)
-0.015
(0.014)
-0.019
(0.015)
Wald joint~sig~ofexp vars 379.88**
(0.000)
Sargan test (164) --- --- 101.10
(0.290)
Diff-Sar --- --- 27.33
(0.745)
Instruments(l 84)
At-2_yl0
P t- 1 ^ - 3
AR(1) serial correlation 
AR(2) serial correlation --- ---
-6.25**
(0.000)
-0.84
(0.399)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.073
No
Yes
2707
0.153
Yes
Yes
2707
Yes
2473
*See notes of Table 4.1
In Table 4.7, the weekly earnings take a negative and significant coefficient 
after controlling for the fixed effects and the persistence in robbery arrests rates. 
Although robbery is considered a violent crime in nature, it is motivated by the desire
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to steal someone else’s property for material gain. The police per capita effect on the 
robbery arrests rates for juvenile males takes the expected sign throughout three 
estimations and attains statistical significance in the OLS and GMM estimations 
enforcing the effect of police presence as a deterring measure. Contrary to our 
expectation, the robbery-unemployment effect in the three models is different from 
those of the property crime effects and insignificant. A possible reason is that an 
unemployed individual is less likely to substitute legal gains form job income by face 
to face crime which takes experience and involves a higher apprehension level than 
other property crimes.
In the GMM estimation, the lagged robbery arrest rate obtains a positive 
and significant coefficient as predicted. But this estimate is fairly low and might be 
the reason behind the low persistence estimate of the overall violent arrests as 
robbery forms 30% of the overall violent crime. The difference-in-Sargan test for 
over-identification shows the instruments applied to the lagged robbery arrest rate 
and police per capita to be uncorrelated with the error term and thus are valid as 
instruments.
We find the estimates of the empirical model on the data from 1962-2003 
(presented in Table D.7) to produce largely similar results with no improvement on 
the significance of the effect of the labour market condition variables on the robbery 
arrest rates. While, we notice a significant improvement on the magnitude and the 
significance of the effect of lagged arrest rates on the current arrest rates of robbery 
in the GMM estimation.
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4.6.3.2 Results for Aggravated Assault
Aggravated assault is defined as an unlawful attack by one person upon 
another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. In some 
cases, however, the offenders carried out such violent actions still aiming for 
financial gains. This type of crime could be in correlation with the economic 
variables in a similar way to property crimes. The empirical analyses are firstly 
conducted using the data set 1972-2003 as usual, the results of which are reported in 
Table 4.8.
Interestingly, similar to the property crime estimations, the weekly earnings 
and the unemployment rate take a negative and positive signs respectively. The 
coefficient on the weekly earnings attains statistical significance in the OLS and 
GMM estimations while the unemployment rate holds significance throughout the 
three estimations. Although the police per capita effect on the aggravated assault 
arrests rates for juvenile males takes the expected sign throughout three 
estimations, it only reflects statistical significance in the OLS estimations. In the 
GMM estimation, the lagged arrest rates obtain a healthy, positive and significant 
coefficient as predicted. The difference-in-Sargan test validates the use of the 
existing instruments.
We present the estimates on the 1964-2003 data in Table D.8 to check 
our results. The estimations based on the longer data return similar results to 
previous findings and confirm the robustness of our estimates. The effects of the 
labour market conditions take the expected sign and are significant in the three 
different estimations. Additionally, the GMM estimates confirm the previous finding
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of the positive and significant effect of the lagged rates on the current aggravated 
assault arrest rates and highlighting the high persistence pattern of the aggravated 
assault arrest rates for juvenile males.
Table 4.8.
0Z.5
Fixed
Effects
GMM-
Independent variables At At At
At-i --- --- 0.359***
(0.068)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.232***
(0.081)
-0.083
(0.064)
-0.120*
(0.07)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
0.089***
(0.025)
0.034*
(0.020)
0.04**
(0.019)
Log~state police per capita -0.050***
(0.019)
-0.005
(0.013)
-0.01
(0.011)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 600.10**
(0.000)
Sargan test (164) --- --- 169.50
(0.347)
--- --- 42.68
(0.121)
lnstruments(l 84) At-2 -^10 
Ft-1^ -3
AR(1) serial correlation -6.97**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- -0.53
(0.593)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.085
No
Yes
2740
0.176
Yes
Yes
2740
Yes
2516
*See notes of Table 4.1
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4.6.3.3 Results for M urder
Murder^^ involves the wilful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by 
another. Our analyses are based on conducted using the data set 1972-2003 and the 
results are reported in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9
US Murder Arrests for Juvenile Males (1972-2003)
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables At At At
At-i ——— 0.145***
(0.052)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.646*** -0.154 -0.424***
non-college educated males (0.105) (0.107) (0.07)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.100*** 0.005 0.073**
o f non-college educated males (0.031) - (0.028) (0.029)
Log state police per capita -0.088*** -0.030 -0.04*
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 285.68***
(0.000)
Sargan test (63) --- --- 58.18
(0.347)
Diff-Sar ” — -------- 16.26
(0.994)
At-2 -^10
Instruments (84) --- --- P t - 1 ^ - 3
AR(1) serial correlation --- “ — -7.56***
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation -------- -------- 0.50
(0.616)
R-squared 0.133 0.211 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes --------
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2109 2109 1716
*See notes of Table 4.1
33 Attempted murder is categorized as an aggravated assault.
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The effect of weekly earnings on the murder arrest rates of juvenile males is 
negative and significant in the OLS and the GMM estimations similar to Messner 
(1980) findings that income is the variable with the most explanatory power on 
murder. Though, we detect a positive and significant effect of unemployment rate 
on murder rates. These findings support the hypothesis that local unemployment 
increases violent tendencies.
The police per capita effect on murder arrests rates for juvenile males is 
positive and statistically significance. It is surprising that murder is deterred by 
policing; a possible cause is the high level of gun crime in the US which could be 
deterred by gun control measures. According to the Committee on Law and Justice 
(2004), gun-related death rates in the United States are eight times higher than they 
are in countries that are economically and politically similar to it.
By estimating our empirical model for arrest rates of murder on the 1964- 
2003 data we prove our previous results (presented in Table D.9) as robust. We 
find negative and significant coefficient for the weekly earning variable and a 
positive and significant one for the unemployment variable. The results confirm the 
persistence pattern in the murder rates acknowledged in the previous GMM 
estimation and the dif-in-Sargan test prove our instruments as valid.
4.6.4 Summary of the Results
The results presented so far in this section and summarized in Table 4.10 
consistently indicate that labour market conditions, represented by earnings and 
unemployment, are important determinants of overall arrest rates. Moreover, they 
show the unemployment rate to play an important role in determining the overall
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property crime arrest rates as well as each of the individual property crime types 
studied.
Estimates of the effect of unemployment rates of low-skilled males return the 
expected sign in the majority of estimations on property arrest rates. Moreover, the 
results for property crimes do not depend on the estimation methodology used, 
although we do find relatively stronger effects when we instrument for area (MSA) 
earnings and unemployment rates.
While the effect of unemployment rate on property arrest rates is obvious, our 
analysis do not reproduce such success in the estimates of the weekly earnings of low- 
skilled males. Although the magnitude of the elasticities generated is greater than 
those "on the unemployment coefficients they fall short on the significance. The only" 
clear and significant effect is that of the earning on burglary arrest rates which 
demonstrate and increase in the weekly earning of low-skilled males to decrease 
burglary arrest rates.
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With violent crime, the estimates for aggravated assault and robbery are quite 
similar to those for the property crimes. Given the economic motives for robbery, this 
similarity is expected and resembles the results in the previous section. Some assaults 
may occur during property crimes, leading them to share some of the characteristics 
of property crimes. Violent crime is composed mainly of aggravated assault (63%) 
and robbery (30.5%) whereas murder (1%) has only a minor influence on the overall 
violent crime rate. Because assault and robbery constitute 94% of violent crimes, the 
violent crime index follows the same pattern. However, the seriousness of latter crime 
gives it a disproportionate influence over social welfare and public policy.
It is expected that the crime with the weakest financial motive (murder) to 
show the weakest relationship between crime and economic conditions. However, it 
resembles those of property crime. This might be due to recording of crime: if a 
murder is committed during a bank robbery, only the murder which might be 
misleading of the actual motive. Historically, murder victims knew their offenders 
(Supplementary Homicide Reports). During the 1990s this relationship changed, with 
the rise in gun crime levels and spread of gang culture, slightly less than half of the 
murder victims know their offenders. For example, in 1993, 47.7% of all murders 
were committed by people who were known to the victim, 14.0% were committed by 
strangers, and in 39.3% of the cases the relationship between victim and offender was 
unknown (Crime in the United States 1993, Table 2.12, p. 20). Violence was 
particularly concentrated in poor, inner-city neighbourhoods. This reinforces the 
idea that more of the murder offences are motivated by financial gains and the 
recording system which quotes the more serious crime is responsible for the
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misleading records of these crimes. Police intervention programs, such as Cease Fire 
Chicago, Operation Ceasefire in Boston and Project Exile in Richmond, 
Virginia during the 1990s, have been shown to be effective in reducing gun crime 
and thus murder rates.
Socio-economic variables, with the exception of real earnings, were not very 
significant predictors of either property or violent crimes. As explained this may 
reflect the opposing effects (the opportunity and motivational perspectives) that 
unemployment have on crime which may be cancelling each other. As mentioned, 
further investigation of how earnings across different percentiles affect crime may 
gives us a better understanding of the channels through which earnings affect crime. 
Moreover, for Robbery and Sexual offences, variables included in ouf-study have 
very poor explanatory power and requires further research.
The GMM estimates help us explore the persistence pattern of the arrest rates 
in the data and our analyses uncover these patterns. We find levels o f persistence 
which for the majority of the different crime types are coherent with corresponding 
findings from the literature.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we examine the relationship between wages and employment 
conditions and arrest rates in the U.S. We focus on the changes in the labour 
market opportunities for those most likely to commit crime. We perform our 
analysis on juvenile males arrest rates and tested their responsiveness to the labour 
market conditions of those most likely to commit crime. Moreover, we measure the
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labour market prospects of potential criminals with the wages of low-skilled 
workers and add controls for policing.
We employed a number of strategies to investigate the employment-crime 
relationship in greater depth than previous studies. We used juvenile males (age 
and gender specific) arrest rates as a dependent variable and considered the 
employment prospects of poorly educated males as the measure of economic 
opportunities. This is a crucial advantage according to Steffensmeier el al. (1989), 
given the strong age-dependency of both employment and crime. We utilize the 
arrest statistics of the UCR as virtually the only source of information on long-term 
trends in age and gender variations in crime in the United States. We limited our 
analysis of trends in the age-crime relat ionship to index I crime offence categories 
for which arrest data have been collected continuously from 1964 to 2003.
We perform various panel data analyses to indentify the effects 
of changing labour market conditions on the different types of crime in the US. 
Our crime rates o f interest are burglary, theft, larceny, robbery, aggravated 
assault and murder. Our panel data enables us to avoid the potential bias caused by 
the correlation between independent variables and area-specific fixed effects. We 
also control for the possible endogeneity resulting from the reverse causality 
between the dependent and the deterrent variable by using GMM type instruments 
for these variables. We also control for the potential persistence in crime in the 
different areas by including the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable in the GMM specification. We report our main results based on the panel 
covering the period 1972-2003. As a robustness check, we also present the
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results based on the full data from 1964 to 2003. The difference is the lack of the 
deterrence control for the full sample.
We find the labour market conditions to play an important role in determining 
the overall arrest rates. We find a positive and significant relationship between 
unemployment and the overall property crime arrest rates as well as each of the 
individual property crime types studied. The sign of the expected relationship between 
unemployment and crime is the key difference between the opportunity and the 
motivational perspectives. Cantor and Land (1985) noted that opportunity effects 
should be more likely to manifest themselves contemporaneously, since the current 
unemployment rate would have immediate effects on the level of personal property. 
Motivational effects should be more likely to appear as lagged effects. Specifically, 
when forms of public assistance begin to run out and/or disappear, there will be fewer 
places for unemployed persons to turn to for financial assistance, thereby increasing 
the level of motivation to crime, either through an increase in frustration or through 
crime being viewed as more attractive and possibly more lucrative than legitimate 
behaviour.
Our estimates reveal a positive significant effect of unemployment rates of 
low-skilled males on the various crimes. With respect to the Canto and Land (1985) 
model, the results indicate that for such crimes, the motivation effect is stronger 
than the opportunity effect. And as argued by Ehrlich (1973) an increased 
unemployment rate would reduce the opportunity cost of committing crimes and 
motivate potential offenders to engage in illegal activities. This could offset the 
impact that higher unemployment would reduce the potential opportunities for
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property crimes. As for weekly earning, the only clear and significant effect is that on 
the burglary arrest rates which demonstrate an increase in the weekly earning of low- 
skilled males to significantly decrease burglary arrest rates.
We find various significant effects of labour market conditions on some types 
of violent crimes. For aggravated assault, we find a significant effect of labour market 
conditions characterised by a positive and significant estimates on the unemployment 
variable and a negative and significant estimates on weekly earnings. This 
motivational effect could be caused by the frustration of individuals due to poor 
employment prospects.
In this chapter we have made an attempt to better understand the 
relationship between labour markets, deterrence and crime.'-We believe that the best 
measures are of those who are most likely to engage in the illegal sector.
Moreover, we focus on the source of the data and its level o f aggregation, 
both for labour market variables and for crime statistics, which according to 
Chiricos (1987) appears to affect the strength of the relationship between these 
variables. He finds that the “level of aggregation” of the data influenced the 
conclusions. Of the studies he examined using state-level data, 21% revealed a 
significant positive relationship between unemployment and the property crime 
rate, while 14% of the studies showed a significant negative relationship. Of those 
studies that relied on city-level data, a larger proportion showed a significant 
positive relationship, while a smaller proportion of the studies showed a significant 
negative relationship. Chiricos (1987) suggested that whereas state-level data may
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enable more controls, MSA data may be more homogenous and thus more likely to 
reflect the specific traits.
We consistently show that legal labour market opportunities of those most 
likely to engage in criminal activity substantially reduce crime. And while we have 
tried to provide unbiased results by using a well refined data set and adopting the 
appropriate estimation methodologies available, our study falls short in two ways. 
First of all, the police per capita data is aggregated at the state-level. Second, while 
we have attempted to control for unobserved variation across areas by adding area 
fixed effects, more work can be done by adding more controls to our main 
specifications. In considering future research it is important to use disaggregated 
data. Additionally, specific» attention should be paid to two forms of potential bias: 
unobserved heterogeneity bias arising from omitted structural factors and 
simultaneity bias that results from the effect of crime on deterrence and the labour 
market.
So far, the empirical analysis has covered the influences of the criminal 
justice system and economic conditions on crime in the UK and US. The next 
empirical chapter compliments these analyses by studying the effect of family 
background on crime and testing the intergenerational criminal correlations for 
England and Wales.
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Chapter Five: Intergenerational Correlations of 
Crime.
5.1 Introduction
Following on from previous analysis, this chapter aims to identify the effect 
of family background on crime. More specifically it tests the effect of the parents’ 
criminal behaviour on the children’s offending habits in England and Wales. An 
appropriate example is one from the US, District of Columbia:
“Don't I  know you?" asks Judge Geoffrey M. Alprin o f  
the Superior Court o f  the District o f Columbia, leaning over 
his high bench to study a woman on the witness stand. "Didn't 
you just recently testify in another case, and didn't I  send your 
daughter to Georgia after she slashed those tires? ”
It turns out, the judge knows not only Lenita Burrell 
and her daughter, but also her son, standing trial fo r  murder, 
and her husband charged with obstructing justice. Many real 
life “Godfather” examples show how different generations in a 
family can make the same “terrible decisions ”
Metzler, 1994.
Most research on the influence of parents on children’s criminality explores 
the role of parents as a deterrent to criminality (Farrington et al. 1996; Warr, 1993, 
mostly using the view of social control theory (Hirschi, 1969). This theory expects 
individuals to avoid committing crimes so as not to jeopardize their relationship
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with their parents. However we are here considering an alternative view; that 
criminal behaviour by children is made more likely by parental criminality.
While extensive research has studied criminal careers, little in-depth 
research has considered the extent of criminal persistence across generations. 
Previous research (e.g. Hirschi, 1969) has shown the importance of parents in 
predicting the criminal behaviour of children. However, studies of the influence of 
parents on children’s criminal behaviour tend to focus on the parents as a deterrent 
factor.
Empirically the relationship between parents’ criminal behaviour and 
criminal behaviour of their children is well established (Thomberry et al. 2003). 
Rowe & Farrington (1997) reveal a correlation of 0.43 between the criminal 
convictions of children and their fathers. Other studies show similar results. The 
larger part of this research, however, remains descriptive and faces a number of 
limitations. First, most studies use small samples. Second, the studies do not 
analyse the influence of paternal criminal behaviour after adolescence. Third, most 
studies focus on sons and neglect the influence of paternal criminality on 
daughters. Finally, most studies lack a comparable control group as they only focus 
on criminal young people. We will improve on these elements and discuss them 
thoroughly in the methodology section.
Farrington et al. (1996), Thomberry et al. (2003) as well as many other 
scholars have noted that research on the intergenerational transmission of crime is 
very limited. Before the 1990s, large-scale high-quality datasets appropriate for 
investigating intergenerational continuity of criminal behaviour were simply
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unavailable. Due to the scarcity of quality data on criminal behaviour of children 
and their parents, the existing literature is mostly applied to the detailed data 
available on Sweden. Apart from Farrington and West (1990) there is a shortage of 
empirical work on the UK. In this chapter we study the intergenerational 
correlations in committing crime between parents and their children and investigate 
the mechanisms behind these correlations.
In order to answer our research questions we analyse data of the OCJS 
2003-2006 which is a longitudinal self-report survey that asks young people in 
England and Wales about their attitudes towards and experiences of offending. One 
advantage is that the data is representative and not focused on a sample of either 
criminal parentS'or criminal children as most studies are in the literature.
The hope is that a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms, and 
their relative importance, may help us to think more clearly about the effect of 
policies on criminal behaviour. One important question is whether or not the parent 
-  child correlation in crime is simply due to the existence of some common 
external factors, such as poverty, or whether there is a mechanism that directly 
links parent criminality to child criminality. If the former is true, then policies 
aimed at reducing poverty may also reduce crime. But, what if the relationship is a 
causal one and that observed intergenerational criminal correlations are produced 
by a behavioural model, such as a role model hypothesis in which the children 
directly observe and model their parents’ behaviour? If this is the case, then 
policies that are successful at reducing crime today may reduce crime even further 
in the future. And, research that evaluates these policies and the resulting savings to
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society may underestimate their effectiveness by not taking into account the effect 
on future generations. An advantage of a research study based on a longitudinal 
study is that changes within individuals can be identified; a series of data collection 
episodes repeated over time allows much more scope for establishing the order in 
which events occurred. But we are unable to utilize this important feature of the 
data as the panel is not long enough for sufficient numbers of parents to change 
their criminal status (3.2% of the fathers offended during the four-year period but 
just 6% of these were new offenders).
Given the nature of the data we have available we must be realistic about 
how far we can go move towards identifying causality. The aim of this chapter is to 
present a good description of the correlations between the offending habits of the 
children and those of their parents. However, we will be able to make some 
comments about the mechanisms that drive the relationships we find. The outline 
of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 explains the possible mechanisms which lie 
behind the intergenerational correlation. Section 3 presents a review of the 
literature. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical framework of this study. 
Section 5 presents a discussion of the results. Section 6 is devoted to explaining the 
limitations and biases and the last section concludes the study.
5.2 Mechanisms Behind the Intergenerational Criminal Correlation
Virtually all economic and criminological theories make the prediction that 
there is a relationship between the criminal behaviour of parents and children. 
However, the explanations for the relationship vary.
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The first of these explanations for the intergenerational transmission is 
imitation. Learning theories state that children learn criminal behaviour by 
observing and modelling the behaviour of their parents. Farrington et a l (1998) 
and Besjes and Van Gaalen (2008) suggest that children of criminal fathers are 
much more likely to commit a crime themselves and that having a strong bond with 
one’s father could in fact lead to a higher chance of committing a criminal act if the 
father is a criminal.
The second explanation is that criminal behaviour is only a small part of the 
transmitted behaviour. A variety of undesirable behaviours, such as poverty, 
teenage pregnancy and living in deprived areas is transmitted from one generation 
to the next. Farrington et a l (2001) refer to this as the ‘cycle of deprivation’. An 
undefined trait is said to be responsible for these undesirable behaviours. This 
undefined trait could include ability, earning power and immorality; if it is 
transmitted from parents to their children this leads to a correlation on criminal 
behaviour.
One explanation that feeds back into the cycle of deprivation mechanism is 
the issue of bad match resulting in bad offspring. This occurs when the criminal 
behaviour is transmitted from a criminal father to his children via the choice of 
spouse. This is to say, men with a criminal history are more likely to match and 
procreate with women who also have a criminal history, or who are more unstable. 
This results in a shaky partnership perhaps leading to poverty and at any rate, 
putting children at risk of delinquency.
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Another explanation that is strongly connected to the cycle o f deprivation is 
the environmental mechanism: Criminal parents tend to live and raise their children 
in the least favourable social environments, which increases the children’s chances 
of criminal behaviour. Rowe and Farrington (1997) assess environmental factors 
contributing to criminal behaviour exhibited between parents and their children and 
found them to contribute considerably to the intergenerational criminal 
correlations.
A further explanation is the presence of a genetic link operating through the 
transmission of a variety of traits such as intelligence, psychology, discount factors, 
or risk aversion. Levy (2005) discusses that genetics may alter individual rates of 
tifife preferences or risk aversion. Similarly, intelligence, which has been showmto 
have clear genetic correlates (Scarr and Weinberg 1977), may play an intervening 
role in the intergenerational crime relationship.
Walters and White (1989) followed four different research methodologies 
(family, twins, adoption and gene environment interaction) suggest the existence of 
a fairly consistent relationship between heredity and crime.
Some economic studies find that criminal parents may have some genetic 
tendency or preference for criminal behaviour, a tendency that is then transmitted 
from one generation to the next in what is known as criminal ability. Hjalmarsson 
and Lindquist (2007) point towards the importance of inherited factors, they find 
that fathers who are not genetically linked to the children, i.e. adoptive fathers, do 
not have as much of an impact on the criminality of the children as do birth fathers.
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In criminology, the Positivist School has attempted to find scientific 
objectivity for the measurement and quantification of criminal behaviour (Nirmala, 
2012). Biological positivism indicates that the development of genetics has 
produced potential inherent cause of criminality with genetic factors variously 
identified as significant to select heredity rather than environment as the cause of 
crime. However, they consider the evidence gathered from family, twin, and 
adoption studies to show no conclusive empirical evidence to prefer either cause.
A final possible mechanism is that some families are monitored more 
intensively by law enforcement because of an official bias towards known criminal 
families. This is somewhat like the process of Tabelling’, by which children born to 
criminal fathers have higher chances of perceiving themselves as criminals, 
resulting in a self-fulfilling prediction of offending (Rowe and Farrington, 1997). A 
combination of these mechanisms might contribute to the intergenerational 
transmission of criminal behaviour.
5.3 Literature Review
Early studies of intergenerational crime covered offender and in most cases 
convicted samples only (see literature review Table 2.1 for sample selections). This 
led to a serious selection problem, which was even greater if only those convicted 
were included. Of all the people in society only a portion offend, o f those who 
commit crimes only a portion are arrested; of those arrested, only a portion are 
prosecuted; of those prosecuted, only a portion are convicted. Common unobserved 
factors may affect continuation from one stage of this process to the next. Indeed, 
the stages may be jointly determined in as much as legal officials may process
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cases mindful of the likely outcomes later in the process. The chances that a person 
will be punished if arrested, for example, may affect the eagerness of police to 
arrest suspects. Analyses that focus on offender or convicted of crimes may be 
subject to selection bias and should take account of the process through which 
persons are convicted by controlling for the proportions of the stages throughout 
the process as noted by Winship and Mare (1992), Hagan and Parker (1985), 
Peterson and Hagan (1984), and Zatz and Hagan (1985).
Studies with similar proposed research questions
In this section of the literature we will focus on four studies similar to our 
study. These recent studies of family relationships and crime try to answer similar 
research question and follow a similar research design. They are centred on parent- 
child influence and cover offenders as well as non-offenders in the data; as well as 
on gathering rich data that including information on factors that might influence 
children to commit crime. These are of special interest to us as they follow a 
similar research design to this study and thus findings are more comparable. Table 
5.1 reports a summary of these studies.
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2007 and 2009) study the intergenerational 
crime transmission. They use data from the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study to 
document the father-son criminal correlations as well as intergenerational 
associations in drunk driving between fathers and their children. They use Probit 
model analysis to find that sons of fathers with criminal records are 55 percent 
more likely to have a criminal record themselves than those whose fathers do not 
have criminal records. They also use ordinary OLS for the intergenerational
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criminal correlation at the intensive (number of offences) level. They find that sons 
commit, on average, 1.42 more crimes for each additional sentence o f the father. 
For the drunken driving associations, they find the average number of convictions 
to be twice as large for sons whose fathers have a conviction for drunk driving than 
for sons whose fathers have not been convicted. For daughters, the average number 
of convictions is 15.3 times larger. This big difference is due to the small number 
of daughters who drink drive.
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2011) use Swedish adoption data combined 
with police register data to study parent-offspring associations in crime. They find 
that both pre-birth and post-birth factors to be important determinants of offspring 
convictions. They also find that mothers contribute approximately «equally through 
both pre-birth and post-birth factors, while fathers contribute mainly through pre­
birth factors (genetics). For sons, biological mothers contribute more than 
biological fathers.
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Table 5.1
Relevant Studies in the Intergenerational Crime Literature
Author Year Country Focus Methodology Results
Hjalmarsson
&
Lindquist
2007 Sweden
Father-Son
criminal
correlation
OLS Regressions 
& Fixed effects
55% more 
likely to 
offend.
Van de Rakt 
et al. 2008 Netherlands
Father-Son 
criminal 
correlation
Group based 
Trajectory Models
Much more 
Likely to 
offend
Hjalmarsson
&
Lindquist
2009 Sweden Parent-Child drunk driving
OLS Regressions 
& Fixed effects
2.5 times 
more likely 
to be 
convicted
Hjalmarsson
&
Lindquist
2011 . Sweden Parent- Offspring Adoptees
OLS Regressions 
& Fixed effects
Twice as 
likely to 
offend
The research question these studies try to answer: Are children of criminal parents 
more likely to commit crime themselves compared to children of non-criminal parents?
Another significant contribution to the latest literature which addresses our 
proposed research question is a study by Van de Rakt et al. (2008). It is a study that 
elaborates on the relationship between convictions of fathers and the development 
of convictions of their offspring over the lifespan. Unique official data from the 
Netherlands Criminal Career and Life Course Study (CCLS) is used to investigate 
the intergenerational transmission of criminal behaviour. They use group based 
trajectory modelling to identify groups o f individuals who display similar 
behavioural trajectories. They find that children of convicted fathers are much more 
likely to be convicted themselves in comparison to those whose fathers have never 
been convicted and that children of highly persistent offending fathers tend to
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commit more delinquent acts in every phase of their lives than children of law- 
abiding fathers.
Literature on the UK
Criminal careers have been extensively studied in the UK. A good example 
is the Farrington and West (1990) study which starts in 1961 tracks a sample o f 400 
men in South London from age 8 to 48. It was not a representative sample as the 
vast majority was chosen by taking all the boys aged 8-9 who were on the registers 
of a primary school which were within a one mile radius of a research office which 
had been established. Self-reported offending data were collected from the sample 
at age 14 and onwards. They find that the delinquents were more likely to have 
convicted parents and that a boy from a known criminal family who was apprehended 
for offending have been more likely to be convicted than an equally delinquent boy 
from a non-criminal family.
Previous UK studies have all been based on qualitative data collection using 
interviews, within a longitudinal design to study criminal careers. Apart from 
Farrington and West (1990) none of these studies collected data on parental 
criminal behaviour and considered the intergenerational mobility of crime.
In this chapter we investigate the intergenerational mobility o f crime in the 
UK and if the children of crime committing parents are more likely to engage in 
delinquent behaviour. It fills the gap in the literature as a unique UK investigation. 
It contributes to the literature improving on Farrington and West (1990) by using a 
representative sample and investigating mechanisms. In this chapter we use the 
OCJS which provides a larger sample (5000 vs. 400 Farrington and West, 1990).
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The OCJS is nationally representative covering England and Wales compared with 
a sample of South London used by Farrington. Our research is concerned with 
documenting these relationships and extending the understanding of the sources of 
these correlations to improve the effectiveness of policies on criminal behaviour. 
We now describe the data used in this study.
5.4 Data
As discussed in the literature review chapter the ideal data requirements to 
study the intergenerational transmission of criminal behaviour are daunting. First, 
data is needed that provides information on the criminal behaviour of parents as 
well as of their children. Second, convicted as well as non-convicted parents should 
be included in order to establish the extent to which crime is transmitted. Third, a 
very long period of observation is required in order to properly analyse both 
generations into their adulthood (a time span of at least 30 years). Such data is very 
rare, however the OCJS fulfils two of these three requirements. It provides crime 
data on the parents and the children as well as data on offending and non-offending 
parents
The OCJS is a nationally representative, longitudinal, self-report survey 
which asks young people in England and Wales about their attitudes towards and 
experiences of offending. Its main aim is to examine the extent of offending, anti­
social behaviour and drug use among the young population of people aged from 10 
to 25. The OCJS series has been designed as a 'rotating panel' which means that in 
each subsequent year, part of the previous year's sample is re-interviewed, and this
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is augmented by further 'fresh' sample to ensure a cross-sectional representative 
sample of young people. The aim of this design is to fulfil two objectives: firstly, to 
provide a solid cross-sectional base from which to monitor year-on-year measures 
of offending, drug use, and contact with the criminal justice system over the 
planned four-year tracking period (2003-2006); and secondly, to provide 
longitudinal insight into individual behaviour and attitudinal changes over time, 
and to enable the Home Office to identify temporal links between and within the 
key survey measures.
One advantage is that the data is representative and is not focused on a 
sample of either criminal parents or criminal children as most studies in the 
literature. This allows us^ To compare the children of criminal fathers with those of 
non-criminal fathers as all those who appeared in the OCJS at any of its four waves 
are included in our sample.
The design o f the OCJS is ‘state of the art’ for self-report offending 
surveys. The main innovation is the use of ‘audio self completion’, in which the 
respondent listened through headphones to the questions about offending and then 
entered his or her answers directly on a computer. Measurement error is a concern 
for any study using self-reported crime; this and other limitations are discussed in 
Section 7. The use of audio files was intended both to maximize privacy and to 
mitigate the impact of low literacy among some respondents. It is believed it 
contributed to data quality in other ways, by encouraging the young people to listen 
to the whole question and the answer categories, by allowing them to work at their 
own pace and by reducing the impact of any distractions around the respondent.
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Interviews were conducted at home and required parental consent for those 
respondents aged 10 to 17^ "^ . Only one young person was selected per household. 
The resultant sample is nationally representative of the population aged 10 to 25.
The first sweep of the OCJS in 2003^^ covered around 12,000 people aged 
from 10 to 65 living in private households in England and Wales. Subsequent 
annual sweeps of 2004, 2005 and 2006 focused on young people aged from 10 to 
25. In each of these subsequent sweeps young people who have previously been 
interviewed and have agreed to further contact are followed up for re-interview. In 
addition to these ‘panel’ respondents, ‘fresh sample’ respondents aged from 10 to 
25 are also introduced to ensure the total sample is around 5,000 young people each 
year, see Figure 5.1, which shows the composition of the sample by the year 
individuals joined.
The interview lasts for approximately one hour using Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing 
(CAPI -  where the interviewer reads the questions from a laptop and enters the respondent’s 
answers) and Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI -  where the respondent reads the 
questions themselves on a laptop and enters their own answers). Audio-CASI (where the respondent 
listens to the questions on headphones and enters their own answer, unaided by the interviewer) is 
used for the most sensitive modules.
Given the sensitive information asked of respondents and the technical complexities involved in 
the survey, the 2003 survey was preceded by a feasibility study which tested out an early version of 
the questionnaire among a small sample of the general population (including offenders). The 
feasibility study was conducted by BMRB Social Research in 2002, and a number of 
recommendations were made which were taken into account in the design of the initial 2003 OCJS.
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Figure 5.1 
OCJS Sample Structure
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The survey covers ‘mainstream’ offences against households, individuals 
and businesses such as burglary, shoplifting and assault. It also covers fraud and 
technology offences.
An important feature of this data is that it contains information about the 
criminal activity of individuals and their parents. Respondents are asked whether 
his parents or guardians have ever been in trouble with the police and whether they 
have ever been in prison. Respondents are also asked about their previous contact 
with the criminal justice system, whether they have been cautioned, moved, 
arrested, or incarcerated.
These data are reported by the children (the cohort member) about their 
parents, which may bias our estimates since children may not recall or have full
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information on their fathers’ arrest records. It is not straight forward to determine 
the direction o f the resulting bias. It depends on the correlation between under­
reporting and the child’s criminal behaviour. If the respondents are offenders 
themselves and fail to report parents’ criminal behaviour, due to not knowing or 
lying, this will impose a downward bias on our estimates. If non-offenders are 
more likely to fail to report parents’ criminal behaviour perhaps because they have 
less information, this will impose an upward bias on our estimates.
The OCJS shows that offending behaviour is common among young people 
in Britain, at least in terms of the broad definition of offending. Nearly a quarter of 
the sample (23%) reported committing any offence, which included relatively 
minor incidents, in the previous 12 months, (Have you committed any offence in 
the last 12 months?). However, half the sample members (50%) reported that they 
have ever committed one or more offences over the four years of data collection 
(Have you ever committed any offence?).
For the 2003 wave of the OCJS, Hales et al. (2009) carried out a validation 
exercise to compare OCJS offence estimates with British Crime Survey (BCS) 
crime estimates. There are difficulties in making comparisons because the OCJS 
includes offences against commercial and public bodies, offences against children 
and drug dealing, unlike the BCS, and any OCJS estimates of individual instances 
of offending will always be higher than the BCS count of the number o f crime 
events because more than one offender can be involved in a single crime. As a 
result, the validation exercise included adjustments to restrict the OCJS to a sub-set 
of offences most comparable to those in the BCS and to compensate for co-
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offending. The results of the exercise suggested that both sources gave similar 
counts of violent crime. However, the OCJS appeared to undercount comparable 
property crime relative to the BCS. This is likely because the highest-rate offenders 
are under-represented in the OCJS sample (harder to follow) and these offenders 
are responsible for a considerable proportion of crimes reported to the BCS.
Table 5.2
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Male<Mean
;
SD
Females 
Mean SD
Respondents Delinquency 
Has ever been in trouble with the police 0.57 0.49 0.44 0.49
Has ever committed a serious offence 033 0.46 0.22 0.41
Has ever been arrested by the police 035 0.06 0.25
Has ever been to court accused of committing 0.05 0:24 0.02 0.16a crime
Has ever been fined by court (accused 0.72 032 0.65 0.27respondents only)
Has ever been sentenced to supervision by a 
probation officer(fined respondents) 032 0.41 0.31 0.46
Has ever been sent to prison, including young 0.13 0.47 0.04 0.42person prison(sentenced respondents)
Parents Variables 
Guardians have ever been in trouble with the 0.09 039 0.10 030police
Guardians have ever been sent to prison 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.16
Sample Size for main variables 2075 2146
Table 5.2 presents variable definitions and summary statistics for the 
respondents and parents crime variables, broken down by sons and daughters. The 
sample is all individuals who have ever appeared in the OCJS and the proportions 
indicate that a positive response has been given in any wave. As expected, females 
commit fewer crimes than males. Thirty two percent of the male respondents have 
committed a serious offence while 22 percent of the females did. Similarly, 15
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percent of males have been arrested by the police while this applies to just 7 
percent of females. About 9 percent of the parents of the male respondents have 
been in trouble with the police and 1 percent of the parents of male respondents 
have at least one sentence on their record.
The percentage of sample members who committed offences each year can 
be linked to their age. Hansen (2003) found that for males crime tends to rise and 
peak in the mid to late teens and then declines with age.
Figure 5.2 relates to the whole of the OCJS sample, representing an average 
of behaviour across the sample aged 10 to 25. It shows a substantial variation in 
behaviour by age and gender. In our analysis, the likelihood of offending generally 
increases with age at the beginmng of the survey, reaching a peak between the ages 
of 16 and 17 before declining. In our data 72% of the male respondents aged 16 to 
17 years old have been in contact with the police. At all ages, males were more 
likely to have committed offences, but half of the women in their teens reported 
some offending. The rate of offending for those women aged 16 or 17 at the start of 
the panel seems likely to be a result of sampling variation, and it seems the true rate 
is likely to be intermediate between the figures for the adjacent (14/15 and 18/19) 
age groups.
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Figure 5.2
Percentage Offending by Age-Group and Gender
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*Age at the beginning of the four-year period 36
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In order to summarize patterns of offending and anti-social behaviour we 
view the OCJS classification of the sample members into a number of distinct 
categories. Each of these categories was given an OCJS descriptive label, reflecting 
the behaviour characteristic of each group. These categories are summarized in 
Table 5.3.
36 Data is sourced from the OCJS report 13 (2007). Age refers to year 2003.
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Table 5.3
Behaviour Classification of Respondents
Category % of four- year panel
% of offences 
committed by 
four-year panel
Law abiders 45 7
Occasional transgressors (Some Minor) 37 29
Anti-social disrupters (Frequent Minor) 9 16
Drug offenders (Drug) 5 16
Prolific offenders (Frequent Serious) 4 32
* Source: OCJS research report 19
Consistent with other studies, this identifies a group of around four percent 
of the four-year-panel sample who were the most ‘prolific offenders’. This group 
accounted for almost one-third of the offending reported in the OCJS^^, including a 
relatively high proportion of the more serious types of offending. The ‘drug 
offenders’ group are characterised by their use o f and selling of drugs. This group 
accounted for 16 per cent of reported offending, some of it serious. The ‘anti-social 
disrupters’ group accounted for a similar proportion o f offending, although they are 
characterised as committing anti-social behaviour and tended to be involved in less 
serious crimes than the ‘prolific offenders’. Over a period of four years, the very 
numerous sample members (82% of 10- to 25-year-olds) with a low propensity to 
offend (neither serious nor prolific) accounted for around one-third (36%) of all 
offences. This is about the same proportion of all offending as that admitted by the 
small group (4% of 10- to 25-year-olds) described here as ‘prolific offenders who 
committed a disproportionately large amount o f offences (responsible for 32% of 
all offences).
This statistic comes from the OCJS.
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Dependent variable: Offending measure
Our measure o f offending among respondents aged 10 to 25 is constructed 
as a 0-1 dichotomous indicator of participation in criminal behaviour based on 
the answer to the question: “Have you ever offended? Including minor offences 
and contact with the police.” Based on an answer to this question that indicated 
offending or not, the respondent is qualified as an offender or not. Reoccurring 
respondents are asked this question in every year they appear in the OCJS. A 
single observation is included for each individual which summarizes his/her 
offending experience throughout the survey.
Intergenerational effect measure
Within ou r analyses, we define a family-based intergenerational crime 
measure. Our measure for each respondent will reflect if any of his parents or 
guardians has ever been in trouble with the police. The question asked in each of 
the four waves is: “Have your parents or guardians ever been in trouble with the 
police?” Based on an answer to this question that indicated offending or not, the 
respondent is assigned a 0-1 dichotomous indicator of parents’ or guardians’ 
participation in criminal behaviour.
Another measure of intergenerational transmission of criminal behaviour 
will be tested through the effect of whether any of parents or guardians has ever 
been sent to prison. The question asked was: “Have you parents or guardian ever 
been sent to prison?” Based on an answer to this question the measure is 
constructed as a 0-1 dichotomous indicator of parents’ or guardians’ having been 
ever sent to prison.
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5.5 Initiai Results
Table 5.4 reports that in our sample 48% of the sons with non-offending 
parents have committed crime compared to 74% of sons of parents who had been 
in contact with the criminal justice system. While 39% of the daughters with non­
offending parents have committed crime compared to 67% of daughters of 
offending parents who were in contact with the criminal justice system.
Table 5.4
Crime Statistics for Respondents against Parents’ Behaviour
Parents Crime Parents No crime
% of Sons with a crime record 74% 48%
% of Daughters with a crime 67% 39%
Avg # of crime by sons 1.01 0.70
Avg # of crime by daughters &68 039
*This is based on the parent and children being contact with the police and the criminal 
justice.
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2009) found that sons whose fathers have 
criminal records are 55 percent (17.2 percentage points) more likely to have 
criminal records than those with fathers without criminal records. Using Table 5.4 
we calculate that sons with offending parents are 54 percent^^ more likely to offend 
than those with non-offending parents. Similarly, we find that daughters of 
offending parents are 72 percent more likely to offend than those with non­
offending parents compared to 142 percent^^ finding by Hjalmarsson and Lindquist 
(2009) for the daughter-father relationship.
It is calculated (74 -  48) /  48 = 54.1%
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2009) found that female cohort members whose fathers have 
criminal records are 142 percent (8.4 percentage points) more likely to have an adult criminal record
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Our empirical analysis will consider the extent to which young people with 
criminal parents are more likely themselves to be criminal. Since crime status is 
considered to be discrete, we use the relative risk ratio as used by Farrington and 
West (1990) to measure intergenerational correlations.
The relative risk is the risk of an event relative to exposure. It is a ratio of 
the probability of the event occurring in the exposed group versus a non-exposed 
group. The relative risk ratio (RRR) will measure the relative chances that a child 
of a criminal parent becomes a criminal himself. A RRR of one will mean that 
children will have the same chances of being in the two states whatever the status 
of the parents. This is clarified through the example presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5
Descriptive Statistics o f Crime Status Across 
Generations (Any Offence)
Criminal Behaviour(C)
I Pr(Ct=l) 0.54
II Pr(Ct=l| Ct_i=l) 033
III Pr(Ct=l| Ct-i=0) 032
IV Pr(Q=0| Ct-i=l) 037
V Pr(Ct=0| Ct4=0) &48
RRR 236
^Generation t = Children, generation t-l=  Parents. Relative Risk 
Ratio = (II/IV)/( IE7V), This table computes the Parent-Child 
(both genders) RRR.
Although the computations are different, the logistic regression model with 
no controls and OR (odds ratio) option produces results that are nearly identical to 
the 2 X 2 RRR. This should give us an idea of the outcomes of our logistic
and commit more than three times as many crimes, on average, as those with fathers without a 
criminal record.
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regression which will follow. The logistic model used in our analysis quantifies the 
effect of a predictor in terms of a log-odds ratio using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). Later in the analysis, we use a set of controls to help explain the 
mechanisms of the intergenerational criminal relationship. We include variables 
controlling for ethnicity, family background, education and attitude.
We begin our empirical analysis by looking at the intergenerational 
correlations inherent in the data between the parent and the respondent criminality. 
Table 5.6 presents the odds ratios that result from estimating the logistic 
regressions of whether the respondent has any conviction on whether the parent has 
been in trouble with the police or has any sentences. We allow the effects to differ 
for sons and daughters given the large differences in the number and types ofr' 
crimes committed by men and women in our sample. Rather than estimating these 
regressions separately for sons and daughters, we control for whether the 
respondent is female and an interaction between this gender dummy and the 
parent’s crime variable. Thus, the coefficient on the parent’s crime variable tells us 
the parent-son relationship while that on the interaction tells us whether the parent- 
daughter relationship significantly differs from that with the son and whether it is 
stronger or weaker.
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Table 5.6
Extensive Margin Odds Ratios: Parent Offending and Prison Sentence
(1) (1)
Child any offence -  parent any Child any offence -  parent
offence prison
Parents 2 134*** 3332***
(0 3 2 1 ) (1.392)
Daughters 0.523*** 0.548***
(0.032) (0.032)
Parents ^ Daughters 1.414* 0.881
(0.283) (0.397)
Observations 4793 4793
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are 
reported. This table presents the results o f logistic regressions where the measures o f  
child and parent criminality used are presented at the top o f the column. In addition to 
this, regressions on the Sons and Daughters sample include an indicator for whether 
the cohort member is female, and an interaction between the two. Odds ratios are 
presented. The odds ratio associated with the parent criminality variable can be 
interpreted as the odds that sons are convicted o f  a crime if  they have a criminal 
parent. The coefficient on the interaction indicates whether the effect o f parents on 
their daughters significantly differs from the effect on their sons.______________________
An examination of Table 5.6 indicates that there is clearly a strong 
relationship between parent and child criminality. Column (1) presents the results 
for the “main” correlation. Parent -  Crime, i.e. when considering whether the 
respondent ever offended and whether the parent has been in trouble with the 
police. Sons whose parent has been in trouble with the police have 2.13 times 
higher odds of having at least one criminal conviction than sons of law-abiding 
parents. These odds increase to 3.73 when the parent has been to prison.
How does the parent-daughter relationship compare to that for sons? The 
odds ratio on the interaction term is significant when considering whether the 
parent had been in trouble with the police. This implies that the parent-daughter 
relationship is greater than the parent-son relationship. This may be a consequence 
of the relative rarity of girls committing crimes; as this indicates a more serious
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tendency towards delinquent behaviour among young females, and as we shall see 
later parental criminality has a stronger relationship with more serious offending.
5.6 Econometric Analysis and Results
Explaining Parent-Child Criminal Correlations: Logistic Regression Analysis
At this stage of the analysis we regress measures of respondents’ 
criminality on measures of paternal criminality and add in vectors of controls, 
which proxy for the underlying mechanisms, in a stepwise fashion. The aim of 
these regressions is not to make any statements of causality, but, rather, to see 
how much of the intergenerational relationship is accounted for by each set of 
controls.
The OCJS collected a variety of demographic and socio-economic data. 
Several potential determinants of participating in criminal behaviour have been 
constructed from these data. Our control variables include: the age o f the 
respondent; his/her gender; race/ethnicity (White/White British, Black, Asian, 
Mixed, other); family structure (Brought up by both parents, one parent, one step­
parent, and other arrangement); household attributes (how well managing 
financially, head of household under 30 years of age, low household income); 
educational attainment (highest educational level attained); attitude and habits 
(skipped school, excluded from school, took drugs, drinking habits).
To help us to make sense of the impact of the controls we draw on the 
model used in Lochner (2004) which explores crime within the more standard 
Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967) investment model of human capital 
formation. He models the decisions to work, to commit crime, and to make costly
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investments in human capital and develops a model in which human capital 
increases the opportunity cost of crime from foregone work and expected costs 
associated with incarceration.
Lochner (2004) produces the decision rule for criminal participation which 
represents the causal effects of age, schooling, and individual characteristics on 
criminal participation through their effects on human capital and the expected cost 
of incarceration.
An individual’s decision to engage in crime is determined by
— 4) + S^age + S^H. + + S^Psych. + S^Z.
- 7 t{F^+  l3 J i+ D e t^ ,)+ ^ ,
where criminal activity is modelled as a function of investment in human capital H, 
learning ability A, a vector of observed characteristics including parental education 
and family composition (including familial criminal behaviour) Z, a variety of 
traits Psych( including risk aversion, discount factor, and deviance). F  represents 
fines incurred of a crime and J  the resulting sentence length within an individual's 
jurisdiction while Det represents other deterrence measures. The individual i 
subscripts are there to make it clear whieh parameters/variables are individual- 
specific.
If human capital provides a higher payoff in the labour market than the 
criminal sector then criminal participation declines with age and education. Factors 
that reflect higher learning ability and initial skill levels and lower criminal abilities 
should reduce crime. The effects of parental education or family composition will
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depend on the relative strength of these factors in determining Z as parental 
criminality may influence or be correlated with many of the factors included in this 
model.
Within the Lochner framework we would seek to assess the causal impact 
of parental criminality as one of detailed array of determinants. The controls we 
have available in the OCJS are not nearly as detailed as we would like. For 
example, we have no information on the psychological traits of parents or children. 
To make some attempt to account for a predisposition towards ‘bad behaviour’ we 
account for other information on truanting for example. However in this case, it is 
clear that we are likely to be controlling for factors that lead to criminality as well 
as those which are endogenous to it (children may truant because they are engaged 
in criminality). This is another example of when a longer panel might help as we 
could trace out the time-path of children’s delinquency.
We begin with first set of variables used in the models presented in Table 
5.7 which use the measures: Has the parents been in trouble with the police at least 
once, yes or no? Has the respondent been in trouble with the police at least once, 
yes or no?
We set up a logistic model to test for the association of parent’s criminal 
background on children’s contact with the police.
Q  = A  + P \^^i + + A  ( /  * CP) + Pa^ S ^  + (5.2)
Where C represents the respondent’s contact with the police, CP represents 
the parent’s contact with the police, /  is a gender dummy for females and an age 
control Age.
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As earlier discussed in section two, there are a number of mechanisms 
through which intergenerational correlations in criminality may arise. Thus, the 
second aim of our empirical analysis is to begin to understand why the parent -  
child criminal relationship exists. In particular, we will regress a measure of cohort 
member criminality on a measure of the parents’ criminality as depicted in 
equation (5.2), adding in a number o f stacked vectors of controls in a stepwise 
fashion. These controls are meant to proxy for various potential underlying 
mechanisms, such as whether the intergenerational criminal correlation can simply 
be attributed to the fact that both the parent and child come from similar social 
backgrounds. The purpose of these specifications is not to make any statements of 
causality,'-but, rather, to see how much of the father-child relationship, can be 
accounted for by each set of controls.
The initial specification will be picking up any effects that are correlated 
with the parent’s criminality. In addition to this, regressions are pooled for both 
genders so they include an indicator for whether the cohort member is female, and 
an interaction between the two. And by adding controls we will be shutting down 
particular mechanisms but not as effectively and clearly as in the ideal model set 
earlier.
The first vector of controls (ParChar), summarized in Table 5.7, captures 
the parent’s socio-economic status and includes variable such as ethnicity, head of 
household sex and age, and whether the respondent has been brought up by both 
birth parents.
C, = fo +  P\CPj + f f f  + A  ( /  * ParChar! + (5-3)
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According to Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2007), it is important to recognize 
the natural difficulties in isolating the role played by inherited attributes. Since 
traditional measures of ability, such as educational attainment, are influenced by 
family background factors, we first control for family background and then for 
education. If we control for education and then family background we will be 
showing an amplified estimate of the effect of education. And we will be 
presenting fairly conservative estimates of the role played by inherited ability.
Table 5.7 
Sets of Controls Variables
Family structure and parental 
Ch aracteristics
Parent's previous contact with the police 
Age Control 
Gender Control
Not brought up by both birth parents 
Managing
Low household income
Head of Household age if  <30 or >=30
Ethnicity White British
Ethnicity Black or Black British
Ethnicity Asian or Asian British
Ethnicity Mixed
Ethnicity Other
Individual Bad behaviour
Ever truanted 
Ever excluded from school 
Ever taken any class A drug 
Drunk twice a month or more
Individual Characteristics
Respondent with a GCSE 
Respondent with a Higher Education 
Respondent holds an A Level 
Respondent with a Trade Apprenticeship 
Respondent No Education Qualification 
Respondent Other Education
Area Controls
Area Fixed Effect
The second vector of controls, Edu, controls for educational attainments. 
This is represented by the highest qualification held by the respondent. We are well
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aware that education is endogenous to our model as our respondents probably take 
crime and education decisions simultaneously. In an effort to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity, Lochner and Moretti (2004) use changes in compulsory 
schooling laws over time as an instrument for education. They examine the effects 
of schooling on the probability of incarceration and on arrest rates, finding that 
education significantly reduces both. More importantly, their estimates are quite 
similar whether or not they instrument for schooling, which suggests that 
endogeneity of schooling decisions does not appear to bias estimates of the impact 
of education on crime.
Q  = A  + + - A /  + A  ( /  * (5 .4 )
According to Van de Rakt et a l (2008) key control variables for studying 
intergenerational correlation in crime would be education of both parents and children. 
It would have therefore been better if we had a measure of the parents’ education 
which we could also include in our analysis.
The last vector of controls includes children have truanted or been excluded 
from school, drinking habits and drug use. We decided to include this despite 
knowing that it is endogenous to our model as it will help capture among other 
things parental quality and environmental effects as discussed in the mechanisms 
section.
C,. = /?o + PffPi + P J  + A  ( /  * C"f) + P^Age + PffarChar^ + P^Edu (5 5 )
+ p.jBadBeh +
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We include controls for the area fixed effects, where the area is defined as 
the member’s district of residence during the interview. Members lived in 42 
different police-force areas in England and Wales. They are not evenly distributed 
across these areas. The mean number of members per PFA is 124. Area fixed 
effects capture information about economic status of the community, crime and 
education. These characteristics may also help explain the individual’s probability 
of committing crime.
As is the socio-economic status it is possible that the area characteristics are 
common to both parents and children. However it is also possible that the area in 
which the child lives is chosen by his parents and this choice might not be 
exogenous to the father’s criminality. For example, parents may choose to live in 
area where their criminal record is less shameful. Alternatively, it might be that the 
parent’s criminal record limits the set of area where they can choose to live. 
Alternatively, it might be that both the parents’ and children’s criminality are 
affected by the area they live in.
C,. = A  + + p j  + A  ( /  * CP) + A ^g ^  + pffarChar, + P^Edu (5.6)
+ P-j BadBeh -I- -f- Uj
Therefore, area fixed effects may also account for some of the Parent— 
Child crime relationship as a result of the parents criminality indirectly affecting 
the area that the child grows up in. This is equivalent to generating dummy 
variables for each area and including them in a standard linear regression to control 
for these fixed "area effects". It works best when you have relatively fewer areas 
and more observations (mean number of respondents per area is 124).
1 8 2
Table 5.8 presents the odds ratios that result from estimating equations 
(5.2-^5.6) with a Logit model. Both parents’ and children’s criminality is measured 
at the extensive margin; for the parents, we are considering whether they have ever 
been in trouble with the police. For children, we are considering whether they have 
ever offended. Each regression includes some measure of parent criminality. In 
addition to this, the regressions include an indicator for whether the cohort member 
is female, and an interaction between the two. Odds ratios are presented.
Table 5.8 
Explaining the Parent-Child 
Criminality: Parent Offending. (Parents in trouble with police)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents 2.560*** 2.378*** 2.276*** 2. 061*** 1.768** 1.781**
(0.296) (0.441) . (0.424) (0.560) (0.508) (0.517)
Daughters ---■ 0.512*** 0.504*** 0.433*** 0.436*** 0.426***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
Daughter*Parents ------- 1.232 1.225 1.225 1.363 1.308
(0.294) (0.294) (0.387) (0.475) (0.46)
Controls for:
Family No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes Yes
Attitude No No No No Yes Yes
Area f e . No No No No No Yes
Observations 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported.
This table presents the results o f  logistic regressions OR option.
As seen in Table 5.8 there is a strong relationship between parent and child 
criminality at the extensive margin, with a stronger effect for daughters. Column 
(3) adds in the family characteristics controls, reducing the coefficient on the 
parents’ crime to 2.27 and thus controls for family characteristics accounts for 3 
percent of the parent-child relationship which is a surprisingly small and could be 
attributed to the lack of vital information on the parents like education. Column (4) 
adds in the education controls. These are added as dummy variables where we omit
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those who hold a GCSE as a baseline group. They account for 7 percent of the 
parent-child relationship. Even when education is entered prior to family 
characteristics, it only accounts for 10 percent of the relationship. Adding the 
individual bad behaviour vector of controls accounts for a significant portion of the 
father-son relationship; as seen in column (5), the coefficient is cut to 1.768, 
keeping in mind the endogeneity problem caused by the addition of this vector of 
controls. Controls for neighbourhood fixed effects have little additional effect on 
the parent-son relationship. Even with the complete set of controls, there is still a 
portion of the parent -  son crime relationship that is left unaccounted for: sons with 
criminal parents have 1.8 times the odds of having a criminal record than sons with 
non-criminal parents. The coefficient on the gender interaction with parental 
criminality also declines as controls are added, indicating that some of the larger 
impact for daughters is working through channels of these controls.
Our results indicate that family background plays an important role in 
explaining the parent-child criminal correlations, similar to findings jftom Duncan 
et a l (2005) that depict that parental characteristics predict characteristics of 
children other than the same one that is measured in parents. Appendix Table E.l 
reports all the odds ratios that result from estimating equation (5.6) with a Logit 
model. A closer look at some of the coefficients reveals expected results. For 
instance, children who lived in a household with financial difficulty were 1.5 times 
more likely to be offenders themselves compared to children who were raised in a 
household that is managing well financially.
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Then we test whether the conviction and imprisonment of the parents is 
correlated with the crime committed by the child.
c, = A  + + A z /+ A  + As^w (5,7)
+ P^BadBeh+a^+Uj 
In equation 5.7, PP corresponds to whether the parents have been sent to prison.
We estimate measures o f child’s criminality on measures of paternal criminality
and add in vectors of controls in the same order of the last estimation.
Table 5.9 presents the odds ratios that result from estimating the building up 
of equation (5.7) with a Logit model. Children’s crime is measured at the extensive 
margin; for the parents, we are considering whether they have ever been sent to 
prison. For children, we are considering whether they have ever offended. The first 
column indicates that children whose parents has been imprisoned are 
approximately 3.5 times as likely to become criminals themselves compared to 
those with law-abiding parents.
The individual bad behaviour vector of controls accounts for a significant 
portion of the parent-son relationship; as seen in column (5), the coefficient is cut 
to 1.96 and thus by 7 percent, keeping in mind the endogeneity problem caused by 
the addition of this vector of controls. Unobserved area characteristics (captured 
with area fixed effects in column (6)) do not help to fiirther explain the 
intergenerational relationship.
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Table 5.9 : 
Explaining the Parent-Child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents 3.480*** 2.217*** 2.094*** 2.044* 1.966* 1.950**
(1.392) (0.594) (0.576) (0.622) (0.699) (0.783)
Daughters -- 0.484*** 0.478*** 0.414*** 0.422*** 0.411***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.041) (0.040)
Daughters *Parents --- 2.470*** 2.365*** 2.142*** 1.979*** 1.862***
(0.395) (0.384) T0.436) (0.440) (0.419)
Controls fo r:
Family No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes Yes
Attitude No No No No Yes Yes
Area f e . No No No No No Yes
Observations 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported. This
table presents the results o f logistic regressions OR option.
By the specification in equation (5.6) we will have controlled for age, 
portion of the investment in human capital (through schooling) and a good part of 
the observed characteristics (Z) including family composition. As earlier discussed, 
we are still short on controls for psychological traits and deterrence measures in the 
corresponding areas as well as the rest of the observed characteristics.
The Children’s Behavioural Classification and the Parent’s Criminality
In this final sub-section we look back at the summary patterns of offending 
in the OCJS, as in Table 5.3. We use these to consider the correlations between the 
parents’ offending habits and the classification of the sample members into one of 
the identified categories. We consider four distinct groups: law abiders, occasional 
transgressors, anti-social disrupters and prolific offenders. We begin by using an 
ordered logit model to examine the associations between the criminality o f the 
parent and the classification of the sample respondents. The independent variable
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in the first estimation will be whether the parents have been in trouble with the 
police and we will look at the impact of parental prison subsequently..
Table 5.10
Parent Offending and Children Behavioural Classification
(1) (2) (3)
Sons & Sons Daughters
Daughters
Law Abiders -0.139*** -0.138*** -0.158***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.033)
Occasional transgressors 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.042***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Anti-social disrupters 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Prolific Offenders 0.102*** 0.111*** 0.107***
(0.019) (0.033) (0.024)
Observations 4812 2373 2439
The coefficients on the four categories are marginal effects and represent the
respondents’ increased probability to be in each o f  these categories if  the parents have
been in trouble with the police compared to if  they are not. Clustered standard errors by
pfa are reported
The results reported in Table 5.10 confirm our previous findings as they 
indicate a negative effect of parental criminality (14 percentage points) on the 
probability of child being a law-abider. More importantly, the coefficients turn 
positive on the other outcomes meaning that children with offending parents are 
more likely to be in one of the three offending classifications.
These findings are reproduced when using the parents’ prison sentence as 
the independent variable. The results in Table 5.11 confirm the negative association 
between the parent’s prison sentence and the children being in the Law Abiders 
group. Moreover, it reflects the positive association between the parents having a 
prison sentence and the children being in the prolific offenders group. In fact
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children whose parents had at least one prison sentence have 13.7 percentage points 
greater probability to be in the prolific offenders group.
Table 5.11
Parent Prison Sentence and Children Behavioural Classification
(1) 
Sons & 
Daughters
(2)
Sons
(3)
Daughters
Law Abiders -0.179*** -0.306*** -0.105
(0.052) (0.061) (0.058)
Occasional transgressors 0.029*** -0.003 0.029*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.015)
Anti-social disrupters 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Prolific Offenders 0.137*** 0.295*** 0.071
(0.046) (0.069) (0.049)
Observations 4812 2373 2439
The coefficients are marginal effects and represent the respondents’ increased 
probability to be in each o f  these categories if  the parents have been imprisoned 
compared to if  they are not. Clustered standard errors by pfa are reported
We now look at the relationship between the parent and child criminality 
for the different types of crime. The aim of these analyses is to check if the parent- 
child criminality relationship is different for the different types of crime. Table 
5.12 presents the odds ratios that result fi*om estimating the logistic regressions of 
whether the respondent has any conviction on whether the parent has been in 
trouble with the police or has any sentences.
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From Table 5.12, sons whose parent has been in trouble with the police 
have 1.8 and 2.1 times higher odds of having at least one property or violent 
criminal conviction respectively than sons of law-abiding parents. These odds 
increase to 2.8 for property and violent criminal conviction when the parent has 
been sentenced. This relationship between parents and sons is significant in 11 out 
of the 12 regressions considered; the insignificant relationship occurs when 
considering the parent’s trouble with the police and the son’s conviction for 
burglary. The significant odds ratios associated with parent’s being in trouble with 
the police are all greater than 1.5 while those associated with parent’s having been 
sentenced are all over 2.5 regardless of the crime categories considered.
More importantly, results reported in Table 5.12 indicate that the parent- 
child criminality relationship is stronger on the violent crime than on the property 
crime. This pattern is consistent with the results found previously for daughters, as 
we saw stronger intergenerational correlations for these rarer (and therefore more 
extreme) behaviours. It therefore appears that the impact of parental criminality is 
stronger in leading to more serious offences. In addition, the literature has often 
stressed a difference in the motivations for property compared with violent crime 
(Fajnzylber et a l, 2002), with violent crime perhaps associated more with 
particular psychological traits and perhaps, with a common family cause such as 
revenge or family honour.
For the parent-daughter relationship, the odds ratio on the interaction term 
is significant in property crime cases when considering whether the parent had
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been in trouble with the police. In each o f these cases this coefficient is greater than 
one. This implies that the parent-daughter relationship is greater than the parent- 
son relationship. The largest effect is seen on burglary conviction which means that 
over and above the parent-son relationship, daughters whose parent had been in 
trouble with the police have 3.7 times higher odds of having at least one burglary 
offence than daughters of law-abiding parents.
We conclude this section with a summary of our main findings. Our 
analysis of the raw data finds strong evidence of an intergenerational criminal 
correlation. Our regression analyses build on this and indicate that both social 
background factors and inherited ability play potentially important roles in 
explaining the parent-child criminal3:orrelations. Although we included many 
controls, there is a lot of the parent -  child relationship is not explained. These 
analyses could be improved by including the gender of the offending parents, the 
type of crime that the parent has committed, the timing of the parents’ crime and 
whether was living with the family at the time. However, the analyses in this 
chapter perform reasonably well and produce results similar to those by 
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2007) using Swedish administrative data.
5.6 Limitations and Biases
The self-report method for measuring crime and delinquency has developed 
substantially since its introduction a half century ago. It is now a fondamental 
method of scientifically measuring criminality. The challenges confronting this 
approach to measurement are daunting; after all, we are asking individuals to tell us
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about their own, undetected criminality. The self-report approach to measuring 
crime has acceptable, although far from perfect, reliability and validity (Miller and 
Ho Hist 2007). However it imposes certain limitations on our analysis.
Accuracy o f responses
The data is reported by the children (the cohort member) about their 
parents, which may bias the number downwards since children may not recall or 
have full information on their parents’ arrest records.
The survey is designed to provide information that is as accurate as 
possible, e.g. by using self-completion for more sensitive questions, and audio aid 
to assist those with literacy problems. However, the accuracy of information 
obtained'^through all surveys depends on respondents’ ability to understand 
questions, their ability to recall events accurately, and their willingness to provide 
complete, honest and accurate responses.
These factors may vary across different groups. Respondents were asked at 
the end of the interview how honest they had been when asked about offending and 
drug use. Although 98 per cent said they answered all offending questions 
honestly. Those who lied and lied about lying create the misclassification bias. This 
cannot be contained in such a survey where respondents are voluntary participants. 
The data collection is through a survey and not through accessing criminal records 
of participants. This is the strength of studies that use administrative data. 
Non-response bias
Missing data for a specific question or item in a questionnaire are referred 
to as item non-response. This occurs when a respondent fails to provide an answer
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to a required item. Despite serious efforts in data collection and the use o f response 
persuasion techniques such as incentives, some respondents remain less willing 
than others to answer completely all questions in aetiological self-reported 
delinquency studies. And even if the response rate on crime related questions is 
high, non-response to these questions might cover problematic respondents who 
choose not to answer this question. Beatty and Herrmann (2002) have described in 
detail the decision processes related to non-response in a survey. The respondent 
may not respond to a question because he or she has problems recalling accurate 
information, e.g. the precise frequency of delinquent behaviour in the reference 
period, or may lie when answering the question, or may not know the answer to the 
question, or may not care about the subject. Finally, the'-respondent may consider 
the question too sensitive or threatening.
Attrition bias
When data are collected over two or more points in time, it is common for 
some participants to drop out of the study prematurely (Miller and Ho Hist 2007). 
The attrition of the original sample can occur in longitudinal research. Despite the 
high response rate (85% from wave I to wave II and 54% from wave I through 
wave IV), it may be that those who drop out differ in key respects from those who 
took part. For example, those with particularly chaotic lifestyles or more serious 
offenders might be difficult to contact and more likely to refuse to be contacted or 
to answer key questions and thus causing a negative bias to our estimates.
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Sample selection bias
Another important short coming is that the data did not include people in 
custodial institutions, residential homes, hospitals and hostels, and the homeless. 
This will impose a sample selection bias. As such, the sample may under-represent 
‘very serious’ offenders, although it should represent reasonably well those on 
community orders and young offenders who were previously in custody. 
Unobserved heterogeneity bias
Due to data limitations, we are unable to capture all of the relevant variation 
in individual characteristics (Z in the ideal model). When this unobserved 
heterogeneity remains (in the form of the error term), estimates for our parameters 
are likely to be biased. ItTs- likely that estimates on the parental characteristics will 
be positively biased. While estimates of the impact of schooling will be negatively 
biased. This is because individuals with a higher learning ability or lower criminal 
ability are likely to invest more in their schooling and to commit less crime. Thus, 
the error term is likely to be negatively correlated with schooling choices. Results 
from Lochner and Moretti (2004) suggest that this may not be too important 
empirically as they obtain similar estimates of the effects of education on arrests 
and incarceration whether or not they instrument for schooling (using compulsory 
schooling laws as an instrument) once adequate efforts have been made to account 
for important observable factors.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has always challenged researchers 
tackling similar research questions. Follow up studies allow for individual/child or
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family fixed effects, but due to the limitations of our data none of these techniques 
is applicable.
Despite the large set of controls, a portion of the parent — child relationship 
is still left unaccounted for. More direct evidence regarding whether the 
intergenerational correlations arise through either an inherited traits mechanism or 
a father as role model mechanism should be studied in three alternative 
experiments. These experiments should focus on: (i) a sample o f twins, (ii) an 
adoptee sample, and (iii) the timing of the father’s crime.
5.7 Conclusion
We conclude our chapter with a summary of our findings and some 
comments on their implications for policy makers. This study identifies the 
relationship between the criminal behaviour of fathers and that of their offspring 
over the period of age between 10 and 25. We adopt the general view that criminal 
behaviour is transmitted from parents on their children very early in life through 
genes or upbringing. We analyse a large-scale dataset (OCJS with over 5500 
participants) describing the intergenerational transmission of criminal behaviour in 
order to provide answers to our research questions. The dataset is also unusual 
because it contains information on the criminal behaviour of both parents and their 
children, and this element of the OCJS has not previously been exploited by 
researchers.
Children whose parents have at least one crime have 2.5 times higher odds 
o f having an offence than children non-criminal parents. The effect of a custodial
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sentence of the parents increases the odds of the children offending by 3.5 times. 
Social class, ethnic group and religious participation were not significantly 
associated with increased or reduced likelihood of offending. Living in a family 
headed by a single parent increased the likelihood of offending. Living in a family 
with a financial difficulty increased the likelihood of offending. Respondents who 
had bad school attitude were more likely to be offenders. Adding these controls 
reduces the coefficient on the headline correlations which is somewhat expected.
Moreover, we find that sons whose parent has been in trouble with the 
police had 12 percentage points less probability of being law abiders and ten 
percentage points more probability of being prolific offenders. While, sons of a 
convicted parent had 24 percentage points less probability o f being law abiders and 
21 percentage points more probability of being prolific offenders.
Comparing our results with existing literature, in line with previous studies, 
we find large correlations between the delinquent acts of parents and those of their 
children. Similar to findings by Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2007) for the father- 
son correlations, we find that sons with a convicted parent are 54 percent as likely 
to be criminals than sons whose parents have not offended.
If we were to evaluate this chapter against the objectives set in the 
introduction we think that it manages to uncover the correlation between the 
offending habits of children and that of their parents. Realistically, this chapter 
provides good descriptive analysis but it provides no evidence of causality.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
6.1 Discussion
The developed world is currently recovering from what the NBER reports 
as the longest-lasting economic downturn since the Great Depression (NBER 
Business Cycle Dating Committee,2010). During the fourth quarter of 2011 various 
UK economic indicators, including the unemployment rate, reached their worst 
levels in decades (BBC Economy Tracker,2012). This has revived the long­
standing debate concerning whether economic factors can be linked to increases in 
the crime rates. The economic theory of crime documents the effect unemploymenf^ 
and wages, among other things, on crime. According to the theory proposed by 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), individuals react to incentives and weigh the 
relative costs and benefits of engaging in crime and choose the option that would 
maximize their expected utility. Thus, unemployment acts as a positive incentive to 
commit crime by decreasing the opportunity cost of being caught and punished. 
Therefore we would expect that during an economic downturn crime will rise as 
unemployment increases and real income falls.
Faced with the budgetary restraints and average cuts of 20 percent the 
criminal justice system is being asked to do more with less. The ability to use 
resources more efficiently has become essential to police under budgetary 
restrictions. Controlling crime rates and maintaining the law are fundamental goals 
of any government. Thus, better understanding of the determinants of crime helps
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policy makers take the appropriate precautionary measures to keep crime levels at 
bay during an economic downturn.
The work in this thesis aims to explore three key determinants of crime 
within the Becker-Ehrlich framework: the criminal justice system, economic 
conditions and family background. The findings produced here could be helpful to 
policy makers and police forces when conducting policy assessments. They should 
also help to predict the impact of the recent economic recession and the ongoing 
economic difficulties on crime rates.
We summarize the existing literature on the different crime determinants in 
the US and the UK. Then drawing on empirical analysis of the data on crime, the 
economy and other relevant socio-demographic trends broadsconclusions are drawn 
about the likely consequences of an economic downturn.
The empirical analyses are spread over three chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 test 
the effect of deterrence measures and labour market conditions on crime in 
England and Wales as well as the US. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) aims 
to test the effect of the family background on the decision to commit crime. This 
concluding chapter brings together and summarizes the general conclusions of this 
thesis including a review of the specific results obtained within the three analytical 
chapters. It evaluates the methodology and data used in the empirical analysis and 
whether it is up to the task. It also discusses the scope of future research in light of 
the limitations of this study.
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) uses a panel of 42 police-force areas 
over 16 years to test Becker’s economic model of crime on the UK and provides an
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analysis of the effect of deterrence and unemployment on burglary, theft and 
robbery. It adopts the methods used by Reilly and Witt (1996) and replicates them 
on new data for England and Wales for the period 1992 to 2007 at the police-force 
area level. Reilly and Witt’s (1996) support of Becker’s economic model of crime 
is reproduced on the new data. Most of the long-run elasticities of the deterrent 
variables are signed in a manner consistent with Becker’s theory. The growth in 
male unemployment appears to impact both burglary and theft but with lesser 
significance on robbery over the time period considered.
We improve on the previous analysis by introducing dynamics, through the 
lagged dependent variable, and estimating the Becker model in the GMM 
framework. These estimates are-aimed at controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
and potential endogeneity between crime and deterrence. This revealed that clear- 
up rates and own-lagged crime rates are the most significant predictors of all crime 
categories. Higher clear-up rate predicts lower burglary, theft and robbery crimes 
and past levels of crime predict current crime rates. The unemployment effects are 
positive and significant in the system GMM for all crime categories but are less 
consistent through the different specifications. Similar to Carmichael and Ward 
(2001) who find in that unemployment rate is significantly and positively related to 
burglary, theft, fraud and forgery and total crime rates.
Chapter 4 analyses the effects of the labour market opportunities for those 
most likely to commit crime (unskilled males) on arrest rates in the U.S. The use of 
juvenile males is motivated by the fact that most of the crimes are committed by 
the male youths, according to Witte and Witt (2000) “by the age of 18 possibly
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90% of young males have participated in delinquent acts and approximately half 
have been arrested for non-traffic offences by the time they are 30”. Moreover, 
youth unemployment rocketed during the recession from 15% in January 2006 to 
27% in September 2009. Furthermore, the unskilled are the first to be axed in the 
recession job cuts.
This study is one of very few large-scale studies to look at whether local 
juvenile male (age and gender specific) crime rates are responsive to the labour 
market conditions of unskilled men, who are most likely to commit crime. 
Moreover, instead of concentrating only on the unemployment rate, it also 
measures the labour market prospects of potential criminals with the wages of low- 
skilled workers and adds controls for the income per capita and the policing aTthe 
MSA-level.
We estimate the effect of wages and unemployment of the non-college 
educated on arrest rates. We include the lagged dependent variable to capture area 
crime persistence and estimate our model using the GMM technique while 
instrumenting for the endogenous variables with GMM-style instruments. We find 
that labour market conditions play an important role in determining the overall arrest 
rates. We find a positive and significant relationship between unemployment and the 
overall property crime arrest rates as well as each of the individual property crime 
types studied. Estimates of the effect of unemployment rates of low-skilled males 
return the expected sign in the majority of estimations on property crime. As for 
weekly earning, the only clear and significant effect is that on the burglary arrest rates
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which demonstrate an increase in the weekly earning of low-skilled males to 
significantly decrease burglary arrest rates.
Similar to the UK findings of the first analytical chapter, the analysis on the 
US shows the labour market conditions to play a vital role in determining crime. 
More specifically, the results produced in the first empirical chapter on the effects 
of male unemployment on the levels of property crime (Burglary and Robbery) are 
reproduced in the second empirical chapter on the US. We find the male 
unemployment among the less skilled to positively impact the overall property 
arrest rates as well as the arrest rates of each of the individual property crimes in 
the US. Similar to Fougere et al. (2009) who find that increases in youth 
unemployment causes increases in burglaries,si-’thefts and drug offences. While 
Hansen and Machin (2002) find a statistically significant negative relationship 
between the number of offences reported by the police over a two year period for 
property and vehicle crime and the proportion of workers paid beneath the 
minimum before its introduction. Hence, there are more crime reductions in areas 
that initially had more low-wage workers.
The final analytical chapter (Chapter 5) aims to identify the relationship 
between the criminal behaviour of parents and the development of crime of their 
offspring over the period of age between 10 and 25. We set up a logistic model to 
test for the association of parent’s criminal background on children’s contact with 
the police. We find that children whose parents/guardians have at least committed 
one crime have 2.5 times higher odds of having an offence than the children of 
non-criminal parents. The effect of a custodial sentence of the parents increases the
201
odds of the children offending by 3.5 times. We also found that living in a family 
headed by a single parent increased the likelihood of offending and living in a 
family with financial difficulties increased the likelihood even more.
We conclude that property crime is closely related to the level of economic 
activity, mainly unemployment. Moreover, increasing the likelihood of punishment 
deters crime more effectively than increasing the severity o f punishment. 
Furthermore, family background plays a vital role in determining the offending 
habits of their offspring. These findings suggest that in a recession, the increase in 
unemployment translates to an increase in property crime. Budget cuts affecting the 
front line police, thereby decreasing the police presence and clear-up rates, will 
result in an inc#ase in property crime. Also, the family background and 
intergenerational mobility findings propose that an increase in crime rates during 
the current recession will inevitably increase crime rates in the future generations.
6.2 Research Questions Revisited
In this section the specific research questions will be answered based on the 
evidence presented within this thesis. The first set of questions I address is: What 
effect do labour market conditions have on crime? What is the effect of the male 
unemployment levels on crime? What is the effect of wages and unemployment 
rate of non-college educated males on property crime arrest rates in the US? The 
analyses o f the first and second analytical chapters provide support for the findings 
o f the Becker-Ehrlich economic of crime framework. The initial analysis in chapter 
four shows the growth in male unemployment to have a more significant effect on 
crime rates rather than the actual unemployment rate. It appears to impact strongly
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on both burglary and theft and our estimates suggest that a 1 % rise in 
unemployment raises burglary by 0.18% and theft by 0.10%. While the GMM 
specification shows the level of male unemployment to positively affect the 
burglary, theft and robbery crime rates in England and Wales.
The analysis in chapter 4 reveals that the labour market conditions play an 
important role in determining the overall arrest rates. We find a positive and 
significant relationship between unemployment and the overall property crime arrest 
rates as well as each of the individual property crime types studied. As for weekly 
earning, the only clear and significant effect is that on the burglary arrest rates which 
demonstrate an increase in the weekly earning of low-skilled males to significantly 
decrease burglary arrest rates. We find various significant effects%f labour market 
conditions on some types of violent crimes for the US. While on the UK, we find 
significant positive effect of unemployment on property crime but not on robbery.
Our estimates can be compared to the actual changes in crime and 
unemployment in England and Wales between 2009 and 2011. During this period 
the unemployment rate increased from 7.7% to 8.4% (0.7 percentage points 
increase or 9%) while robbery increased by 1% (data sourced from the Crime in 
England and Wales 2011 report). Our preferred GMM estimate of the effect of 
unemployment on robbery in England and Wales produces a coefficient of 0.11. A 
simple multiplication of unemployment increase of 9% by the coefficient of 
unemployment on robbery (0.11) shows a predicted increase of 0.99% of robbery. 
Of course, this does not take into account the changes in the other explanatory
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variables. However, it indicates that our results are plausible when related to the 
actual magnitudes of recent changes.
The second main question that this thesis aims to answer is whether the 
criminal justice system helps in deterring crime. The analysis in chapter 3 provides 
general support to deterrence theory proposed in Becker’s economic model of 
crime. The majority of the long-run elasticities of the deterrent variables are signed 
in a manner consistent with Becker’s theory.
The first sub-question regarding the effect of deterrence on crime is 
question Q.2.a: How effective are deterrence measures in reducing crime? There is 
evidence that the clear-up rate and average custodial length play an important role 
in determining the crime rate in England and Wales.
This second sub-question on the effect of deterrence on crime is question 
Q.2.b: Which dimension of the threat of punishment has a greater deterrent effect, 
likelihood or severity? The analysis in the GMM specification in Chapter 3, reveals 
that the likelihood, as measured by the clear-up rate, significant predictor of crime 
rates across the three categories and suggests that the majority of criminals in our 
sample have a preference for risk. Higher clear-up rate predicts lower burglary, 
theft and robbery crime rates. No significant effects are found for sentence length.
The third main question that this thesis aims to answer is whether family 
background helps to explain the propensity to engage in criminal activity. The 
analysis in the third empirical chapter shows that family background generally and 
parental criminal involvement specifically does play a very important role in the 
crime decision making of the individuals.
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The first sub-question of the analysis in chapter five is Q.3.a: Are children 
with offending parents/guardians more likely to offend themselves compared to 
children with non-offending parents/guardians? Given the modelling approach 
applied to the data, the statistical analyses imply that family background do 
influence one’s likeliness to commit crime. More specifically, children whose 
parents have offended at least once are 2.5 times as likely to commit an offence 
themselves compared to children of non-criminal parents.
The second sub-question that chapter five answers is question Q.3.b: How 
much more likely are children to offend if their parents/guardians have been sent to 
prison compared to children with non-offending parents/guardians? The analysis of 
the third empirical chapter show a custodial or prison sentence o f the parents to  ^
increase the odds of the children offending by 3.5 times.
6.3. Limitations and Future Research
This thesis has sought to answer a number of questions and overall to 
respond to two main issues, (i) can the present data be used for sound econometric 
modelling? (ii) can the econometric analysis answer to our research questions? 
Both of these points has been responded to rather vigorously with the three separate 
models being well specified and largely adhering to the priori expectations and 
satisfying the necessary statistical significance. However, the empirical analysis 
has faced some limitations.
Despite the innovations in Chapter 3 compared to Reilly and Witt (1996), it 
still falls short in two respects. First, it is not ideal to use sentencing length as the
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only measure of severity of punishment. This measure of severity might not be 
adequately specified, since no controls are provided for the likelihood of a 
convicted offender being imprisoned. Second, although our analysis provided some 
support for the Becker model, it is clear that further and deeper understanding of 
these relationships may be facilitated by investigations at the micro-level. 
According to Weisburd et al. (2009) micro-level work has consistently identified 
crime concentration and persistence at specific places. These micro-level findings 
provide evidence of significant intra-neighbourhood variance in crime that is lost 
when neighbourhoods are examined as homogenous units. This also applies to our 
analysis on the US at the MSA-level. We have tried to provide unbiased analysis by 
using a well refined nationally representative dataMjet and by building a well 
specified model. However, our study is faced with a major limitation represented 
by the usage of the police per capita data aggregated at state-level.
We rely on self-reported survey data to measure the intergenerational 
association of criminality in chapter 5. The self-report method for measuring crime 
and delinquency, has developed substantially since its introduction a half century 
ago, and it now has acceptable, although far from perfect, reliability and validity 
(Miller and Hollist 2007).
In terms of understanding the mechanisms that lie behind the 
intergenerational criminal association our data is clearly limited. Despite using all 
the available control variables a portion of the parent -  child relationship is still left 
unaccounted for. To uncover the causality in these relationships we would need 
data capable of more sophisticated analysis such as
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(i) a sample of twins, (ii) an adoptee sample, and (iii) the timing of the father’s 
crime.
These outstanding issues and shortcomings we hope will inspire further 
research in this area. In considering future research, scholars should take careful 
note of how the recent wave of scholarship has made important progress in 
resolving many substantial problems. Important advances can be made by 
continued use of better data and econometric techniques. More specifically, future 
research should focus on two main issues: (i) Although our analysis on England 
and Wales provided some support for the Becker model, and also provided an 
important insight into other socio-economic factors influencing criminal activity, 
the aggregate-level approach adopted here, while informative, can only serve to 
complement an individual-level approach ideally using administrative data, (ii) 
Finally, future research should improve on the current work by analysing the 
effects of a broader range of labour market measures, and finding new ways 
through natural experiments and other identification strategies to better identify the 
underlying relationship between labour market conditions and crime.
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App A: UCR Index I Crimes Definitions
Crime Definition
Burglary: The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a
theft. B&E Motor vehicle is NOT a burglary; it is a Larceny from
MV.
Motor The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. For UCR
Vehicle purposes, the definition o f a vehicle is a self-propelled vehicle that
Theft: runs on land surface and not on rails. Do Not include farm
equipment, bulldozers, airplanes, construction equipment, or motor 
boats. Unauthorized use of MV is NOT to be categorized as a MV 
theft. It should be a fraud.
Larceny- The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of
Theft: property from the possession or constructive possession o f another.
Types of Larcenies:
Larceny by Pocket-picking:
The theft of articles from a person by stealth where the 
victim usually does not become immediately aware of the theft. 
Larceny by Purse-snatching:
The grabbing or snatching of a purse, handbag, etc., from the 
custody of an individual.
Larceny by Shoplifting:
The theft by a person (other than an employee) of goods or 
merchandise exposed for sale.
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Larceny From Motor Vehicle:
The theft or articles from a motor vehicle, whether locked or 
unlocked.
Larceny of Motor Vehicle Parts:
The theft of any part or accessory attached to the interior or 
exterior of a motor vehicle in a manner which would make the part 
an attachment to the vehicle or necessary for the operation of the 
vehicle. Includes: motors, radios, hubcaps/wheel covers, license 
plates, mirrors, gasoline, etc.
Larceny o f Bicycle:
The unlawful taking of any bicycle, tandem bicycle, 
unicycle, etc.
Larceny From Building:
A theft from within ^ a building which is open to the general 
public and where the offender has legal access.
Larceny From a Coin-Operated Machine:
A theft from a device or machine which is operated or 
activated by the use of a coin.
Larceny-Other:
All thefts which do not fit the definition of the specific 
categories of larceny.
Arson: Any wilful or malicious burning or attempt to bum, with or without
intent to defraud, a dwelling house, public building, motor vehicle or 
aircraft, personal property of another, etc.
Types of Arson:
Structural:
Arson-Single occupancy dwelling:
A residence should be considered Single Occupancy if it:
Is a private dwelling, duplex, townhouse, etc. each occupied
2 0 9
by a single family group;
Has total sleeping accommodations for no more than 20
people;
Has no more than two rooms per unit rented to outsiders 
Arson-Other Residential:
Residential property not meeting the above criteria 
Mobile:
Arson-Mobile:
"Motor Vehicles" as described in the UCR definition. 
Arson-Other Mobile:
Items that do not fall into the "Motor Vehicle" definition, ex: 
trains, boats, airplanes.
Other:
Arson-Other:
Arsons of all property not classified as structural or mobile. To 
include, crops, timber, fences, signs, and merchandise stored outside 
structures.
Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care,
custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force 
or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.
Types of Robberies:
Robbery-F irearm:
Any firearm is used as a weapon or employed as a means of force to 
threaten the victim or put the victim in fear.
Robbery-Knife or cutting instrument:
A knife, broken bottle, razor, ice pick, or other cutting or stabbing 
instrument is employed as a weapon or as a means of force to 
threaten the victim or put the victim in fear.
Robbery-Other dangerous weapon:
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A club, acid, explosive, brass knuckles or other dangerous weapon is 
employed or its use is threatened.
Robbery-Strong Arm (hands, feet, fists):
Includes muggings and similar offences where no weapon is used, 
but strong-arm tactics are employed or their use is threatened to 
deprive the victim of possessions.
Aggravated An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of
Assault: inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault
usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to 
produce death or great bodily harm. In other words, all assaults by 
one person upon another with the intent to kill, maim, or inflict 
severe bodily injury with use of a dangerous weapon are classified 
under one of the aggravated assault categories. It is not necessary 
that injury result from an aggravated assault when a gun, knife, or 
other weapon is used which could and probably would result in 
serious personal injury if the crime were successfully completed. 
Types of Aggravated Assaults:
Assault-Firearm:
All assaults wherein a firearm of any type is used or its use is 
threatened. Includes assaults with revolvers, automatic pistols, 
shotguns, zip guns, rifles, etc.
Assault-Knife or Cutting Instrument:
Assaults wherein weapons such as knives, razors, hatchets, 
axes, cleavers, scissors, glass, broken bottles, ice picks, etc., are used 
as cutting or stabbing objects or their use is threatened.
Assault-Other Dangerous Weapon:
Assaults resulting from the use or threatened use of any 
object as a weapon which does or could result in serious injury. 
Could include: clubs, bricks, tire irons, bottles, explosives, acid.
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poison, scalding water, etc.
Assault-Hands, Fists, Feet-Aggravated Injury:
Attacks by use of personal weapons such as hands, feet, fists, 
etc., which result in aggravated or serious injury.
Murder: Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter:
The wilful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by another. 
Attempted Murder should be categorized as an aggravated assault.
Rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
Statutory rape and other sex offences are not to be counted as Rapes. 
Statutory Rape is defined as the carnal knowledge or the attempted 
carnal knowledge of a female with no force used and the female 
victim is undecthe legal age of consent. If the female victim is under 
the legal age and is forced against her will to engage in sexual 
intercourse, the incident would be classified as a rape. Attempts to 
Rape are scored as Rapes.
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App B: UGR Data Quality Control
Stratifying into Similar Agencies
In detecting outliers, the algorithms compare a given agency’s report to 
those of similar agencies. The choice of similar agencies is made by a stratum to 
which the agency belongs. Stratification is therefore a scheme of partitioning 
agencies into similar agencies.
In developing stratification, it was decided that a scheme should incorporate 
the following four factors:
• The jurisdictional size (i.e., the agency’s population size).
• The geographic area where an agency is located (i.e., geographic 
regions/U.S.).
• The degree of urbanization (i.e., in Metropolitan Statistical Areas or not).
• The agency type (i.e., sheriffs office vs. police department).
These four variables have been historically used as a basis of UCR crime 
estimation and are considered to represent the minimum set of requirements. The 
new scheme, differing only by geographical designation (state vs. region/U.S.), is 
based on stable and available factors that do not require constant updates or 
assessment of their applicability.
The stratification scheme is based on data external to the UCR Program but 
not based on agencies’ reported crime data. If reported crime or arrest data were 
used as one of the factors in stratification, the resulting stratification would 
partially be reduced to a classification through self-declaration. By design, each 
stratum contains an adequate number of agencies. In this way, norms used in 
outlier detections will have sufficient meaning and stability, and all strata have 
large enough numbers of reports to define outliers.
'*°This section is based on the UCR report “Methods o f  Data Quality Control: For Uniform Crime Reporting Programs” by 
Akiyama and Propheter (2005) for the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau o f  Investigation.
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The Review o f Annual Arrest Data
In principle, arrest data should be submitted monthly. However, there are 
exceptions to this principle. A limited number of agencies report arrest data in a 
nonstandard manner. For example, an agency may submit only an annual arrest 
total. The review of annual arrest data relates to both types of reports.
Review of arrest data is conducted for annual arrest totals. At the end of the 
reporting year, arrest data from agencies reporting via NIBRS are converted to 
Summary statistics. In the UCR Summary system, the Age, Sex, Race, and Ethnic 
Origin of Persons Arrested (ASR) are collected for adults and juveniles, known as 
Adult ASR and Juvenile ASR. The Adult ASR form contains 27 crime categories 
for Part I and Part II crimes (26 crime categories if the drunkenness category is not 
a crime for the state). The Juvenile ASR form contains the maximum of 29 crime 
categories (or 28 if drunkenness is not a crime for the state).
The review of annual arrest data conducted for individual crime 
categories. To be specific, the annual arrest data review for a given crime category 
is applied to agencies, except those in Stratum 33 (zero-population agencies), that 
satisfy the following conditions:
• Agencies submitted 12 monthly arrest reports for the crime category (or 
submitted arrest data on a nonstandard basis but covered the total year for the crime 
category, e.g., one annual report that included the combined arrest data for the 
year).
• Agencies submitted both Adult and Juvenile ASR forms for the crime 
category under review.
• Agencies’ arrest reports included age and sex breakdowns for the crime 
category under consideration.
Reporting of the arrestee race is not required for the annual review. Also, it 
is not required that drug abuse violations and gambling contain arrest data 
breakdowns for subcategories. Based on the stratification introduced earlier, 
agencies’ arrest totals for a given crime category are compared with similar 
agencies within the stratum. The cross-sectional outlier test is applied as before. 
The agencies’ arrest rates per 100,000 inhabitants are divided by the median arrest
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rate of the stratum, and the resulting quotients are compared in terms o f their ranks 
as was done for the crime statistics. The longitudinal outlier test is applied to the 
volumes of arrests reported for the consecutive years (this year against the 
preceding year). The method of comparison is the same as in the crime 
reasonableness review. Finally, for Parts I and II crimes, the distributional outlier 
detection is applied. Outlier tests can be expanded to additional situations relating 
to NIBRS data.
Data Reviews fo r  Large Agencies
Each of the three components of outlier detection is based on a single 
variable. The cross-sectional test is based on the agency’s crime rate divided by 
the median crime rate.
The longitudinal test is based on the z-value computed from the agency’s 
numbers of crimes for consecutive years. The proportionality test is based on the 
modified chi-square measure. Irrespective of the power of these outlier detection 
algorithms, measuring the total complexity in the fluctuations o f data is beyond a 
mechanical process (represented by outlier detection algorithms).
A small number of large agencies (jurisdictional populations over 50,000 
regardless of NIBRS or summary reporting) represent a large portion o f the 
Nation’s crimes. Therefore, applying more extensive methods of data quality 
control to large agencies is expected to enhance the data quality by:
• Extending the scope of applications for algorithms (e.g., increasing the 
check points for the distributional outlier test and extending the distributional test 
to a variety of situations),
• Increasing the categories of quality control models beyond the three 
components (cross-sectional, longitudinal, and distributional),
• Increasing the level of communications with large agencies,
• Acquiring more refined information for individual agencies,
• Securing monthly reports from large agencies to avoid missing data, etc.
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As mentioned earlier, the distributional (proportional) outlier test can be 
used for multiple purposes. It can be used to check the distributions of data such 
as:
• Simple assaults and aggravated assaults.
• Violent crimes and property crimes.
• Exceptional clearances and clearances by arrest.
• Crimes completed and attempted.
• Recovered and unrecovered vehicles.
• The proportion of multiple vs. single-offence incidents.
• Monthly variations of the number of crimes.
• The proportion of crimes, clearances, and arrests for a given crime 
category.
• The distribution of offence locations.
• The distribution of the monetary losses in property crimes.
• The distribution of weapons used.
• The distribution of property losses.
• The distribution of victims by age, sex, and race.
• The distribution of injury types.
• The proportion of offenders, victims, and arrestees.
• The distribution of the victim-to-offender relationships.
The quality control models can be expanded to areas not covered by the 
three components of outlier tests. For example, the test can be applied to the time 
lapse patterns from theft to recovery and from crime incident to clearance, the 
average monetary losses in property crime, time series for crimes and arrests, and 
graphic displays of data.
Regular communications with large agencies and accumulation of 
information relating to each agency (such as its record-keeping system and special 
conditions prevailing within the agency) would refine the quality control process 
for large agencies. The expanded data quality control for large agencies has to be 
developed and applied with constant human involvement.
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App D: Labour Market and Arrests for the US: full sample estimates
Table D.l
US Total Arrests for Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables At At - At
At-] — — 0.279***
01075)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0T61** 0.038 -0.09*
non-college educated males (&058) (0.049) (0.059)
Log MSA Unemployment rate (h078*** 0.009 Od%8**
o f non-college educated males (0.018) (0.08) (0.016)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 696.33***
(0.000)
Sargan test (88dof) -------- -------- 117.11
(&2K0
——  . .  — . -------- 9.70
: (0.999)
Instruments (122) ——— -------- At-2^-3
AR(1) serial correlation --- -------- -6.70**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation - — -------- I j #
(0.594)
R-squared 0.098 0.159 —
Area fixed effects No Yes —
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3192 3192 2988
Notes: Standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and presented 
in parentheses. The p-value of the Wald test o f a joint significance of all explanatory variables 
is reported. Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, p-value 
is reported. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests o f first-order and second-order serial correlation, 
asymptotically N(0,1), p-value is reported. GMM results are one-step estimates, (b, C S )These 
variables are instrumented by lagged own values.** Significant at the 5% level ; * Significant at 
the 10% level. Diff-sargan test (null H = exogenous).
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T able D .2
ÜS Total Property Arrests for Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
Fixed
Effects
Independent variables At At At
At-i --- --- 0.233***
(0.063)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.170*** 0.132** -0.016
non-college educated males (0.063) (0.053) (0.07)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.085*** 0.026** 0.035**
o f non-college educated males (0.020) (0.015) (0.017)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 1003.90***
(0.000)
Sargan test (88) --- --- 102.70
(0.135)
Dijf-Sar --- --- 15.05
(0.989)
Instruments (122) —— —— At-2^-3
AR(1) serial correlation --- --- -6.71**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- 1.54
(0.124)
R-squared 0.174 0.293 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes ---
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3192 3192 2988
*See notes of Table D .l
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Table D .3
US Burglary Arrests fo r Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026
Fixed
Effects GMM:6]6
Independent variables At At At
At-i -- --- 0:283*** -  
(0.05)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.591***
(0.066)
0.095
(0.056)
-0.231***
(0.083)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
0.076***
(0.020)
0.030**
(0.016)
0.025*
(0.017)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 1967.32**
(0.000)
Sargan test( 88) --- --- 96.83
(0.244)
--- --- 16.87
(0.974)
Instruments (122)
A t- 2 ^ - 3
Pt-1^-2
AR(1) serial correlation -5.59**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- 0.69
(0.488)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.301
No
Yes
3191
0.471
Yes
Yes
3191
Yes
2987
*See notes of Table D .l
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Table D .4
US Auto Theft Arrests for Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026
Fixed
Effects O m 4:6]6
Independent variables A t A t A t
At-j ——— 0443 * * *
(0.056)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.065 0.109 -0.015
non-college educated males (0.086) (0.071) (0.063)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.081*** 0.045*** 0.024*
o f non-college educated males (0.027) (0.019) (0.015)
Waldjoint sig o f exp vars 1721.51***
(0.000)
Sargan test (88) --- --- 93.51
(0.324)
Diff-Sar --- --- 11.08
(0.999)
At-2^-10
Instruments (122) --- --- P t- 1 ^ - 3
AR(1) serial correlation --- --- -7.71**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation ——— —--: 0.15
(0.880)
R-squared 0.142 0.248 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes ---
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3177 3177 2970
*See notes of Table D.l
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Table D.5
US Larceny Theft Arrests fo r  Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026
Fixed
Effects GMML616
Independent variables A t A t A t
At-i --- ——— 0.327***
(0.059)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.181*** 0.105* -0.051
non-college educated males (0.070) (0.06) (0.065)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.044** 0.023* 0.002
o f non-college educated males (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 1366.31**
(0.000)
Sargan test (214) --- --- 136.67
(0.156)
Diff-Sar --- --- 33.88
(0.156)
Instruments (122) —— ——— At-2^-10
AR(1) serial correlation --- --- -4.23**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- -— 2.26
(0.24)
R-squared 0.135 0.293 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes ---
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3192 3192 2988
*See notes of Table D .l
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T able D .6
US Total Violent Arrests fo r Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026 Fixed Effects GMM:6]6
Independent variables At At At
At-i --- ——— 0.184**
(0.053)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.167*** -0.033 -0.154**
non-college educated males (0.061) (0.056) (0.072)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.071*** -0.005 0.026*
o f non-college educated males (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 366.01***
(0.000)
Sargan test (88) --- --- 109.23
(0.062)
Diff-Sar --- --- 5.84
(1.000)
Instruments(157) --- --- At-2 -^10
AR(1) serial correlation --- --- -7.58***
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- 2.06
(0.040)
R-squared 0.060 0.961 —
Area fixed effects No Yes —
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3192 3192 2988
*See notes of Table D .l
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Table D .7
US Robbery Arrests fo r Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026 Fixed Effects GMM:6]6
Independent variables A t A t A t
A t-i --- --- 0.210***
(0.045)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f  
non-college educated males
-0.105
(0.086)
-0.009
(0.071)
-0.105*
(0.058)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 
o f non-college educated males
-0.012
(0.026)
0.014
(0.019)
0.001
(0.016)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 1000.62**
(0.000)
Sargan test (88) --- --- 94.62
(0.296)
Diff-Sar --- --- 13.79
(0.995)
Instruments (122)
At-2^-10
P t- 1 ^ - 3
AR(1) serial correlation -6.48**
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- --- -0.43
(0.3665)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.151
No
Yes
3153
0.159
Yes
Yes
3153
Yes
2932
*See notes of Table D .l
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Table D .8
USAgg. Assault Arrests fo r Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026 Fixed Effects 7MM-6I6
Independent variables A t A t A t
At-i ■--- --- 0.349***
(0.068)
Log MSA weekly earnings o f -0.314*** -0.101 -0.140*
non-college educated males (0.079) (0.065) (0.07)
Log MSA Unemployment rate 0.089*** 0.032* 0.041**
o f non-college educated males (0.024) (0.018) (0.019)
Wald joint sig o f exp vars 686.46***
(0.000)
Sargan test (88) --- -------- 92.06
(0.363)
Diff-Sar --- -------- 18.64
(0.947)
Instruments (122) -------- At-2^-10
AR(1) serial correlation -------- -7.47***
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation -------- -------- -0.93
(0.353)
R-squared 0.076 0.166 ---
Area fixed effects No Yes ---
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3184 3184 2975
*See notes of Table D .l
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Table D .9
US Murder Arrests for Juvenile Males (1964-2003)
026
Fixed
Effects GMM-616
Independent variables A t A t A t
At-i --- 0.200***
(0.068)
weekly earnings o f  non-college 
educated males
-0.677***
(0.106)
-0.092
(0.107)
-0.412**
(0.07)
Unemployment rate o f  non-college 
educated males
0.081***
(0.031)
-0.009
(0.028)
0.058**
(0.019)
Wald joint sig o f  exp vars 417.84***
(0.000)
Sargan test (88) --- 59.85
(0.991)
Diff-Sar --- --- 19.27
(0.934)
Instruments (122) --- — At-2^-W
AR(1) serial correlation -7.30***
(0.000)
AR(2) serial correlation --- 1.00
(0.318.)
R-squared 
Area fixed effects 
Time effects 
Observations
0.105
No
Yes
2522
0.180
Yes
Yes
2522
Yes
2129
*See notes of Table D .l
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